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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the ongoing debate on the conduct of monetary and fiscal
policies near the lower bound on the policy rate.
Chapter 1 studies optimal monetary policy in a model with portfolio adjustment
costs. Central bank purchases of long-term debt (quantitative easing; ‘QE’) influence
the average portfolio return and hence aggregate demand and inflation. It is optimal
to adopt QE rapidly with large scale asset purchases triggered when the policy
rate hits the lower bound, consistent with observed policy responses to the Global
Financial Crisis. Optimal exit is gradual.
Chapter 2 examines the effects of money-financed fiscal transfers at the lower bound.
It is assumed that money may earn interest so that money-financed transfers at
the lower bound are feasible, while the short-term policy rate is used to stabilize
the economy in normal times. A simple financial friction generates a wealth effect
on household spending from government liabilities. This encourages households to
spend rather than save a transfer from the government. While temporary money-
financed transfers to households can stimulate spending and inflation at the lower
bound, similar effects could be achieved by bond-financed tax cuts.
Chapter 3 explores optimal monetary policy in a model with long-term government
debt and ‘active’ fiscal policy. This means that stabilization of government debt is a
binding constraint on monetary policy. Away from the lower bound, policy cannot
fully offset the effects of shocks to the natural rate of interest, reducing welfare. At
the lower bound, recessionary shocks increase debt and generate the anticipation
that inflation will be higher in future, to stabilize the real value of debt. This
mechanism mitigates the effects of recessionary shocks. For sufficiently long debt
duration, improved performance at the lower bound may outweigh welfare losses in
normal times.
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Introduction
The interaction of monetary and fiscal policy has been the subject of extensive study
for many years. The wide range of important questions in this area has generated
several strands of literature. For example, Blinder (1982) examines the appropriate
level of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies using Tinbergen-Theil
analysis, large scale macroeconomic models and game-theoretic approaches.
Indeed, analysis of these questions predates modern economics, in part because
many central banks were formed to assist in the financing of the central government
(for example, in France, Spain and the United Kingdom). For the United Kingdom,
Ricardo (1824) discusses the incentives for the government to use monetary policy
for fiscal purposes.
However, the recent experience with interest rates at the zero lower bound has
raised new questions.
Shortly after the Global Financial Crisis in 2007–8, short-term policy rates in
the United States and United Kingdom reached their lower bounds. Policymakers
embarked on large scale purchases of assets (primarily government debt) financed by
the creation of central bank reserves. This unconventional policy – commonly known
as quantitative easing (QE) – was introduced in a bid to stimulate the economy, when
conventional instruments were unavailable. Such policy measures were introduced
without a clear understanding of some key questions. For example, how should QE
be optimally used alongside the short-term policy rate? Is there scope for QE to
become part of the conventional monetary policy toolkit?
Unconventional monetary policies were accompanied by discretionary fiscal stim-
ulus in a number of countries. However, many of these programs were reversed, at
least in part because of concerns about rapidly rising government debt. How should
monetary policy be optimally conducted if the government is unwilling or unable
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to stabilize the debt stock using taxes and spending? How should monetary policy
respond to a risk of such a situation arising?
While the monetary and fiscal responses to the financial crisis were bold and
unprecedented, some economists and commentators have proposed even more radical
policy options. In particular, some have argued that financing government spending
increases, tax cuts or direct monetary transfers to households by printing money
would boost spending when in an economy trapped at the zero bound. Others argued
that such policies risked creating runaway inflation. What are the possible effects
of such ‘monetary financing’ policies in a standard macroeconomic framework?
This thesis addresses these questions.
Chapter 1 looks at the optimal use of quantitative easing (‘QE’): the purchase
of long-term government bonds by the central bank, financed by the creation of
reserves. It adds to the literature by studying the optimal deployment of QE in
a model containing a ‘portfolio balance channel’. This is the mechanism through
which most monetary policymakers believe that QE operates.
Portfolio rebalancing effects arise from the assumption that the relative demand
for assets in an investor’s portfolio will depend on their relative returns. The mech-
anism that captures this effect in the model follows the ideas of James Tobin and
William Brainard in the 1950s and 1960s. Different assets are imperfect substitutes
because they have individual non-pecuniary properties that investors value. In the
model, investors face a particular type of portfolio adjustment costs that give rise
to asset demand functions similar to those studied by Tobin and Brainard.
The presence of a portfolio balance effect creates the potential for a policymaker
to influence relative asset prices by altering the relative supplies of assets available to
investors. In particular, QE reduces the available supply of long-term government
bonds, which increases their price and hence reduces long-term interest rates. A
reduction in long-term interest rates can be used to stimulate spending and hence
inflation when the short-term interest rate is stuck at its lower bound.
The model is calibrated to match evidence on the effects of QE in the United
States. I use the model to study how QE should be optimally used alongside the
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short-term policy rate when both instruments may be constrained. The short-term
policy rate is constrained by an effective lower bound (ELB). The quantity of long-
term government debt purchased by the central bank cannot be negative or exceed
a pre-specified upper bound. This upper bound can be interpreted as a proxy for
central bank solvency concerns highlighted by some monetary policymakers.
The analysis delivers three main results. First, QE is only adopted when the
economy hits the zero bound and in such cases asset purchases are often large and
occur rapidly. Second, exit from QE is gradual. Third, QE policy generally starts
to tighten before the policy rate rises from the ELB.
The first two results are consistent with both observed QE policies and com-
munications about exit plans by policymakers in the United Kingdom and United
States. But the third result is not consistent with the observed behavior of both
the FOMC and the MPC: ‘liftoff’ from the zero bound has preceded a QE unwind.
I demonstrate that the third result could be reconciled with actual policy behavior
by accounting for the fact that total total government debt was rising during the
period of large scale asset purchases, a factor that is abstracted from in the simple
model.
Chapter 2 studies fiscal policy actions financed by the creation of money. Vari-
ants of this type of policy have been advocated in light of the slow recovery from
the Global Financial Crisis in many economies, despite the deployment of unconven-
tional policies, such as QE considered in Chapter 1. The use of monetary financing
as a policy tool is regarded as even more unconventional or extreme than QE, given
historical experiences of high inflation (or even hyperinflation) when governments
have relied on money creation to finance their deficits.
I use a small sticky price model to examine the effects of two types of money-
financed fiscal policies: using money creation to finance government spending and
using money creation to finance direct transfers to households. The latter has some
similarities to Milton Friedman’s famous ‘helicopter drop’ experiment.
With respect to money-financed government spending increases, I verify exist-
ing results regarding their apparently powerful effects. Specifically, money-financed
government spending has large effects on output and inflation because this policy
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amounts to adopting a policy rule for the short-term nominal interest rate that re-
sponds very weakly to inflation. This implies that monetary policy accommodates
the inflationary effects of a government spending increase.
I contribute to the literature by extending existing results to demonstrate that
the adoption of a money-financing rule may generate very poor macroeconomic
outcomes in response to other economic shocks, such as an unanticipated change in
private sector demand.
These results show that the effects of adopting a monetary financing rule stem
from the implications of that rule for the behavior of the short-term nominal interest
rate, rather than a special role for money.
The subsequent analysis focuses on money-financed transfers to households, re-
lying on two model features. First, that money may earn a strictly positive rate of
return. Second, a simple financial friction implies that households regard govern-
ment liabilities as net wealth.
The fact that money earns interest allows control of the stock of money inde-
pendently of the short-term bond rate. So monetary transfers can be used without
altering the monetary policy response to shocks away from the zero bound. The
financial friction creates a special role for money (and other government liabilit-
ies). Importantly, it introduces an incentive to spend, rather than save, a monetary
transfer from the government.
Simulations of money-financed transfers to households demonstrate that they
can increase spending and inflation when the short-term nominal interest rate is
temporarily stuck at the lower bound. Moreover, such transfers increase household
wealth and hence spending and inflation, even if they are implemented in the form
of a temporary increase in the stock of money.
However, the results also suggest three reasons to be cautious about the use of
money-financed transfers to stimulate spending and inflation. First, the scale of the
monetary transfers required to deliver a meaningful increase in aggregate demand
and inflation is likely to be extremely large. Second, the frictions in the model
suggest that equivalent effects could be achieved by an increase in conventional
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government debt, without requiring interest-bearing money. Finally, robustness
analysis shows that the stimulative effect is likely to be sensitive to both the precise
nature of the frictions giving rise to a meaningful role for money and the policy rule
used to set the short-term bond rate.
While Chapters 1 and 2 examine alternative monetary and fiscal policy options
close to the zero bound, they share a common assumption about the broad con-
figuration of monetary and fiscal policies. In particular, fiscal policy operates in a
so-called ‘passive’ fashion: taxes and/or spending are adjusted to ensure that the
real government debt stock is stabilized for any path of prices. This behavior means
that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is irrelevant for the monetary
policymaker.
Chapter 3 studies the opposite case: fiscal policy is ‘active’ and monetary policy
decisions must ensure that the real value of (nominal) government debt is stabilized.
This policy configuration is sometimes called ‘fiscal dominance’.
I use a textbook New Keynesian model extended to include long-term nominal
government debt. While the presence of this debt has no implications for optimal
monetary policy under the textbook assumption of passive fiscal policy, it plays an
important role when fiscal policy is active.
I first ignore the lower bound on the short-term interest rate and demonstrate
three key results.
First, the duration of government debt plays a key role in determining the equi-
librium behavior of output and inflation and underpins the extent of the so-called
‘debt stabilization bias’.
Second, the monetary policymaker cannot fully offset disturbances to the natural
rate of interest under active fiscal policy, giving rise to costly fluctuations in output
and inflation (that are fully offset when fiscal policy is passive).
Third, welfare losses generated by shocks that generate a trade-off between sta-
bilizing the output gap and inflation may be smaller under active fiscal policy than
passive fiscal policy. A cost-push shock that reduces inflation today increases the
real value of outstanding nominal government debt. Stabilizing the real debt stock
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requires future policymakers to deliver higher inflation. Higher inflation expecta-
tions cushion the impact of the cost-push shock on current inflation.
These results also provide intuition for the behavior of the model in the presence
of a lower bound on the short-term interest rate. My key result is that when the
lower bound is accounted for, welfare losses may be smaller when fiscal policy is
active than for the textbook model with passive fiscal policy.
This result is driven by the balance between two effects. Away from the zero
bound, welfare losses are larger under active fiscal policy, since shocks to the natural
rate of interest cannot be fully stabilized. But when the short-term interest rate is
constrained by the lower bound, the combination of active fiscal policy and long-
duration debt reduces welfare losses. Deflationary shocks that drive the policy rate
to the lower bound raise the real value of government debt. This requires future
policymakers to generate higher inflation to stabilize the debt stock, thus increasing
inflation expectations. Higher inflation expectations at the lower bound reduce the
real interest rate, stimulating spending and mitigating the recessionary effects of the
deflationary shock. If the duration of government debt is long enough, the reduction
in welfare losses at the zero bound outweighs the higher welfare losses from poorer
performance away from the zero bound.
Finally, I consider the effects of a risk that fiscal policy behavior switches from
passive to active during a debt reduction program. These experiments are motivated
by recent debates over fiscal sustainability and so-called austerity programs in many
countries. While the debt reduction program has no implications for the output gap
or inflation under passive fiscal policy, even a small risk that fiscal policy becomes
active can generate sizable effects. In the event that fiscal policy does become active
in the future, delivering the debt reduction program will require higher inflation. The
risk of higher future inflation increases expected longer-term inflation expectations
and the optimal time consistent policy is to allow inflation to rise in the near term.
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Chapter 1
Optimal quantitative easing
Abstract
I study optimal monetary policy in a simple New Keynesian model with
portfolio adjustment costs. Purchases of long-term debt by the central bank
(quantitative easing; ‘QE’) alter the average portfolio return and hence influ-
ence aggregate demand and inflation. The central bank chooses the short-term
policy rate and QE to minimize a welfare-based loss function under discretion.
Adoption of QE is rapid, with large scale asset purchases triggered when the
policy rate hits the zero bound, consistent with observed policy responses to
the Global Financial Crisis. Optimal exit is gradual. Despite the presence of
portfolio adjustment costs, a policy of ‘permanent QE’ in which the central
bank holds a constant stock of long-term bonds does not improve welfare.
1.1 Introduction
Central bank purchases of long-term government debt – often called quantitative
easing (QE) – have been deployed as a monetary policy tool since the depth of the
Great Recession, when short-term policy rates became constrained at their effective
lower bounds. The widespread use of an unconventional monetary policy instru-
ment has spawned much research. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there has been
relatively little investigation of the optimal conduct of monetary policy when QE
is a policy instrument, though recent contributions include Cui and Sterk (2018),
Darracq Parie`s and Ku¨hl (2016), Harrison (2012), Reis (2017) and Woodford (2016).
In this chapter I study the optimal use of QE alongside the short-term policy rate
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using a model that captures a ‘portfolio balance’ mechanism. This is the predomin-
ant channel through which most monetary policymakers believe that QE affects the
economy. I extend the textbook New Keynesian model (Gal´ı, 2008; Woodford, 2003)
to include a bond market friction, following Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2004)
and Harrison (2012). The representative household faces portfolio adjustment costs
when allocating its assets between short-term and long-term bonds.
Portfolio adjustment costs create a wedge between returns on short-term and
long-term bonds that can be influenced by changes in the relative supplies of assets,
thus providing a role for QE as a policy instrument. In addition to the direct (‘stock’)
effects of asset purchases on relative bond yields, the adjustment cost specification
also captures ‘flow effects’ of QE purchases (the effects on changes in the stocks
of long-term and short-term bonds held by households). The adjustment costs are
calibrated to match estimates of the stock and flow effects of QE on US long-term
bond yields by D’Amico and King (2013).
The monetary policymaker acts under discretion to minimize a loss function de-
rived from a quadratic approximation to the welfare of the representative household.
In addition to the standard New Keynesian terms in inflation and the output gap,
the loss function includes terms in the quantitative easing instrument. These arise
because the portfolio adjustment costs through which QE has traction are welfare
reducing.
The model is solved using projection methods, accounting for the non-linearities
generated by the zero bound on the short-term interest rate and the possibility
that bounds may also apply to the QE instrument (for example, the central bank’s
holdings of long-term debt must be non-negative).
I study entry into and exit from a ‘QE regime’, defined as a period during which
the central bank holds a positive stock of long-term bonds on its balance sheet.
I find that entry into QE regimes can be rapid, with large scale asset purchases
commencing as soon as the short-term policy rate hits the zero bound. Exit from
QE is slower in order to mitigate the costs of changes in the portfolio mix.
Relative to the case in which the only policy instrument is the short-term interest
rate, use of QE reduces the welfare costs of fluctuations by around 50%. In this
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‘active QE’ case, the central bank holds a positive stock of long-term bonds on
average. On average, the long-term interest rate is below the short-term rate.
These observations suggest that a policy of ‘permanent QE’ in which the central
bank is instructed to hold a constant stock of long-term bonds on its balance sheet
may mitigate the effects of the zero bound on the short-term interest rate, by in-
creasing the average short-term interest rate. However, I show that this is not the
case.
While permanent QE does succeed in ‘twisting’ the term structure on average
(the long-term rate falls and the short-term policy rate rises), this has little effect on
average inflation expectations. Raising average inflation expectations requires agents
to expect that the central bank will cushion the effects of future deflationary shocks
by purchasing assets if those shocks are sufficiently large to force the short-term
policy rate to the zero bound. A permanent QE policy does not have this property.
The welfare gains of ‘active QE’ are therefore generated by an expectation effect.
I also study the effects of delegation schemes by allowing the central bank to
use both instruments, but instructing the central bank to minimize a loss function
that differs from the one derived from household welfare. Consistent with similar
analysis using textbook New Keynesian models, a small increase in the inflation
target does improve welfare. However, increasing average inflation beyond a small
amount generates welfare costs that outweigh the benefits associated with hitting
the zero bound less frequently.
Allowing active use of QE but instructing the central bank to target a positive
average quantity of long-term bonds on its balance sheet does not improve welfare
relative to the case in which the central bank may freely choose the scale of QE.
As in the case of permanent QE, this result stems from the fact that the most
powerful effects of QE arise from the expectation that it will be deployed when
necessary, rather than the direct effects of central bank asset holdings on long-term
bond returns.
Several papers have studied QE using larger models featuring similar portfolio
frictions: for example, Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012), Darracq Parie`s and Ku¨hl
(2016), De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016), Hohberger, Priftis, and Vogel (2017)
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and Priftis and Vogel (2016). However, all of these papers assume that agents’
expectations satisfy a certainty equivalence assumption.1 With the exception of
Darracq Parie`s and Ku¨hl (2016) and Quint and Rabanal (2017), these papers do not
consider the optimal design of QE policies. Neither Darracq Parie`s and Ku¨hl (2016)
nor Quint and Rabanal (2017) consider potential bounds on the QE instrument or
use a welfare-based loss function.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the ‘portfolio
balance effect’ through which QE operates in the model and relates it to the broader
literature on QE. Section 1.3 presents the model. Section 1.4 analyzes the optimal
policy problem of a central bank tasked with using the short-term interest rate and
QE to minimize a welfare-based loss function in a time-consistent manner. The
results from the baseline parameterization of the model are presented in Section 1.5.
Section 1.6 examines the effects of delegating alternative loss functions to the central
bank. Section 1.7 assesses the robustness of the results to alternative assumptions
about key parameter values and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The portfolio balance mechanism
In an oft-quoted remark, former FOMC Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that “the
trouble with QE is that it works in practice, but not in theory”.2 In this section, I
argue that the so-called ‘portfolio balance’ mechanism has become the predominant
channel through which most monetary policymakers believe that quantitative easing
affects asset prices and the wider economy.
When quantitative easing was introduced as a response to the global financial
crisis, there was uncertainty among policymakers about the channels through which
the policy might operate and skepticism among academics that it would have any
1While the rational expectations assumption specifies that shocks are zero in expectation, the
certainty equivalence assumption specifies that these shocks are assumed (by agents) to be zero
with certainty.
2The comment was made during a discussion session at the Brookings Institution: Bernanke
(2014).
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effect at all.3 For example, Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young, and Robson (2009) doc-
ument several possible channels through which quantitative easing might stimulate
spending and inflation.4 Academic skepticism over the likely effects of the policy
was typified by the analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), who demonstrated
that a change in the composition of households’ portfolios would have no effect on
equilibrium asset prices or allocations in a widely studied benchmark model.
A wide range of studies provided evidence that the quantitative easing policies
enacted in response to the financial crisis increased asset prices and reduced longer-
term interest rates.5 Other studies attempted to estimate the macroeconomic effects
of these changes in asset prices and yields, with a general consensus that central bank
asset purchases were successful in increasing output and inflation.6
Alongside the accumulating empirical evidence, economists explored possible the-
oretical mechanisms that could give rise to such effects. From an asset pricing per-
spective, King (2015) notes that the neutrality results of Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) rely on the (common) assumption of an additively time separable utility func-
tion. This implies that the stochastic discount factor used to price assets depends
only on consumption allocations across time. A broader class of utility functions
imply that the stochastic discount factor also depends on the return on wealth (or
the average portfolio return). In such cases, shifts in the composition of agents’ port-
folios can affect the average portfolio return and hence individual rates of return via
the stochastic discount factor.
King (2015) demonstrates that Epstein-Zinn-Weil preferences7 and the ‘preferred
3I focus on quantitative easing measures of the type introduced by several central banks in
response to the Global Financial Crisis. The Bank of Japan introduced a range of (somewhat
different) balance sheet measures much earlier, given that it encountered the zero bound in the
late 1990s.
4As well as the portfolio balance effect discussed in this section, the authors argue that the
expansion of bank reserves generated by asset purchases may create conditions that encourage
bank lending and that asset purchases may help to anchor inflation expectations by signaling the
central bank’s resolve to return inflation to target.
5Notable examples include D’Amico and King (2013), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010, 2014),
Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).
6See, among many others, Baumeister and Benati (2013), Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010),
Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoridis (2012), Pesaran and Smith (2016) and Weale and
Wieladek (2016).
7This specification of preferences has become a benchmark model for the case in which the
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habitat’ investor framework set out by Vayanos and Vila (2009) fit into the wider
class of models in which portfolio composition affects asset prices.
The Vayanos and Vila (2009) model is an important contribution, as it provides
a link with the strand of the macroeconomics literature, described below, to which
this chapter contributes. The model features two types of agents, one of which has
preferences for assets of a particular maturity which give rise to a downward sloping
demand curve for the asset. The second type is an arbitrageur, trading in all assets.
The interaction of the two agents gives rise to an equilibrium in which changes in the
supply of an asset of a particular maturity affects the price of that asset (through
the downward sloping demand of preferred habitat investors) and the prices of other
assets with similar maturities (through the effect of arbitrage).
In macroeconomics, there is a long tradition of studying the effects of portfolio
allocations on asset prices (and vice versa), dating back at least to the work of
James Tobin and coauthors.8 The key assumption underpinning this theory is that
the relative demand for alternative asset classes depend on their relative prices or
returns, because of imperfect substitutability:
[A]ssets are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other in wealth-
owners’ portfolios. That is, an increase in the rate of return on any one
asset will lead to an increase in the fraction of wealth held in that asset,
and to a decrease or at most no change in the fraction held in every other
asset. (Tobin and Brainard, 1963)
These models assumed a (primitive) relationship between relative yields and rel-
ative asset demands. Frankel (1985) showed that this type of asset demand could be
derived as the solution to a Markowitz portfolio problem.9 As King (2015) notes, this
approach does not incorporate rational expectations, because the portfolio problem
does not account for the fact that future asset prices (which determine the rates of
return on some assets) will be determined in the same way as current asset prices.
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is distinct from the coefficient of relative risk aversion. See
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990).
8See, for example, Tobin (1956, 1969) and Tobin and Brainard (1963).
9The investor’s objective function is the expected return on the portfolio, less a term in the
covariance across returns that captures risk aversion.
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The seminal work of Andre´s et al. (2004) embedded portfolio adjustment costs
into a New Keynesian rational expectations model to provide a more microfounded
treatment of imperfect substitutability. The model echoes the finance approach of
Vayanos and Vila (2009) and also features two types of agents.10 Unconstrained
households have access to both short-term and long-term bonds, paying a port-
folio adjustment cost when investing in the latter. Arbitrage by these households
equates the returns (accounting for adjustment costs) of the two bonds. Constrained
households only have access to long-term bonds. The consumption of constrained
households is influenced by changes in the price of long-term bonds, which can be
driven by changes in their relative supply via the portfolio adjustment costs paid by
unconstrained households.
The Andre´s et al. (2004) model has been modified and extended in several direc-
tions. Harrison (2012) builds a representative agent model in which all households
face portfolio adjustment costs. In such a setting, aggregate demand depends on
the average returns of short-term and long-term bonds as in Andre´s et al. (2004).
However, there is no heterogeneity, so that the effect of long-term returns on ag-
gregate demand depends on the (average) shares of long-term and short-term debt
held by households rather than on the fraction of constrained households. This
representative agent framework is arguably more tractable, in particular facilitating
welfare analysis.11 Ellison and Tischbirek (2014) uses an indirect utility argument
to directly impose portfolio balance terms in the asset pricing equations of the banks
who manage portfolios on the behalf of households.12
Chen et al. (2012) develop a medium-scale model based on the Andre´s et al.
(2004) setup, estimate it on US data and use it to study the effects of the FOMC’s
10Note, however, that the portfolio adjustment cost role for QE is somewhat different from the
role generated by the effects on portfolio risk studied in the finance context by, for example, King
(2015).
11Welfare analysis is possible in models with heterogeneous agents, given an assumption about
how to measure social welfare. For example, Cui and Sterk (2018) study the welfare implications
of QE in a state of the art heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) model by adopting a
utilitarian definition of social welfare.
12In some ways, this approach has more similarities with the early models of Tobin and others,
though the indirect utility approach does deliver cross equation restrictions on the asset pricing
relationships.
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Large Scale Asset Purchase programs.13 Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2017)
adopt a market segmentation approach in which households invest in long-term
government debt via leveraged financial intermediaries.
Once QE programs had been implemented and their effects observed, a consensus
among monetary policymakers on the portfolio balance transmission channel seemed
to emerge. For example, Bernanke (2010) argues that:
The channels through which the Fed’s purchases affect longer-term
interest rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject
to debate. I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such
purchases work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance chan-
nel, which holds that once short-term interest rates have reached zero,
the Federal Reserve’s purchases of longer-term securities affect financial
conditions by changing the quantity and mix of financial assets held by
the public.
Of course, while there may be near consensus among monetary policymakers on
the transmission channel of QE, the portfolio balance effect is not without critique.14
Thornton (2014) challenges the empirical evidence on the effects of QE, finding little
evidence of that QE operations had economically important effects on long-term
bond yields.15
One alternative theory for the efficacy of QE is that it contains signals about
the likely path for the short-term policy rate Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) provide
some empirical evidence for this channel and Bhattarai, Eggertsson, and Gafarov
13Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba, and Lo´pez-Salido (2008, 2011) have
explored models in which government bonds provide liquidity services so that the mix of assets
held by private agents affects relative returns via liquidity premia. This complementary strand of
the literature does not focus on the effects of quantitative easing per se.
14The discussion here focuses on quantitative easing operations in which the central bank pur-
chases long-term government debt (the focus of this chapter). In response to the financial crisis,
some central banks also engaged in the purchase of private debt instruments. Such policies may
be expected to operate through different channels and represent a complementary line of research.
Important contributions include Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and
Kiyotaki (2017) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
15These findings chime with the argument that Federal Reserve purchases of US government
debt constituted such a small fraction of total debt holdings that any portfolio balance effects
would likely be very small (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014; Cochrane, 2011).
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(2015) provide a theoretical framework. Another theory is that changes in the
composition of the central bank balance sheet can be used to reduce the risk exposure
of private agents (Farmer and Zabczyk, 2016). Other authors have focused on the
liabilities side of the central bank balance sheet, arguing that QE operates through
the expansion of central bank reserves associated with asset purchases (see, for
example, Aksoy and Basso, 2014; Reis, 2017).
The transmission mechanism in Cui and Sterk (2018) implies that both sides of
the central bank balance sheet matter since QE involves a swap of relatively illiquid
assets for more liquid assets (interpreted as reserves or bank deposits). Providing
more liquid assets to households increases their ability to maintain consumption
when they become unemployed, stimulating overall spending. This approach could
be regarded as a microfounded variant of the ‘demand for liquidity’ narrative used
by Andre´s et al. (2004) to motivate the type of portfolio friction used in their (and
my) model.
My model can be seen as complementary to many of those discussed above, as
QE may operate via several channels. However, my focus on a portfolio balance
mechanism is prompted by the views of monetary policymakers cited above. So this
chapter can be viewed as an exploration of what the portfolio balance mechanism
implies for the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
1.3 The model
The model is a simple extension to the textbook New Keynesian model (Wood-
ford, 2003; Gal´ı, 2008). This highlights the marginal implications of introducing
an additional friction (portfolio adjustment costs) and hence the possible value of
an additional monetary policy instrument, relative to a widely studied benchmark.
Given the widespread use of the textbook model, in this section I focus on the
additional features and relegate details of the derivation to Appendix 1.B.
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1.3.1 Short-term and long-term bonds
There are two assets in the economy: short-term and long-term nominal govern-
ment bonds. Following Woodford (2001), long-term government bonds are infinite
maturity instruments, paying a geometrically declining coupon. Specifically, a bond
issued at date t pays nominal coupons χs in dates t + 1 + s, s ≥ 0. This modeling
assumption is convenient because it implies that a one dollar holding of a bond
issued j periods ago is equivalent to a χj dollar holding of a bond issued today. The
fact that the values of long-term bonds issued at different dates can be linked in this
way means that it is possible to write budget constraints in terms of a single bond
price and a single stock of long-term bonds.16
Consider first the nominal budget constraint of a representative household:
VtB˜
h
L,t +B
h
t = (1 + χVt) B˜
h
L,t−1 +Rt−1B
h
t−1 +Wtnt + Tt +Dt − Ptct −Ψt (1.1)
The right hand side of the budget constraint captures income from working nt
hours at nominal wage Wt, net transfers/taxes Tt from the government and dividends
Dt from firms, less spending on consumption goods ct at price Pt and portfolio
adjustment costs Ψ (discussed in Section 1.3.2). The household decision problem
will be analyzed in detail below: here I focus on the role of short-term and long-term
bonds.
The household holds one-period bonds Bh, which pay a gross rate of return
R. The budget constraint with respect to short-term bonds is standard: bonds
purchased at date t− 1 mature in date t with a nominal payoff of Rt−1 per bond.
The household also holds long-term bonds, where B˜hL denotes the number of
bonds held, measured in terms of the equivalent quantity of newly issued bonds.
V is the nominal value (price) of each bond. The right hand side of the budget
constraint contains the current value of existing holdings of the long-term bond. The
quantity of long-term bonds purchased at all previous dates can be summarized in
terms of a quantity of bonds (newly) issued in the previous period by virtue of the
pricing relationship discussed above. The bond holdings from the previous period
16See Woodford (2001) and Chen et al. (2012) for further discussion.
29
1.3. The model
B˜hL,t−1 pay a coupon of 1 per bond in period t and have value χVt, reflecting the fact
that the quantity B˜hL,t−1 of date t− 1 issued bonds has the same value as a quantity
χB˜hL,t−1 of date t issued bonds.
The budget constraint can be conveniently re-written in terms of the one-period
return on long-term bonds:
BhL,t +B
h
t = R
1
L,tB
h
L,t−1 +Rt−1B
h
t−1 +Wtnt + Tt +Dt − Ptct −Ψt (1.2)
where:
BhL,t ≡ VtB˜hL,t ; R1L,t ≡
1 + χVt
Vt−1
This formulation treats the choice variables of the household as the value of long-
term bond holdings. Because households take bond prices as given this is isomorphic
to the original formulation, but simplifies the model derivation. Similarly, the one
period return is simply a definition expressed in terms of other asset prices. While
the one-period return on long-term bonds is a sufficient statistic to characterize
household behavior in the model, it is possible to map the implications for the one-
period return back to bond yields that are more readily compared with the data, as
shown below.
1.3.2 Households
The optimization problem of the representative household is
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtφt
{
c
1− 1
σ
t − 1
1− 1
σ
− n
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
}
where c is consumption and n is hours worked. A preference shock φt is included and
will serve as the ‘demand shock’ that generates a persistent decline in the natural
real interest rate considered in the simulation experiments examined below.
Maximization is subject to the budget constraint (1.2), including an explicit
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formulation of portfolio adjustment costs, Ψ:17
BhL,t +B
h
t = R
1
L,tB
h
L,t−1 +Rt−1B
h
t−1 +Wtnt + Tt +Dt − Ptct
− ν˜Pt
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
δ
Bht
BhL,t
− 1
]2
− ξ˜Pt
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
Bht /B
h
L,t
Bht−1/B
h
L,t−1
− 1
]2
(1.3)
The portfolio adjustment costs have two components. The first component is a
function of the deviation of the households ‘portfolio mix’,
Bht
BhL,t
from their desired
level, δ−1. These adjustment costs are intended to capture ‘stock effects’: shifts in
the supply of these assets can have a direct effect on their price. Following Andre´s
et al. (2004), δ is set equal to the steady-state ratio of long-term bonds to short-term
bonds so that these portfolio costs are zero at the non-stochastic steady state.
The second component of the portfolio adjustment costs is a function of the
change in the household’s portfolio mix. This adjustment cost is motivated by the
empirical evidence that changes in asset supplies associated with the auctions that
implement asset purchases have an effect on the prices of assets purchased and their
close substitutes (see D’Amico and King, 2013). In the context of my model, such
‘flow’ effects may be interpreted in terms of frictions in adjusting portfolios including
transactions costs.
The tractability of this type of adjustment costs has led to their adoption in
several monetary models.18 In reality, transactions costs are likely to be low, so
the portfolio adjustment costs in the model are a stand in for a broader range of
frictions. Andre´s et al. (2004) argue that they represent a perception by households
that longer-term bonds are riskier than short-term bonds, such that households’
require a greater quantity of liquid assets (in their model, money) as compensation.
Cast in this way, these costs may be better suited to inclusion in the utility func-
tion. However, Harrison (2012) demonstrates that taking this approach gives rise
17Here bh and bhL denote the steady state real levels of short-term and long-term bonds.
18See, for example, Andre´s et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2012), De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016),
Gertler and Karadi (2013), Darracq Parie`s and Ku¨hl (2016) and Priftis and Vogel (2016).
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to isomorphic expressions for the model equations and welfare functions. Similarly,
portfolio frictions in financial intermediation can give rise to very similar behavioral
equations (Carlstrom et al., 2017; Harrison, 2011).
1.3.3 Firms
There is a set of monopolistically competitive producers indexed by j ∈ (0, 1) that
produce differentiated products that form a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle that is purchased
by households. Preferences over differentiated products are given by
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
1−η−1t
j,t dj
] 1
1−η−1t
where yj is firm j’s output. The elasticity of demand among consumption varieties
ηt is assumed to be time-varying, which generates a ‘cost push’ shock in the Phillips
curve that characterizes log-linear pricing decisions.
Firms produce using a constant returns production function in the single input
(labor):
yj,t = Anj,t
where A is a productivity parameter.
A fixed subsidy is assumed to ensure that the steady state is efficient. Calvo
(1983) staggered pricing gives rise to a New Keynesian Phillips curve derived in
Appendix 1.B.2 and discussed below.
1.3.4 Fiscal and monetary policies
To focus on the role of monetary policy, fiscal policy is highly simplified. There is
no government spending and net transfers to households are lump sum. Of course,
quantitative easing, by its nature, is a prime candidate for study from the perspective
of monetary and fiscal policy interactions.19 My assumptions abstract from these
considerations entirely.
19For example, Del Negro and Sims (2015) and Benigno and Nistico (2015) take such an approach
to examine the potential importance of the government and central bank intertemporal budget
constraints.
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Two aspects of these assumptions (detailed below) are intended to make quantit-
ative easing an exclusively monetary policy operation. The assumption of a ‘neutral’
debt management policy (so that relative bond supplies are kept always in line with
the desired holdings of households) gives the monetary policymaker maximal control
over the debt stocks held by households. The assumption that the total value of
debt is fixed implies that fiscal policy is ‘passive’ (in the sense of Leeper, 1991).20
As a result, the only non-neutrality from QE operates through the portfolio balance
channel.21
To the extent that fiscal policy does not deliver the optimal mix of assets for
households, the model would imply a role for QE in normal times (away from the
zero bound). However, my assumptions are an attempt to capture the key elements
of institutional arrangements in practice. For example, government treasury depart-
ments (or their agents) are tasked with actively managing the maturity structure
of government debt. Their mandate is typically expressed in terms of achieving
favorable financing conditions for the government and ensuring adequate liquidity
in government debt markets. In the context of my model, debt issuance in line
with household portfolio preferences would (other things equal) minimize portfolio
adjustment costs and hence the (social) costs of financing a given debt stock.
My assumptions also require that debt management policy remains unchanged
when monetary policy uses QE at the zero bound. There is an active debate on
the extent to which US government debt issuance may have offset some effects
of FOMC asset purchases (see, for example, Greenwood, Hanson, Rudolph, and
Summers, 2015). However, my assumptions are consistent with the institutional
20Tax revenues are adjusted to hold the debt stock constant which ensures that the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied, for any policy choices of the central bank. In
particular, losses and gains on the central bank’s asset portfolios are immediately financed/rebated
to private agents via lump sum taxes/transfers. As Benigno and Nistico (2015) point out, such a
setup implies that only the consolidated government/central bank budget constraint matters for
allocations.
21This focuses the analysis on the implications of the portfolio balance channel separately from
other mechanisms through which QE may operate. For example, Bhattarai et al. (2015) analyze the
case in which the stock of long-term debt is a state variable in the model, because the government
budget constraint is a constraint on policy actions. This setup gives rise to the possibility that
QE can be used to provide a credible signal that interest rates will remain low in the future (the
‘signaling channel’). By assuming that government debt stocks are held fixed for all realizations
of the short-term policy rate, this channel is eliminated from the model.
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arrangements for QE in the United Kingdom, where the Debt Management Office
was instructed to ensure that debt management operations “be consistent with the
aims of monetary policy” including the asset purchases implemented by the Bank
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee.22
Given the specification of the long-term bond discussed in Section 1.3.1, the
nominal government budget constraint is:
Bt + VtB˜L,t = Rt−1Bt−1 + (1 + χVt) B˜L,t−1 + Zt − Ptτt
where B and B˜L represent stocks of short-term and long-term debt, Z denotes net
asset purchases by the central bank and τ represents net tax/transfer payments
from/to households. The inclusion of Z reflects the assumption that QE is financed
by the central government, as discussed below.
Applying the same change of variables introduced in Section 1.3.1 allows the
constraint to be expressed in terms of the value of long-term bonds and their one-
period return:
Bt +BL,t = Rt−1Bt−1 +R1L,tBL,t−1 + Zt − Ptτt (1.4)
The government implements the following debt issuance policies:
Bt
Pt
≡ bt = b > 0, ∀t (1.5)
BL,t
Pt
≡ bL,t = δb, ∀t (1.6)
As discussed above, these issuance policies ensure that – absent QE operations by
the central bank – households achieve their desired portfolio positions. Conditional
on these issuance policies and QE by the central bank, net transfers to households T
are pinned down by the government budget constraint (1.4). In particular, changes
in the value of the total government debt stock are transferred to/from households
(lump sum) in order to keep the overall value of debt constant over time (a form of
balanced budget financing).
22The quotation is from the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor
of the Bank of England, 3 March 2009: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/
Documents/pdf/chancellorletter050309.pdf.
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Net purchases of long-term government bonds by the central bank are:23
Zt = VtQ˜t − (1 + χVt) Q˜t−1
where the quantity of long-term bonds purchased by the central bank is denoted by
Q˜ and it is assumed that coupon payments are paid to the central bank. Defining
Qt ≡ VtQ˜t implies that:
Zt = Qt −R1L,tQt−1 (1.7)
The QE policy instrument is defined as the fraction of the market value of long-
term bonds purchased by the central bank, denoted q:
Qt = qtBL,t
1.3.5 Market clearing and aggregate output
Market clearing for short-term and long-term bonds implies that:
bht = bt = b ;
Qt
Pt
+ bhL,t = bL,t = bL
where lower case letters denote real-valued debt stocks (for example, bhL,t ≡ BhL,t/Pt).
Combining the government debt issuance policy with the specification of the QE
instrument q gives:
bhL,t = (1− qt) δb
Goods market clearing implies that:
ct = yt −
ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
δ
bht
bhL,t
− 1
]2
− ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
− 1
]2
where total output satisfies:
yt =
Ant
Dt
and Dt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)−η
dj is a measure of price dispersion across firms.
23In a model with money, the net expansion in the monetary base would also be included in this
expression. Here, QE is financed by a loan from the central government, which must ultimately
be financed by lump sum taxes on households.
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1.3.6 Model equations
As shown in Appendix 1.B, the log-linearized model can be reduced to an Euler
equation for the output gap (xˆ) and a Phillips curve for inflation (pˆi):24
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 − σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − γqt + ξqt−1 + βξEtqt+1 − r∗t
]
(1.8)
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + κxˆt + ut (1.9)
where γ ≡ ν + ξ (1 + β), ν ≡ ν˜ (1 + δ) and ξ ≡ ξ˜ (1 + δ).
The ‘natural rate of interest’ is r∗t ≡ −Et
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)
and the cost push shock is
defined as ut ≡ − (1−α)(1−βα)α ηη−1 ηˆt. These variables follow exogenous processes given
by:
r∗t = ρrr
∗
t−1 + ε
r
t (1.10)
ut = ρuut−1 + εut (1.11)
where εrt ∼ N (0, σ2r) and εut ∼ N (0, σ2u).
As shown in Appendix 1.D, the yield to maturity of the long-term bond is given
by:
Rˆt =χβEtRˆt+1
+ (1− χβ)
(
Rˆt − δ−1 (1 + δ) γqt
+ξδ−1 (1 + δ) qt−1 + βξδ−1 (1 + δ)Etqt+1
)
(1.12)
1.3.7 Parameter values
Table 1.1 shows the baseline parameter values.25 It is convenient to scale the model
by 100 to convert log-deviations into (approximate) percentage deviations.26 To do
this, the standard deviations of the natural rate and cost-push shocks are scaled
by 100. The portfolio adjustment cost coefficients, ν and ξ, are also scaled by 100,
since the model equations are derived by linearizing (rather than log-linearizing)
with respect to q.27
24Here, zˆt ≡ ln (zt/z) denotes the log-deviation of variable zt from its non-stochastic steady
state, z. The equations are linearized (rather than log-linearized) with respect to q.
25The productivity parameter A is chosen to normalize output to unity in the steady state.
26So that an output gap of x = 1 corresponds to a gap of one per cent.
27The approach to scaling effectively multiplies all model equations by 100 to convert log de-
viations to percentage units. However, q represents an absolute deviation of q from zero, so does
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Table 1.1: Parameter values
Description Value Description Value
σ Intertemporal substitution elasticity 1 χ Long-term bond coupon decay rate 0.975
κ Slope of Phillips curve 0.0516 δ Ratio of long-term to short-term bonds 0.3
β Discount factor 0.9918 b+ bL Total debt stock (relative to quarterly GDP) 2
ρr Autocorrelation, natural rate 0.85 100ν Adjustment cost (portfolio mix) 0.105
100σr Standard deviation, natural rate 0.25 100ξ Adjustment cost (change in portfolio mix) 3.2
ρu Autocorrelation, cost push shock 0
¯
q Lower bound on QE 0
100σu Standard deviation, cost push shock 0.154 q¯ Upper bound on QE 0.5
η Elasticity of substitution 7.66
α Probability of not changing price 0.855
ψ Inverse labor supply elasticity 1
The key parameters of the aggregate demand and pricing equations are σ and κ.
Setting σ = 1 is a standard assumption in the literature. Many studies that examine
optimal policy at the zero bound use a much higher value (Adam and Billi, 2006;
Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes, 2012; Levin, Lo´pez-Salido, Nelson, and Yun, 2010,
among others, use a value of 6 or above). As Levin et al. (2010) point out, such
calibrations are often required to generate significant effects on output at the zero
bound under optimal commitment policy in a canonical New Keynesian model. As
I focus on the case of optimal discretionary policy, the zero bound has substantial
effects even with a value for σ that is more in line with empirical evidence (such as
that presented by Guvenen, 2006).
The slope of the Phillips curve (κ = 0.0516), though larger than the values used
in similar studies (typically around 0.02–0.024), is consistent with my choice of a
lower value for σ, given the values for the other parameters.28
The value of β is chosen to be consistent with a real interest rate of 3.35% in
the non-stochastic steady state. As shown by Adam and Billi (2007), as β increases,
the steady-state real interest rate falls and so the chances of encountering the zero
bound (and the costs associated with hitting it) increase.29
not require scaling in this way. To preserve the model relationships, the coefficients multiplying q
are therefore multiplied by 100.
28Given the assumed elasticity of disutility of labor supply (ψ = 1), achieving this value of
κ requires setting α = 0.855. This high degree of price stickiness is consistent with estimates
from macroeconomic models such as Smets and Wouters (2005). More plausible estimates of
average contract length can be obtained by adopting more flexible formulations of the demand for
alternative product varieties as demonstrated by Smets and Wouters (2007). The value of η = 7.66
is commonly used in the canonical New Keynesian model (see, for example, Adam and Billi, 2006;
Bodenstein et al., 2012).
29My calibration implies a lower non-stochastic steady-state real interest rate than previous
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Other parameters that are important in determining the incidence of the zero
bound are those governing the shock processes. The process for the natural real
interest rate is assumed to be persistent, with ρr = 0.85, following Levin et al.
(2010). The standard deviation of the shock is roughly in line with the value used
by Adam and Billi (2006) in their ‘RBC calibration’ and the values of the parameters
governing the cost push shock are also taken from that calibration.
The parameters related to long-term and short-term bonds deserve particular
attention. The value of χ is chosen to imply that the long-term bond has a duration
of between 7 and 8 years in the non-stochastic steady state (see Appendix 1.D).
This corresponds to the average duration of 10-year US Treasuries at the time of
the first large scale asset purchase programme (D’Amico and King, 2013). I therefore
interpret the long-term bond as a 10-year bond for the purposes comparing the model
predictions with the data.
The steady-state ratio of government debt to (quarterly) GDP (i.e., b+ bL)
is set to 2, in line with the findings of Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012).
They estimate an average debt to (annual) GDP ratio of around 50% for advanced
economies over the pre-crisis period. The steady-state ratio of long-term to short-
term bonds (δ) is set to 0.3 on the basis of the data presented in D’Amico and King
(2013).30
The values for the parameters governing the portfolio adjustment costs, ν and
ξ are designed to capture the empirical effects of quantitative easing, defined as
‘stock effects’ and ‘flow effects’ by D’Amico and King (2013). To arrive at these
parameter values the model was solved on a grid of {ν, ξ} pairs and the values that
studies, including Adam and Billi (2007). Nevertheless, this value may be considered rather high,
even by pre-crisis standards. The calibration is best thought of as an assumption about the non-
stochastic steady-state nominal interest rate, because the efficient inflation rate in the model is
zero.
30The ratio can be inferred from the data on the dollar amounts and percentages of stock
purchased displayed in D’Amico and King (2013, Fig 1) where short-term bonds are interpreted
as those with an outstanding maturity of six years or less. Debt management strategies differ
over time and across countries. Kuttner (2006, Figure 3) suggests that the average fraction of
short-term (less than five-year maturity) bonds held by the private sector was around 25% over
the period from 1965 to 2006, suggesting δ ≈ 3. The data underlying Figure 1.1 suggests δ > 1 for
the United Kingdom.
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generated stock and flow effects closest to those estimated by D’Amico and King
(2013) selected. This procedure and the results are discussed in Section 1.5.1.
Andre´s et al. (2004) estimate a parameter similar to ν (relating the long-term
bond premium to household’s relative holdings of money and long bonds) using US
data. Their estimate implies a value of 100 × ν of around 0.035, though the long-
term rate in that study is a three-year bond, a somewhat shorter maturity than the
focus of my model. The evidence presented in Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004)
would, using a simple back of the envelope calculation, suggest a much larger value
for 100× ν ≈ 2.31 Of course, such calculations ignore the fact that asset purchases
will have effects on other asset prices (in particular, expected short-term rates). The
simulation approach discussed in Section 1.5.1 attempts to overcome these issues.
The finding that flow effects appear to be more important than stock effects
(since ξ > ν) is consistent with the results of De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016).
They estimate a flexible functional form for the mapping between maturity structure
and the long-short bond spread and find that the data prefers a specification close
to a first difference specification (implying ν ≈ 0 in the context of my model).
Finally, the parameters
¯
q and q¯ represent the lower and upper bounds on the
scale of QE operations that the central bank may undertake. Recall that q represents
the fraction of the total quantity of outstanding long-term bonds held by the central
bank. Under the assumption that the central bank cannot issue long-term bonds
that are perfect substitutes for long-term government bonds, qt ≥ 0, and I set
¯
q = 0.
It must also be the case that q¯ ≤ 1, since the central bank cannot purchase
more than 100% of the existing stock of long-term bonds. There may be practical
reasons why the upper bound on asset purchases is less than 1, for example if there
are some financial institutions that must hold long-term safe assets for regulatory
31This is calculated using a steady-state version of equation (1.12), assuming that an asset
purchase operation of size q = 0.1 is permanent and there are no effects on short-term rates
long-term bond returns. To see this note that, since 100γ ≡ 100ν + 100ξ (1 + β), equation (1.12)
can be written as
Rˆt = χβEtRˆt+1+(1− χβ)
(
Rˆt −
(
1 + δ−1
)
100νqt − 100ξ
(
1 + δ−1
)
∆qt + β100ξ
(
1 + δ−1
)
Et∆qt+1
)
.
A ‘steady state’ version of the equation sets zˆt = zˆ,∀t so that Rˆ = Rˆ −
(
1 + δ−1
)
100νq
and hence ∂Rˆ∂q = −
(
1 + δ−1
)
100ν. Since Rˆ is measured in quarterly units, we require
0.1× (1 + δ−1) 100ν = 0.25 which implies 100ν ≈ 2.
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purposes. In addition, if the central bank balance sheet is considered independently
from the government, then the size of the balance sheet may be limited by a solvency
constraint.32
Figure 1.1: Approximate measure of q for the United Kingdom
2009Q1 2011Q1 2013Q1 2015Q1 2017Q1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Notes: The figure shows the ratio of the value of the Bank of England’s asset purchase facility
(APF) to the value of outstanding medium-term and long-term UK government debt. Vertical
dotted lines indicate dates at which the Monetary Policy Committee voted to increase the size of
the APF.
Sources: Bank of England; UK Debt Management Office.
These types of friction are not explicitly incorporated in the model. My as-
sumption that q¯ = 0.5 is set with reference to the QE programs observed since
the financial crisis. QE in the United Kingdom resulted in purchases amounting
to around half of the long-term debt stock (Figure 1.1).33 Quantitative easing pro-
grams in the United States, while substantial, represented a much smaller share of
the long-term government debt market. At the time of writing, the ECB’s quantit-
ative easing is limited to purchasing no more than one third of the eligible sovereign
debt of any member state.34 Section 1.7.2 examines the robustness of the results to
32The issue depends on the financing agreement between the central bank and government, as
explored by Benigno and Nistico (2015).
33Figure 1.1 is consistent with the results in Daines, Joyce, and Tong (2012), who estimate that
the first phase of QE in the United Kingdom purchased around 30% of the long-term government
debt stock.
34See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html.
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the assumed value of q¯ and the implications for profits and losses associated with
the central bank’s asset portfolio.
1.4 The monetary policy problem
In this section, I consider the optimal use of QE alongside the short-term policy rate.
I assume that the monetary policymaker sets both instruments to minimize a loss
function based on an approximation to the utility of the representative household.
The loss function includes terms in the QE instrument (q), reflecting the fact that the
portfolio frictions that give QE traction impose costs on households.35 Specifically,
Appendix 1.C demonstrates that a loss function based on a quadratic approximation
to household utility is given by:
L0 = 1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ωxxˆ
2
t + ωpipˆi
2
t + ωqq
2
t + ω∆q (qt − qt−1)2
)
(1.13)
where the weights are related to the model parameters according to:
ωx ≡
(
ψ + σ−1
)
; ωpi ≡ αη
(1− αβ) (1− α) ; ωq ≡ ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
; ω∆q ≡ ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
The loss function specifies that the policymaker seeks to stabilize the output
gap, inflation and the extent of (and changes in) its quantitative easing policy.
The first two terms in parentheses appear in the welfare-based loss function of the
textbook New Keynesian model.36 The third and fourth terms appear because of the
introduction of imperfect substitutability between assets. This additional friction
can be mitigated by stabilizing the relative supplies of assets and the rate at which
portfolio shares change. Because the maturity structure of government debt issuance
is matched to households’ preferred portfolio mix, deviations in the relative supplies
of assets are due entirely to quantitative easing, qt.
35Indeed, Alla, Espinoza, and Ghosh (2016) argue that welfare-based loss functions for models
that feature a wide range of unconventional policy instruments (for example, including foreign
exchange intervention) should include terms in the variability of those instruments for this reason.
Using an ad hoc loss function to study the optimal use of QE (as in, for example, Darracq Parie`s
and Ku¨hl, 2016) may fail to capture the full welfare costs of policy actions, which may in turn
determine some of the policy prescriptions.
36See Woodford (2003).
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The policymaker minimizes the loss function (1.13) subject to (1.8), (1.9) and
the relevant constraints on the policy instruments:
Rˆt ≥ 1− β−1 (1.14)
qt ≥
¯
q (1.15)
qt ≤ q¯ (1.16)
I assume that there is no commitment technology that allows the policymaker
to make credible promises about future policy actions. Examining time-consistent
policy is motivated by two considerations. The first is that, for the class of models I
consider, the zero lower bound does not pose a substantial problem if the policymaker
is able to make commitments about how the short-term policy rate will be set in
the future (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Adam and Billi, 2006).37 The second
reason is that many central bankers have expressed doubts over their ability to
credibly commit to future policy actions (Nakata, 2015).38
In this time consistent setting, the policymaker at date t is treated as a Stack-
elberg leader with respect to both private agents at date t and policymakers (and
private agents) in dates t + i, i ≥ 1. I seek a Markov perfect policy in which
optimal decisions are a function only of the payoff relevant state variables in the
model ({ut, r∗t , qt−1}). Under this interpretation, the policymaker understands that
future policymakers will choose allocations according to time-invariant Markovian
policy functions and therefore that its current policy decisions affect future outcomes
through their impact on the endogenous state variable (q).
Appendix 1.F shows that the first order conditions of the policymaker’s problem
37Levin et al. (2010) point out that if aggregate demand is very sensitive to real interest rates,
then the zero bound can be costly, even under commitment. Harrison (2012) studies optimal
quantitative easing under commitment in a model with such a calibration.
38This evidence is consistent with the observation that, in the United States and United King-
dom, QE was used as a policy tool before explicit forward guidance. Moreover, even when forward
guidance was deployed, there was much debate over the extent to which it represented a commit-
ment by policymakers (see, for example, Plosser, 2012).
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are given by:
0 = ωpipˆit − λpit (1.17)
0 = ωxxˆt + κλ
pi
t − λxt (1.18)
0 = ωqqt + ω∆q (qt − qt−1) + β∂EtLt+1
∂qt
+ β
∂Etpit+1
∂qt
λpit
+
[
∂Etxt+1
∂qt
+ σ
∂Etpit+1
∂qt
+ σγ − βσξ∂Etqt+1
∂qt
]
λxt − λq¯t − λ¯
q
t (1.19)
0 = − σλxt − λRt (1.20)
where λxt , λ
pi
t , λ
R
t , λ¯
q
t , λ
q¯
t are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (1.8), (1.9),
(1.14), (1.15) and (1.16) respectively. Appendix 1.F reports the required Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the multipliers on the inequality constraints.
The first order condition for quantitative easing (1.19) shows that the policy-
maker accounts for the fact in which the choice of QE at date t may have effects
on welfare and future outcomes because the date t+ 1 policymaker will inherit the
stock of QE. In the case that the optimal level of QE is an interior solution (that is,
qt ∈
(¯
q, q¯
)
), (1.19) can be written as:
qt =
ω∆q
ωq + ω∆q
qt−1 − β
ωq + ω∆q
∂EtLt+1
∂qt
− β
ωq + ω∆q
∂Etpit+1
∂qt
ωpipit
− 1
ωq + ω∆q
[
∂Etxt+1
∂qt
+ σ
∂Etpit+1
∂qt
+ σγ − βσξ∂Etqt+1
∂qt
]
(ωxxt + κωpipit)
which shows that current QE will be larger if the policymaker inherits a larger
initial stock of QE and if additional QE reduces losses in the next period (the first
two terms on the right hand side). The policymaker’s current choice of QE will also
affect current losses via the effects on private agents’ expectations and hence current
decisions. The third term, for example, captures the effect of QE on current losses
via the effect of QE on inflation expectations and hence current inflation choices
through the Phillips curve (1.9).
This expression for optimal QE also highlights the importance of ‘flow effects’ of
portfolio changes. If these flow effects are absent, then ξ˜ = ξ = ω∆q = 0. Moreover,
in that case, q ceases to be a state variable in the model, so that current choices
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of QE have no effect on expectations or future losses. In this case, for an interior
solution for qt, the first order condition becomes:
qt = −σγ
ωq
(ωxxt + κωpipit)
so that the choice of depends only on the current output gap and inflation.
This condition balances the marginal cost of QE (ωqqt) with the marginal benefits
of improved output gap and inflation stabilization via the effect of QE through the
IS equation, (1.8). Crucially, for this equation to hold, the IS equation must be an
active constraint on policy choices. For this to be the case, we require that λxt be
non-zero which (from (1.20) and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions) requires that the zero
bound on the short-term policy rate must be binding. A corollary of this observation
is that the policymaker does not use QE when the zero bound is not binding: in
this case we have ωxxt + κωpipit = 0 and hence qt = 0.
The logic of this result is simple. The policymaker has access to two instruments
that affect the output gap in the same way, but one is costly to operate (since q
appears in the loss function). When the zero bound on the short-term interest rate
is not binding, the policymaker is unconstrained in their ability to choose the output
gap by the choice of the short term interest rate and hence will not use the costly
instrument.
1.4.1 Solution approach
To capture the distortions created by the zero bound on the short-term interest rate,
I solve the model using projection methods. The algorithm is an extension of a time
iteration algorithm to solve for equilibrium policy functions as in Coleman (1990).39
I specify a grid for the state vector {ut, r∗t , qt−1} formed as a tensor product of three
linearly spaced vectors. The vector for qt−1 is defined on the range
[¯
q, q¯
]
and the
grids for ut and rt are specified across ±4 standard deviations. Expectations are
computed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature using five nodes for each shock (εr and
εu) and linear interpolation of the policy functions. Appendix 1.F.3 describes the
solution algorithm in more detail.
39The algorithm is similar to those presented by Adam and Billi (2007) and Nakov (2008),
extended appropriately because q is an endogenous state variable.
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1.5 Results
This section presents the results from the baseline model. I first examine the model’s
ability to replicate the effects of QE on asset prices that have been reported in
the literature. I then examine the behavior of the model and in particular asset
purchases/sales as the economy enters or leaves a recession. Finally, I compare my
results with the statements by monetary policymakers about their plans for asset
purchases and sales.
1.5.1 Stock and flow effects
To compare the model’s implications for the effects of asset purchases on long-term
bond prices with the empirical evidence presented in D’Amico and King (2013), I
focus on the estimated ‘stock effects’ and ‘flow effects’ of asset purchases reported
by those authors.
To uncover the model’s implications for stock effects and flow effects, I simulate
the model for 100,000 periods and relate surprise movements in QE to surprises in
long-term bond yields.40 By focusing on surprises I mimic the empirical approach of
D’Amico and King (2013), which attempts to control for all predictable asset price
movements. However, in my model all surprises are generated by optimal policy
responses to unforeseen macroeconomic shocks, whereas it is possible that D’Amico
and King (2013) estimate the effects of a surprise innovation to a non-optimal QE
policy rule (that is, a ‘QE policy shock’).
Stock effects are computed by isolating the set of QE surprises of a similar
magnitude to the FOMC’s QE1 programme (0.10 ≤ qt−Et−1qt ≤ 0.12) and recording
the corresponding surprise movements in long-term bond rates Rˆt − Et−1Rˆt. The
mean of the distribution of these surprises (in annualized units), shown as the thick
black dashed line in the left panel of Figure 1.2, is -0.43 implying a substantially
larger effect than the estimate of -0.27 presented in D’Amico and King (2013) (the
solid red line) and just outside the 90% confidence interval (dotted red line).
40A simulation of 110,000 periods is used with the first 10,000 periods discarded.
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Figure 1.2: Model implied estimates of ‘stock effects’ and ‘flow effects’
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Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of the surprise movements in long-term bond yields for
QE surprises amounting to approximately 10% of the debt stock. This is calibrated to match the
size of from the FOMC’s QE1 programme. The dashed black line is the mean of the distribution and
the solid red line is the estimated effect on long-term bond yields attributed to QE1 D’Amico and
King (2013). The right panel shows the distribution of surprise movements in the yield differential
Gt = Rˆt − Rˆat , where Rˆat is defined in equation (1.21), for surprise movements in QE of a similar
size to the individual QE1 operations. The dashed black line shows the mean of the distribution
and the solid red line shows the estimate of flow effects from D’Amico and King (2013). In both
panels, the dotted red lines show 90% confidence intervals around the mean estimate.
To estimate flow effects, I examine the surprise on the difference in yields between
the long-term bond and the price of that bond when agents do not face costs of
adjusting their portfolio mix (ξ˜ = ξ = 0). The yield to maturity of that hypothetical
bond is given by:
Rˆat = χβEtRˆat+1 + (1− χβ)
(
Rˆt − (1 + δ) νqt
)
(1.21)
and the yield differential is defined as Gt = Rˆt−Rˆat . This definition is designed to be
the closest match to the effects estimated by D’Amico and King (2013). If estimated
accurately, the flow effects in D’Amico and King (2013) reflect reactions to surprises
in the maturity composition of asset purchases when the New York Fed enacted the
purchases. The model does not incorporate the full maturity structure of government
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debt, but focusing on marginal effects on yields of changes in households’ portfolio
mix is the closest analogue.
Flow effects are computed by isolating the set of QE surprises of a similar mag-
nitude to individual QE auctions (0.006 ≤ qt − Et−1qt ≤ 0.008) and recording the
corresponding surprise movements in the long-term yield differential Gt − Et−1Gt.
This distribution is compared to D‘Amico & King’s estimate of the flow effects of
-0.013% shown as the red line in the right hand panel of Figure 1.2, with 90% confid-
ence intervals indicated by the dotted red lines.41 The model matches the estimated
flow effects well.
These results reflect the use of a minimum distance estimator that weights the
mean squared deviation from the mean estimated (stock and flow) effects according
to the inverse of the confidence intervals. Because the confidence interval for the
flow effects is quite narrow (relative to the mean estimate) the flow effect receives a
relatively high weight in the estimation process.
1.5.2 QE entry and exit
In this section, I study the properties of the model and in particular its predictions
for asset purchases when the economy enters and leaves a recession. Figure 1.3
plots ‘slices’ of the policy functions conditioned on particular values for the cost
push state, ut, and the lagged value of the QE instrument, qt−1. In all cases I
condition on ut = 0. I then consider policy functions conditional on qt−1 =
¯
q = 0
and qt−1 = q¯ = 0.5. By conditioning on the minimum and maximum levels of QE, I
can study conditions of ‘entry’ into and ‘exit’ from periods in which the central bank
holds assets on its balance sheet. Both of these cases are compared to a variant in
which the central bank is not allowed to implement QE (that is qt = 0,∀t).42 Given
the conditioning assumptions, all policy function ‘slices’ show how optimal outcomes
are affected by the natural real interest rate, r?, holding ut and qt−1 constant.
41Appendix 1.D explains how these confidence intervals are constructed from the results in
D’Amico and King (2013).
42Formally, this case corresponds to a situation in which the policymaker acts to minimize the
welfare-based loss function using only the short-term nominal interest rate as the policy instrument.
This setup therefore corresponds to the case of discretionary policy subject to the zero lower bound
in the canonical New Keynesian model, as studied by Adam and Billi (2007) and Nakov (2008).
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Figure 1.3: Policy function comparison
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Notes: ‘Slices’ of policy functions for alternative model variants. The solid blue lines are slices
of the policy functions conditional {ut, qt−1} = {0, 0}. The dashed red lines are slices of the
policy functions conditional on {ut, qt−1} = {0, 0.5}. The dot-dash black lines are policy functions
conditional on ut = 0 for a version of the model in which the policymaker does not use QE (so
qt = 0,∀t).
Figure 1.3 demonstrates that when QE is assumed to be unavailable (black dot-
dash lines), the policy functions have the same qualitative features as those presented
in Adam and Billi (2007).43 Low values of r∗ are associated with the policy rate at
the zero bound and negative outcomes for the output gap and inflation. The fact
that agents understand that policy will be constrained in this way for low realizations
of r∗ reduces inflation expectations for values of r∗ that are low enough to imply
a substantial risk of hitting the zero bound. This effect implies that the policy
rate hits the zero bound when the natural rate is positive (around 2%). Moreover,
the downward skew in the distribution of future inflation outcomes induces the
policymaker to generate a positive output gap for values of r∗ are slightly above the
value at which the policy rate to hit the zero bound. As described by Adam and
Billi (2007), this is the optimal response to the effect of low inflation expectations
43The policy functions are quantitatively different because different parameter values are used.
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on inflation.44
When QE is used, the recessionary consequences of low realizations of r∗ are
mitigated, since QE can be used to ease monetary conditions when the short-term
policy rate is constrained by the zero bound. The policy functions conditioned on
qt−1 = 0 (solid blue lines) show that the policymaker does not make substantial
use of QE until the short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero bound. This
follows from the first order condition for QE in the case that the policymaker is
unconstrained in their instrument settings (λxt = λ
q¯
t = λ¯
q
t = 0):
qt =
ω∆q
ωq + ω∆q
qt−1 − β
ωq + ω∆q
∂EtLt+1
∂qt
− β
ωq + ω∆q
∂Etpit+1
∂qt
ωpipit (1.22)
When the short-term policy rate is unconstrained, active use of QE does not
affect current allocations (since the short-term policy rate can be adjusted to deliver
the unconstrained optimal allocations). Moreover, setting 0 ≤ qt ≤ q¯ reduces the
scope for subsequent stimulus in the event of bad shocks arriving (such that the
short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero bound). So the effects of choosing
0 ≤ qt ≤ q¯ on future losses are positive and the effects on expected future inflation
are negative. Taken together, these observations imply that it is not optimal to
engage in QE until the short-term policy rate has hit the zero bound.
When the policy rate is constrained by the zero bound, the optimal level of QE
rises for lower realizations of r∗. Higher QE reduces the long-term interest rate and
provides additional monetary stimulus, hence reducing the recessionary effects of
these realizations of r∗. Importantly, the anticipation of additional monetary easing
via QE when the short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero bound supports
inflation expectations for ‘low’ values of r∗. As a result, the policy rate becomes
constrained at a lower value of r∗ (around 1.5% compared with a value of around
2% when QE is unavailable, black dash-dot lines).
Nevertheless, the policy functions in which QE is used as a policy instrument
exhibit a similar trade-off between inflation and the output gap for very low values
of r∗. This reflects the fact that as r∗ reaches very low levels, it becomes optimal
44That is, the policymaker pursues the targeting rule pˆit = −ωxωpi xˆt when away from the zero
bound.
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to purchase the maximum possible quantity of assets, qt = q¯ = 0.5. In such states,
further easing in the event of future recessionary shocks is not possible and the same
downward skew in future inflation outturns described above for the standard New
Keynesian model once again emerges.
Finally, comparisons of the policy functions for the cases in which qt−1 = 0 and
qt−1 = 0.5 (dashed red lines) reveal the importance of ‘flow effects’ in influencing
long-term interest rates, monetary conditions and hence output and inflation. When
qt−1 = 0, setting qt > 0 generates both ‘stock effects’ and ‘flow effects’ on the long-
term rate. For extremely low values of r∗, setting qt = 0.5 reduces the long-term by
around 100bp more than setting qt = 0.5 when qt−1 = 0.5.45
To shed further light on how initial conditions effect outcomes as the economy
enters or exits a recession, Figures 1.4 and 1.5 present ‘modal’ simulations for al-
ternative initial conditions. In each case, the simulation traces out the outcomes in
the event that the sequence of cost push and natural rate shocks are equal to their
most likely value of zero (that is, εut = ε
r
t = 0, t = 2, . . . ). The alternative paths
represent outcomes for different initial conditions for the exogenous states and QE
holdings.
Figure 1.4 shows the case in which the initial condition for the natural rate of
interest is extremely low (r∗1 = −2.25%, measured as an annualized rate) and the
short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero bound. When the initial condition
for QE is zero (q0 = 0, solid blue lines), the policy maker sets QE to its maximum
level immediately. The flow effects from this action are sufficient to generate a
substantial initial fall in long-term interest rates.
45Compare the solid blue and red dashed lines in the bottom left panel of Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.4: Modal simulation of a severe recessionary scenario
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Notes: Each simulated path is computed under the assumptions that the sequence of shocks is
equal to the most likely value (εut = ε
r
t = 0, t = 2, . . . ). The values of the exogenous state variables
in period 1 are u1 = 0 and r
∗
1 = −2.25% (in annualized units). The solid blue lines correspond to
the case in which the initial stock of QE is q0 = 0. The red dashed lines correspond to the case in
which the initial stock of QE is q0 = 0.5. The dash-dotted black lines show the case in which the
policymaker does not use QE (so qt = 0,∀t).
In contrast, a policymaker that experiences the same recessionary state (r∗1 =
−2.25%), but inherits a maximal stock of QE (q0 = q¯ = 0.5, red dashed lines) is
unable to loosen policy further. So in this case, inflation and the output gap are
more negative in period 1. However, from period 2 onward, the outcomes from these
two simulations are identical, because the endogenous state variable is identical in
period 2 (that is, q1 = 0.5 in both cases). Compared to the case in which QE is not
used (black dash-dotted lines), the additional stimulus from asset purchases allows
the short-term policy rate to liftoff from the zero bound several quarters earlier.
Figure 1.5 shows the case of a much milder recessionary state, so that r∗1 = 0.55%
(in annualized units). In the case in which the policymaker does not inherit any
assets on its balance sheet (q0 = 0, solid blue lines), it is optimal to engage in a
small-scale QE operation that is unwound slowly. When the policymaker inherits
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Figure 1.5: Modal simulation of a mild recessionary scenario
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Notes: Each simulated path is computed under the assumptions that the sequence of shocks is
equal to the most likely value (εut = ε
r
t = 0, t = 2, . . . ). The values of the exogenous state variables
in period 1 are u1 = 0 and r
∗
1 = 0.55% (in annualized units). The solid blue lines correspond to
the case in which the initial stock of QE is q0 = 0. The red dashed lines correspond to the case in
which the initial stock of QE is q0 = 0.5. The dashed-dotted black lines show the case in which
the policymaker does not use QE (so qt = 0,∀t).
a large stock of assets (q0 = q¯ = 0.5, red dashed lines), it is optimal to start
unwinding the stock after one period. The unwinding of the large stock of assets
tightens monetary conditions, both through the flow effects of asset sales and the
stock effect of reducing the size of the balance sheet. So the trajectory of long term
interest rates is similar despite the different paths for QE.46
In the case of a large inherited balance sheet (q0 = 0.5), exit from the zero
bound is delayed by one quarter relative to the case in which the policymaker does
not inherit any assets on its balance sheet. Moreover, when the policymaker is
unwinding a large initial stock of assets, there is, on average, less capacity to respond
to a future shock that constrains QE at its upper bound. As a result, the trade-off
46Mechanically, the long rate is calibrated to a duration of around 8 years and the fact that QE
is substantially unwound after four years in both simulations implies that the effects on the long
rate of the different paths will be relatively small.
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between weaker inflation and stronger output is more acute in this case. Compared
with the case in which QE is not used (black dashed-dotted lines), however, the
trade-off is managed much more effectively and, once again, liftoff from the zero
bound occurs earlier.
Figure 1.6: Distribution of changes in QE (∆qt)
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Notes: The histogram records the distribution of outcomes for the change in QE (∆qt) from a
stochastic simulation of 100,000 periods.
The analysis of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 suggests that there is a skew in the distri-
bution of QE policy actions: it is more common to observe large asset purchases
than large sales. This is because large scale purchases can be triggered by a large
recessionary shock when the policy rate is constrained by the zero bound but exit
from QE typically occurs slowly and at least partially during periods in which the
short-term policy rate is unconstrained by the zero bound. Figure 1.6 confirms
this intuition by plotting the distribution of changes in QE (∆qt) from a stochastic
simulation of the model. The distribution exhibits an upward skew.47
47One observation from Figure 1.6 is that there are ‘spikes’ in the distribution of QE changes.
This reflects the fact that unwinding existing QE stocks is in many cases a near deterministic
process. To see this, recall the first order condition for QE when the policy instruments are
unconstrained, (1.22). When the policy rate is unconstrained, the effects of current QE decisions
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The policy functions in Figure 1.3 show the trade-off between the output gap
and inflation that occurs as the limits of policy accommodation are reached (that
is, when the policy rate is at the lower bound and q ≈ q¯). Figure 1.5 demonstrated
that this trade-off may still be present even when policy is relatively unconstrained.
Using simple New Keynesian models (without QE), Evans, Fisher, Gourio, and
Krane (2016) examine the typical size of the output gap and deviation of inflation
from target at the point of liftoff from the zero bound. Appendix 1.A.1 explores this
issue in the context of my model.
1.5.3 Discussion
The results from the baseline model show that QE is not actively used until the
policy rate hits the zero lower bound and that asset purchases of a very large scale
occur fairly frequently. These predictions are consistent with the implementation of
QE in early 2009 in the United States and the United Kingdom. In both cases, the
initial purchases of long-term government debt were sizable and occurred when (or
very soon after) the policy rate hit the effective lower bound.
However, it is less obvious that the model’s predictions for exit from QE are
consistent with the exit strategies announced and implemented by real-world poli-
cymakers. In the United States, the FOMC began to unwind QE only after the
short-term policy rate has been increased from the zero bound.48 In contrast, it
is optimal in the model to start reducing the stock of QE at or before the date at
which the short-term policy rate lifts off from the zero lower bound.49 What might
on expectations are likely to be small (because there are many future states of the world in which
the short-term policy rate will be unconstrained and current QE decisions will have no impact
in those states). In the limiting case where QE has no effect on future outcomes, the first order
condition implies qt =
ω∆q
ωq+ω∆q
qt−1. For states in which the effects of current QE on future decisions
are small, we will observe qt ≈ ω∆qωq+ω∆q qt−1 and the implied changes in QE will ‘bunch’ around the
values implied by a deterministic unwind of QE.
48See Federal Open Market Committee (2011, p3) and Monetary Policy Committee (2015, p34).
The Bank of England’s MPC has indicated QE unwind will not begin until the policy rate has
reached levels that make it possible to respond to negative shocks by reducing the policy rate
rather than expanding QE (see Monetary Policy Committee, 2015, p34).
49Harrison (2012) and Darracq Parie`s and Ku¨hl (2016) reach similar conclusions: optimal policy
behavior implies that QE is halted and begins to unwind at or before the date of liftoff. However,
both of these studies assume that the policymaker is has access to a commitment technology and
adopt a perfect foresight methodology.
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explain these differences?
One key difference is that the QE policy variable (q) in the model represents the
fraction of the stock of long-term government bonds held by the central bank, rather
than the absolute size of the asset stock held by the central bank. Recall that Figure
1.1 plots a crude approximation of q for the United Kingdom. The figure shows that
q rises following MPC decisions to increase the stock of assets purchased (dashed
vertical lines). But for periods during which the asset stock was held constant and
total government debt rose, q was typically falling.50 This suggests that actual policy
behavior has been broadly consistent with the model’s predictions: a fixed central
bank asset stock when government debt is rising corresponds to a reduction in q. In
the model, because government debt is assumed to be fixed, q can only be reduced
by active sales of assets.
Another consideration is that the policymaker in the model minimizes a loss
function based on the household utility function, whereas the mandates of real-
world central banks more closely resemble a so-called ‘flexible inflation targeting’
loss function which only accounts for the costs of output gap and inflation variability.
Moreover, monetary policymakers have stressed the relative uncertainty over the
effect of QE on aggregate demand and inflation relative to the effects of movements
in the short-term policy rate.51 This gives rise to a preference to use the short-term
policy rate as the ‘primary instrument’ to set the overall stance of monetary policy,
a result that arises in the simple model analyzed by Williams (2013). This sentiment
may be strengthened further by the possibility that asset sales may generate different
effects from asset purchases.
In the model, the costs of portfolio misallocation are assumed to be quadratic,
suggesting symmetry in the marginal effects of QE tightening and loosening. How-
ever, these effects will not in fact be symmetric under optimal policy. Increasing
the level of QE reduces the remaining scope for loosening policy via flow effects,
50Greenwood et al. (2015) present evidence of a similar effect for the United States.
51One source of uncertainty over the model’s predictions is that the factors that gave rise to
large effects from initial asset purchases may have been related to the particular state of financial
stress during the period in which they were implemented. In contrast, the model assumes that the
portfolio adjustment costs that give QE traction are structural.
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whereas many instances in which QE is reduced will have negligible effects on out-
comes because the short-term policy rate is unconstrained.52 Nevertheless, the model
abstracts from any uncertainty over the impact of policy actions on outcomes: the
aforementioned asymmetries are perfectly understood by agents in the model.
1.6 Welfare and alternative delegation schemes
The results of Section 1.5 suggest that active use of QE improves welfare by allowing
the policymaker to use an additional instrument to offset the effects of shocks on
output and inflation. Table 1.2 confirms this by reporting the means of key variables
for a simulation of 100,000 periods.53 The mean of the period loss (that is, ωxxˆ
2
t +
ωpipˆi
2
t + ωqq
2
t + ω∆q (qt − qt−1)2) is also reported.54
Table 1.2: Statistics from model simulations
Mean (%) Baseline No QE No ZLB
Qtly inflation -0.03 -0.10 0.00
Output gap -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Policy rate 3.30 2.92 3.31
10-year rate 2.79 2.92 3.31
QE 0.28 0 0
Loss 3.49 7.25 2.52
Table 1.2 shows the results from the baseline version of the model (with active
use of QE), a ‘no QE’ version in which the policymaker sets qt = 0,∀t and a ‘no
ZLB’ version in which the zero bound on the short-term policy rate is ignored.
Results from this variant represent the best achievable outcomes for the policymaker,
conditional on their inability to commit to future policy actions.55
52See the discussion on page 60.
53A simulation of 110,000 periods is produced and the first 10,000 periods are discarded.
54Results for welfare losses are often converted into consumption equivalent units (see, for
example, Adam and Billi, 2007; Nakov, 2008). As in these papers, applying this conversion to
my results generates quantitatively small consumption equivalent losses. However, the relative
sizes of the losses in consumption equivalent units are very similar to those reported in Table 1.2
since σ = 1. Moreover, using (1.13) to compare losses ignores the ‘terms independent of policy’
that generate costly fluctuations in potential output. The scale of the changes in losses therefore
represent an upper bound on the changes in welfare.
55In a version of the model without QE, the loss under optimal commitment, and in the absence
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Comparing the case in which the policymaker does not use QE with the variant
in which the zero bound is ignored reveals that the presence of the zero bound
reduces mean outcomes for inflation, the output gap and the short-term policy rate.
These effects are sufficient to almost triple the average loss.
When QE is actively used, the downward skew in the distributions of the output
gap and inflation are reduced. Relative to the case in which QE is not used, losses
are more than halved. This improved performance is associated with an average
level of QE of 0.28, a higher level of the short-term policy rate and a lower average
level of the long-term rate.
These observations suggest that it may be possible to mimic the outcomes from
active use of QE by mandating that the central bank holds a fixed fraction of the
stock of long-term bonds on its balance sheet at all times. This type of ‘permanent
QE’ implies that the central bank sets qt = q
∗,∀t, where
¯
q < q∗ ≤ q¯. Such a policy
might be expected to reduce average long-term nominal interest rates so that a
higher short-term nominal interest rate is required, on average, to deliver inflation
at target. A higher average short-term nominal interest rate should in turn reduce
the frequency with which the short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero lower
bound and therefore improve the policymaker’s ability to stabilize the economy.
The above logic is similar to the argument for increasing the inflation target: a
higher average inflation rate increases the level of the short-term policy rate consist-
ent inflation at target and reduces the frequency with which the short-term policy
rate is constrained by the zero bound. So I also compare the results from ‘perman-
ent QE’ policies with the case in which qt = 0,∀t, and the short-term policy rate is
set to minimize the period loss function ωxxˆ
2
t + ωpi (pˆit − pi∗)2 where pi∗ ≥ 0 is the
inflation target delegated to the central bank.
of the zero bound, is 1.90. Adam and Billi (2007, Table 2) show that, in that model, the zero bound
has a very small impact on losses under commitment. So 1.90 represents a close approximation to
the optimal achievable loss in the presence of the zero bound.
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Figure 1.7: Mean outcomes under ‘permanent QE’ and alternative inflation targets
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Notes: Each panel reports mean outcomes from a simulation of 100,000 periods for alternative
policy specifications. The bottom left panel shows the frequency with which the short-term policy
rate is constrained by the zero bound for each of the policy specifications. The blue lines with
diamond markers show the outcomes from the case in which the policymaker sets qt = q
∗,∀t for
alternative values of q∗ shown on the x-axis. The red lines with circle markers show the case in
which the policymaker sets qt = 0,∀t, but sets the short-term policy rate to minimize the period
loss function ωxxˆ
2
t + ωpi (pˆit − pi∗)2. The values of the annualized inflation target (4pi∗) are shown
on the x-axis.
Figure 1.7 shows the results of these experiments. Up to a point, increasing the
inflation target reduces losses and is associated with a lower frequency of the short-
term policy rate being constrained by the zero bound. Beyond this point, while the
incidence of the zero bound continues to fall, losses start to increase because the
higher level of average inflation is sufficiently costly.56
In contrast, ‘permanent QE’ policies do not improve welfare. As predicted, these
56These results are consistent with those of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012), who
use a much richer model and also account for the implications of positive average inflation on
the dynamics of the model (see also, Ascari and Ropele, 2007). My experiments assume that
the structure of the economy is described by (1.8) and (1.9), which are linearized around the
deterministic steady state. The fact that losses start to increase at very low values of the inflation
target (0.3% per year) suggests that my results are robust to this simplification.
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policies succeed in ‘twisting’ the term structure so that the long-term rate falls and
the short-term policy rate rises as q∗ is increased. However, the strength of these
effects is limited and the frequency of zero bound incidents falls only marginally as
q∗ is increased.
What accounts for these results?
By prohibiting active use of QE in response to shocks, a ‘permanent QE’ policy
influences the term structure only through ‘stock effects’. These effects are determ-
ined by ν which is small relative to the parameter determining flow effects, ξ. A
policy of permanent, but fixed, QE therefore has less traction over the term structure
than a policy of adjusting the level of QE in response to shocks.
Moreover, increasing the inflation target has a effect on inflation expectations
which is absent for permanent QE policies. Increasing the inflation target raises
inflation expectations and nominal yields directly, which mitigates the downward
skew in the distribution of inflation outcomes. This improves the policymaker’s
ability to stabilize outcomes (as measured by the delegated loss function) both at
and away from the zero bound. A permanent QE policy does not have this effect on
inflation expectations and as a result the only effect on welfare comes through the
frequency with which the short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero bound.
To examine potential gains from more general delegation schemes – when active
use of QE is permitted – I assume that the central bank is delegated the following
loss function:
L˜ =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ωxxˆ
2
t + ωpi (pˆit − pi∗)2 + ωq (qt − q∗)2 + ω∆q (qt − qt−1)2
)
(1.23)
where pi∗ and q∗ ∈ (0, q¯) (with q¯ ≤ 1) are inflation and QE targets delegated to the
policymaker. The loss function coincides with the utility-based benchmark when
pi∗ = q∗ = 0.
Figure 1.8 shows the results of experiments using (1.23). Once again a small
increase in the inflation target reduces losses. However, the optimal increase in
the inflation target is relatively small, reflecting the fact that active QE is quite
effective at offsetting the negative skew in inflation outcomes. As a result, there
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Figure 1.8: Mean outcomes with active QE under alternative delegated loss functions
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Notes: Each panel reports mean outcomes from a simulation of 100,000 periods for alternative
policy specifications. The bottom left panel shows the frequency with which the short-term policy
rate is constrained by the zero bound for each of the policy specifications. The blue lines with
diamond markers show the outcomes from the case in which the policymaker minimizes the loss
function (1.23) for alternative values of q∗ shown on the x-axis (with pi∗ = 0). The red lines with
circle markers show the case in which the policymaker minimizes the loss function (1.23) for values
of the annualized inflation target (4pi∗) shown on the x-axis (with q∗ = 0).
is less benefit from increasing average inflation expectations, so the costs of higher
inflation in states of the world when the policymaker is unconstrained offset these
benefits quickly as pi∗ is increased.
Figure 1.8 also illustrates that mandating the central bank to target a higher
level of assets on its balance sheet does not improve outcomes. Losses increase
with q∗ because the central bank is forced to hold assets (which imposes costs on
households) even when the short-term policy rate is unconstrained.57
Despite a mild increase in the short-term policy rate (and a fall in the long-term
57Recall that the social welfare function is given by (1.13), which penalizes any qt > 0.
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rate) generated by higher average stock effects, the frequency with which the short-
term policy rate is constrained by the zero bound actually rises as q∗ is increased.
This reflects the importance of flow effects in determining the effects of QE on out-
put and inflation. To see this, consider the case in which the policymaker inherits
a stock of assets equal to the target level (qt−1 = q∗ > 0). Suppose a recessionary
shock arrives that constrains the short-term policy rate at the zero bound and ne-
cessitates active use of QE. In this case, the maximum ‘firepower’ that policymaker
can deploy through QE is q¯− q∗. A higher value of q∗ therefore limits the ability of
the policymaker to reduce long-term rates via flow effects by increasing QE and so
the ability to stabilize the economy at the zero bound is reduced.
1.7 Robustness analysis
This section explores the robustness of the results presented in Section 1.5 to al-
ternative assumptions for key parameter values and to the assumption about the
maximal level of QE (q¯).
1.7.1 Alternative parameter values
To assess robustness to the choice of parameter values, I focus on those parameters
that are most important for the transmission of monetary policy actions.
I consider the case in which the interest elasticity of demand is smaller than
in the baseline case by setting σ = 0.5 following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
The interest elasticity of demand is a key parameter because it affects the extent to
which changes in both short-term and long-term interest rates affect the output gap.
A smaller interest elasticity reduces the power of monetary policy, but also reduces
the extent to which monetary conditions are tightened when the zero bound binds.
In this case, the slope of the Phillips curve (κ) is held fixed to the baseline value of
0.0516 by setting α = 0.8805.
I also consider a case in which the Phillips curve is flatter. Setting α = 0.9
reduces the Phillips curve slope to κ = 0.024. This is the value used by Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) and Levin et al. (2010) in their studies of optimal commitment
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policy at the zero bound. Other things equal, the flatter Phillips curve specification
mitigates the downward drag on inflation expectations near the zero bound.
Flattening the IS and Phillips curves is likely to improve the policymaker’s ability
to stabilize the economy. In a similar vein, I also consider a case in which the
standard deviation of the shock to the natural rate of interest is smaller (100σr =
0.225 rather than 0.25 as in the baseline specification). This alternative calibration
implies that the zero bound on the short-term policy rate will be less often (and less
severely) binding.
Finally, I consider a case in which there are no ‘flow effects’ (ξ = 0). This case is
of interest given the uncertainty over the size of flow effects. For example, D’Amico
and King (2013) note that flow effects seem to be somewhat short-lived (though
are persistent in my model) and Kandrac and Schlusche (2013) find evidence that
flow effects from the Fed’s LSAP2 and MEP operations were smaller than those for
LSAP1.58
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for each of the model variants.
Table 1.3: Model statistics for alternative parameterisations
Variant Baseline σ = 0.5 α = 0.9 100σr = 0.225 ξ = 0
Mean (%)
Qtrly inflation -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06
Output gap -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Policy rate 3.29 3.28 3.33 3.34 3.11
10-year rate 2.78 2.49 2.75 2.86 2.92
QE 0.28 0.43 0.32 0.27 0.10
QE gain (%) 51.89 16.75 12.62 20.74 40.19
Notes: QE gain is the percentage difference in loss when QE is used relative to the case in which
qt = 0,∀t. See footnote 59 for the full definition.
58In this case, the policy problem becomes static, as in the simple New Keynesian model with
no portfolio balance effects (ν = ξ = 0), because the existing stock of QE does not affect the
choices of future policymakers.
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As expected, the gain from active use of QE is smaller for all of the variants
considered.59 When the IS curve and Phillips curves are flatter (σ = 0.5 and α =
0.9), the welfare costs of hitting the zero bound in the absence of QE are smaller
and hence the gains from using QE are smaller. When the variance of natural rate
shocks is smaller (100σr = 0.225) the likelihood of hitting the zero bound is lower,
so the benefits of QE are once again reduced. In the absence of flow effects from QE
(ξ = 0), agents recognize that future QE actions will have a smaller effect on long-
term bond yields. This weakens the expectations channel through which QE helps
to support inflation expectations and hence reduces the ability of QE to stimulate
spending in the event of future negative demand shocks. The policy functions from
these alternative parameterizations of the model are consistent with these results,
as discussed in Appendix 1.A.2.
1.7.2 The upper bound on QE
As noted in Section 1.3.4, the model makes no distinction between the central bank
and government balance sheets (or budget constraints). When the central bank
holds long-term bonds on its balance sheet, it faces the risk that the value of those
bonds may fall if the long-term interest rate rises. In the model, the government
implicitly stands ready to cover any losses incurred on the central bank’s portfolio
by means of a transfer (or capital injection). Such transfers are funded by levying
(lump sum) taxes on households. This fiscal policy is fully credible.
In practice, doubts over whether the government would guarantee such uncon-
ditional support to the central bank have been regarded as a limit on the scale of
asset purchases by the central bank. For example, Dennis Lockhart, President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta argues that:
A second perspective on limits [on monetary policy] might reference
statutory or self-imposed limits that central banks observe. These might
encompass limits on how far the central bank can or should go in ad-
dressing what are fiscal concerns. Monetary policymakers have tried to
avoid interventions that put taxpayers at risk of loss. (Lockhart, 2012)
59 The ‘QE gain’ is given by 100 × (1− L¯/L¯q=0) where L¯ is the mean welfare-based loss and
L¯q=0 is the mean welfare-based loss computed under a policy in which qt = 0,∀t.
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Such considerations motivate the imposition of the upper bound on the scale
of quantitative easing that the central bank may undertake, q¯. Appendix 1.A.3
explores the implications of alternative assumptions about q¯ for the results presented
in Section 1.5. The results show that, unsurprisingly, restricting the maximum scale
of asset purchases inhibits the policymaker’s ability to stabilize output and inflation
for low realizations of the natural real interest rate. In contrast, higher values
of q¯ deliver better stabilization performance even with relatively low average QE
holdings by the central bank because agents recognize that QE can be expanded to
a substantial level in particularly bad states.
However, a higher value of q¯ implies that the central bank will (optimally) hold
a larger quantity of long-term government debt in some states. This exposes its
balance sheet to greater interest rate risk, compared to a central bank operating
under a lower q¯ constraint. To explore the extent of the interest rate risk, I calculate
the size of the revaluation of the central bank’s portfolio as a fraction of steady-state
GDP. Appendix 1.E derives the following expression for the revaluation effect:
Kt ≈ δ (b+ bL)
1 + δ
[
Rˆ1L,t − Rˆt−1
]
qt−1 (1.24)
based on the assumption that purchases of long-term debt are financed by issuing
interest-bearing reserves.60
Calculating the distribution of Kt from simulations of the model provides a way
to assess the interest rate risk associated with alternative assumptions about q¯.
Without a fuller treatment of the central bank budget constraint it is not possible
to infer from this distribution the likelihood of the central bank paying a negative
dividend to the government. However, very large revaluation effects make it more
likely that dividends will be negative in some states.61
60Reserves are assumed to earn the same return as the short-term government bond. A formal
model of this type of approach is presented in Bassetto and Messer (2013), which is used to study
the feasibility of alternative central dividend policies (see also, Hall and Reis, 2014). Since my
model abstracts from the central bank balance sheet and budget constraint, I am restricted to
much simpler, indicative, exercises.
61As made clear by Reis (2015), negative dividends would only create solvency problems for the
central bank under an extremely strict dividend policy (generating what he calls ‘period insolvency’
in the event that the government insists that all positive net income is transferred to the government
as a dividend). Moreover, my calculations represent an upper bound on the extent to which balance
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To assess the likelihood of such an event, I calculate the probability of K <
−0.005: the probability that capital losses exceed 0.5% of GDP. The choice of
critical value is intended to proxy for the fact that, in general, central banks generate
seigniorage revenue from the issuance of non-interest bearing currency. A generous
estimate for seigniorage revenue as a proportion of GDP is 0.5%, so I interpret the
estimated probability as approximating that of a negative dividend payment: the
portfolio revaluation exceeds the likely flow of seigniorage revenue.62
Panel (a) of Figure 1.9 plots kernel-based estimates of the distribution of Kt for
100,000 period simulations of the models with q¯ ∈ {0.75, 0.5, 0.25}. While there is a
notable skew in the distributions, the case in which q¯ = 0.75 has a particularly long
left tail.
Figure 1.9: Distributions of portfolio revaluation K for alternative q¯
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q¯ = 0.75;E(Kt|Rt−1 = 1) = −0.005
q¯ = 0.5;E(Kt|Rt−1 = 1) = −0.003
q¯ = 0.25;E(Kt|Rt−1 = 1) = −0.0008
Notes: Panel (a) shows kernel estimates of the distribution of K computed using equation (1.24).
Panel (b) shows kernel estimates of the the distributions of central bank profits, conditional on
being at the ZLB in the previous period (Rt−1 = 1). Results for both panels are constructed from
a 100,000 period simulation of the model with q¯ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
When q¯ = 0.75, negative dividends occur with a frequency of almost 10%, and
even the baseline assumption of q¯ = 0.5 implies a frequency of around 8%. Reducing
sheet risks present a problem for central bank solvency because they assume that the central bank’s
asset portfolio is marked to market.
62Reis (2015) argues that the steady-state seigniorage ratio is 0.23% in the model presented by
Del Negro and Sims (2015). The data in Aisen and Veiga (2008) give average ratios of 0.3% and
0.4% for the United States and United Kingdom respectively.
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q¯ to 0.25 reduces the risk to less than 1%. In the absence of a full articulation of the
central bank budget constraint and balance sheet, the revaluation effects considered
here can only provide an indication of the effects on central bank profitability. How-
ever, Benigno (2017, equation (35)) demonstrates that central bank profits will be
equal to the revaluation effect computed above in the special case that the nominal
interest rate in the previous period is at the zero bound (that is Rt−1 = 1).
Panel (b) of Figure 1.9 plots estimates of the distributions of K, conditional on
being constrained by the zero bound in the preceding period. Once again, allowing
the central bank to undertake larger asset purchases results in a larger left tail of
losses. Conditional on being constrained by the zero bound, losses are 0.5% of steady
state GDP when q¯ = 0.75 compared with less than 0.1% when q¯ = 0.25.63 Of course,
a higher q¯ also allows the central bank to post larger profits on its asset portfolio
during a period in which the ZLB is binding, as panel (b) of Figure 1.9 also shows.
However, the debate on policy constraints imposed by the central bank’s balance
sheet has focused on the extent to which the government will stand ready to make
transfers to the central bank (or forgo dividend payments).
1.8 Conclusion
I study the optimal use of quantitative easing alongside the short-term policy rate
using a textbook New Keynesian model extended to include portfolio adjustment
costs. The existence of these costs implies both that QE can influence long-term
rates (via a portfolio balance mechanism) and that its use has welfare costs. Re-
ducing long-term rates can increase aggregate demand when the economy is in a
recessionary state in which the short-term policy rate is constrained by the zero
bound. In such cases, the welfare costs of portfolio distortion are typically out-
weighed by the benefits of higher aggregate demand. Indeed, relative to the case
in which QE is unavailable, use of QE reduces the welfare costs of fluctuations by
around 50%.
63The frequency of losses is roughly the same for the alternative values of q¯: although the
distribution of profits is narrower for lower values of q¯, the frequency with which the ZLB constraint
binds is also higher. These effects roughly cancel out.
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The model predicts that asset purchases can be large and rapid, with purchases
commencing as soon as the short-term policy rate hits the zero bound. Exit from
QE is gradual. Both of these findings are consistent with the actual implementation
of QE in the United States and United Kingdom. However, the model also predicts
that ‘quantitative tightening’ (sales of previously accumulated assets) should start
at around the same time that the policy rate lifts off from the zero bound. This
contrasts with real-world policy actions, though the comparison is blurred by the
fact that QE occurred alongside increases in government debt, which the model
abstracts from.
These observations suggest that a comparison of the optimal policy prescriptions
from alternative theories of QE, including those that operate via the government
budget constraint (e.g., Bhattarai et al., 2015), is an important avenue for further
research.
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Appendix 1.A Additional results
1.A.1 Macroeconomic conditions at liftoff
Figure 1.10: Distributions of variables at liftoff
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Notes: The top row shows kernel based estimates of the distributions of the output gap, inflation
and the policy rate for the baseline version of the model in which QE is used (solid black lines)
and a case in which QE is not used (dashed grey lines). The distributions are computed using
a simulation of 100,000 periods and selecting those periods in which the current policy rate is
positive and in which the policy rate in the preceding was at the zero bound. The bottom row
shows distributions conditional on the policymaker having a ‘large’ balance sheet immediately
prior to liftoff (0.4 ≤ qt−1 ≤ 0.5, dash-dotted red lines) and conditional on a ‘small’ balance sheet
(0 ≤ qt−1 ≤ 0.1, dashed blue lines).
The top row of Figure 1.10 shows the distributions of the output gap, inflation
and the short-term policy rate in liftoff quarters (defined as those in which the policy
rate is positive, but was equal to the lower bound in the previous period). The solid
black lines show the distribution in the baseline model, with active use of QE and
the dashed grey lines show the distributions when QE is not used (qt = 0,∀t).
These distributions show that, when QE is used as an active policy tool, liftoff of
the short-term policy rate will tend to occur with a more negative output gap and
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smaller inflation overshoot when compared to the case in which QE is not used.64
The use of QE allows the policymaker to lift off before the output gap has closed
(on average).65
The bottom row of Figure 1.10 shows the distributions in liftoff quarters for cases
in which the central bank’s pre-liftoff balance sheet is ‘small’ (0 ≤ qt−1 ≤ 0.1, dashed
blue lines) and ‘large’ (0.4 ≤ qt−1 ≤ 0.5, dash-dotted red lines). The distributions
for the output gap and inflation in these cases are similar, with little difference in
the means.66 However, it is notable that the variance of the distributions is larger
when the policymaker lifts off with a small initial balance sheet. This reflects the
fact that such liftoff episodes tend to to occur in relative benign situations (in which
previous shocks have not required substantial use of QE). So these liftoff episodes
tend to correspond to cases in which policy is less likely to be constrained in the
near future. The distribution of the short-term policy rate supports this reasoning:
lifting off with a large balance sheet is more likely to be associated with a smaller
initial rate rise.
1.A.2 Policy functions for alternative parameterizations
Figure 1.11 plots ‘slices’ of the policy functions for key variables as functions of
the natural real interest rate, r∗ (conditional on a zero cost push shock state and
zero inherited QE, u = q−1 = 0) for the alternative parameterizations of the model
considered in Section 1.7.1. For the cases in which the IS and Phillips curves are
flatter (σ = 0.5 and α = 0.9 respectively) the policy functions for the output gap and
inflation are generally closer to zero relative to the baseline parameterization. This
reflects the fact that monetary policy is better able to stabilize the economy in light
of the smaller downward skews in expected inflation and output gap realizations
associated with the zero bound on the short-term policy rate.67 When σ = 0.5 the
policy functions for the instruments show that more aggressive policy is required to
64When QE is used, the average output gap is -0.21 and the average inflation rate is 0.02.
Without QE the means are both zero to three decimal places.
65Inspection of Figure 1.4 indicates that for deep recessionary shocks this is likely to be because
liftoff will be somewhat later after the impact of the shock if QE is not used as a policy instrument.
66For the ‘large’ (‘small’) balance sheet cases the mean output gap is -0.23 (-0.20) and the mean
inflation rate is 0.03 (0.03).
67Those skews are smaller precisely because the IS or Phillips curves are flatter.
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Figure 1.11: Policy functions for alternative parameter values
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Notes: ‘Slices’ of policy functions for alternative model variants. All slices of the policy functions
are conditional on {ut, qt−1} = {0, 0}. See the main text for a full description of the alternative
model variants.
deliver the better stabilization outcomes. That follows from the fact that, when the
IS curve is flatter, larger changes in both the short-term and long-term interest rate
are required to achieve a given change in the output gap.
Finally, Figure 1.11 shows that the absence of flow effects from QE (ξ = 0)
generates substantially worse outcomes than the baseline parameterization. The
policy function for the long-term interest rate is much flatter because the strong
effects of flow effects on depressing long-term yields are absent. As a result, outcomes
for both inflation and the output gap are much worse when the economy is at or in
the vicinity of the zero bound on the short-term policy rate.
1.A.3 Policy functions for alternative assumptions about
maximal QE
Figure 1.12 shows representations of the policy functions for key variables, under
alternative assumptions about q¯. Each policy function is plotted holding both the
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Figure 1.12: Policy functions for alternative q¯
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Notes: ‘Slices’ of policy functions for alternative assumptions about the upper bound on asset
purchases, q¯. Each slice is conditional on {ut, qt−1} = {0, 0}.
cost push shock and the inherited stock of QE equal to zero.68 This representation
is convenient for assessing the conditions under which a QE regime is entered (that
is, the range of values for the natural real interest rate r∗ for which asset purchases
are initiated) and how the scale of asset purchases is influenced by the natural real
interest rate.
The results show that, unsurprisingly, restricting the maximum scale of asset
purchases inhibits the policymaker’s ability to stabilize output and inflation for low
realizations of r∗. When q¯ = 0.25, the policy rate hits the zero lower bound at a
(slightly) higher value of r∗. Moreover, the scale of asset purchases is larger over
the range r∗ ∈ (0.5, 1.5) when the maximal scale of QE is smaller. This means
that a higher q¯ implies a larger ‘bang for buck’ of a given scale of asset purchases.
The reason for this result is that, as explained in Section 1.6, agents recognize that
a policymaker with a larger q¯ has more ‘firepower’ remaining. Agents therefore
expect that outcomes will be better stabilized in future bad states. This mitigates
68That is, conditioned on {ut, qt−1} = {0, 0}.
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the drag on inflation and output gap expectations generated by the presence of the
zero bound on the short-term interest rate and the upper bound on QE.
Table 1.4: Model statistics for alternative q¯
Mean (%) q¯ = 0.75 q¯ = 0.5 q¯ = 0.25
Qtrly inflation -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
Output gap -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Policy rate 3.37 3.29 3.16
10-year rate 2.74 2.78 2.86
QE 0.35 0.28 0.17
Loss 3.08 3.49 4.34
The fact that output and inflation are better stabilized implies that welfare is
higher at all points on the slice of the policy function plotted in Figure 1.12. Table 1.4
shows that this is also true on average. Increasing the upper bound on QE reduces
welfare losses and keeps inflation and the output gap closer to zero on average.
Moreover, comparing the results for q¯ = 0.75 with those of the baseline specification
(q¯ = 0.5) reveals that improved stabilization is achieved with only slightly higher
average QE holdings and very slightly lower long-term bond rates.
Appendix 1.B Model derivation
The model has some similarities to Harrison (2012), but differs in several important
respects. The long-term government bond pays a geometrically declining coupon to
better approximate the behavior of long-term interest rates. The behavior of fiscal
policy is simplified, to focus exclusively on the role of monetary policy. The portfolio
friction is in the form of adjustment costs rather than within the utility function
and portfolio adjustment costs also depend on changes in households’ portfolio mix
(between short-term and long-term bonds) as a way to capture ‘flow effects’ of asset
purchases on bond yields. Finally, base money is ignored (a ‘cashless limit’ following
Woodford, 2003), which reduces the scale of the model without affecting the main
conclusions.
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1.B.1 Households
The optimization problem considered in Section 1.3.2 is
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtφt
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The first-order conditions of the optimization problem are:
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where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the nominal budget constraint (1.25).
Define the real Lagrange multiplier as:
Λt ≡ Ptµt
and real bond holdings and inflation as
bht ≡
Bht
Pt
bhL,t ≡
BhL,t
Pt
The first order conditions for short-term and long-term bond holdings, (1.28)
and (1.29) can be written in terms of real-valued variables as:
0 =− Λt − Λt
ν˜δ
(
bh + bhL
)
bhL,t
[
δ
bht
bhL,t
− 1
]
− Λt
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
[
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
− 1
]
+ βRtEtΛt+1pi−1t+1
+ βEtΛt+1
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
bht+1(
bht
)2 bhL,tbhL,t+1
[
bht+1
bht
bhL,t
bhL,t+1
− 1
]
(1.30)
0 =− Λt + Λt
ν˜δ
(
bh + bhL
)
bht(
bhL,t
)2
[
δ
bht
bhL,t
− 1
]
+ Λt
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1(
bhL,t
)2
[
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
− 1
]
+ βEtR1L,t+1Λt+1pi−1t+1
− βEtΛt+1
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
bht+1
bht
1
bhL,t+1
[
bht+1
bht
bhL,t
bhL,t+1
− 1
]
(1.31)
Several steady-state relationships are useful for log-linearizing the first order
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conditions:
bhL
bh
= δ
bh
bh + bhL
= (1 + δ)−1
bhL
bh + bhL
= 1− (1 + δ)−1 = δ
1 + δ
Combining (1.26) and (1.30) creates an Euler equation for consumption:
φtc
− 1
σ
t =βRtEtφt+1c
− 1
σ
t+1pi
−1
t+1 − φtc−
1
σ
t
ν˜δ
(
bh + bhL
)
bhL,t
[
δ
bht
bhL,t
− 1
]
− φtc−
1
σ
t
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
[
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
− 1
]
+ βEtφt+1c
− 1
σ
t+1pi
−1
t+1
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
bht+1(
bht
)2 bhL,tbhL,t+1
[
bht+1
bht
bhL,t
bhL,t+1
− 1
]
which can be log-linearized to give:
cˆt =Etcˆt+1 − σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 + Et∆φˆt+1
]
+ σν˜ (1 + δ)
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
+ σξ˜ (1 + δ)
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
(1.32)
The first order conditions for labor supply (1.27) and consumption (1.26) can be
combined and log-linearized to give
ψnˆt = wˆt − σ−1cˆt (1.33)
Log-linearizing the first order condition for long-term bonds (1.31) gives:
Λˆt =ν˜δ
−1 (1 + δ)
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
+ Et
[
R1L,t+1 + Λˆt+1 − pˆit+1
]
+ ξ˜δ−1 (1 + δ)
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
Log-linearizing the first order condition for short-term bonds (1.30) gives:
−Λˆt =− Et
[
Rˆt + Λˆt+1 − pˆit+1
]
+ ν˜ (1 + δ)
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
+ ξ˜ (1 + δ)
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
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Adding the previous two equations gives:
0 =Et
[
R1L,t+1 − Rˆt
]
+ ν˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
+ ξ˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
or
EtR1L,t+1 =Rˆt − ν˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
− ξ˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
(1.34)
The final equation can be used to write the Euler equation in terms of returns on
short-term and long-term bonds. First note that (1.34) can be rearranged to give:
Rˆt − EtR1L,t+1 =ν˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
+ ξ˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
The right hand side of this expression appears on the right hand side of (1.32),
multiplied by σδ (1 + δ)−1. This implies that the Euler equation can be written as:
cˆt =Etcˆt+1 − σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 + Et∆φˆt+1
]
+ σδ (1 + δ)−1
[
Rˆt − EtR1L,t+1
]
=Etcˆt+1 − σ
[
1
1 + δ
Rˆt +
δ
1 + δ
EtR1L,t+1 − Etpˆit+1 + Et∆φˆt+1
]
1.B.2 Firms
The real profit of producer j is:
(1 + s)Pj,t
Pt
yj,t − wtnj,t =
(
(1 + s)
Pj,t
Pt
− wt
A
)(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ηt
yt
where s is a subsidy paid to producers in order to ensure that the steady-state level
of output is efficient. This assumption permits the use of a quadratic approximation
of the household utility function as an appropriate welfare criterion for policy (see
Benigno and Woodford, 2006).
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Under a Calvo (1983) pricing scheme the objective function for a producer that
is able to reset prices is:
maxEt
∞∑
k=t
Λk (βα)
k−t
(
(1 + s)
Pj,t
Pk
− wk
A
)(
Pj,t
Pk
)−ηt
yk
where Λ represents the marginal utility of consumption and 0 ≤ α < 1 is the
probability that the producer is not allowed to reset its price each period.
The first order condition is
Et
∞∑
k=t
Λk (βα)
k−t
(
(1− ηt) (1 + s)
Pk
+ ηt
wk
Pj,tA
)(
Pj,t
Pk
)−ηt
yk = 0
or
Et
∞∑
k=t
Λk (βα)
k−t
(
(1− ηt) (1 + s) pj,t
Πt,k
+ ηt
wk
A
)(
pj,k
Πt,k
)−ηt
yk = 0 (1.35)
which defined the price set by firm j relative to the aggregate price level as:
pj,t ≡ Pj,t
Pt
and defines the relative inflation factor as
Πt,k ≡ Pk
Pt
= Πk × Πk−1 × ...× Πt+1 for k ≥ t+ 1
≡ 1 for k = t
Since all firms are identical in terms of their information and production con-
straints, all firms that are able to change prices at date t will choose the same price,
denoted p∗t . Thus
Et
∞∑
k=t
Λk (βα)
k−t
(
(1− ηt) (1 + s) p
∗
t
Πt,k
+ ηt
wk
A
)(
p∗t
Πt,k
)−ηt
yk = 0
The aggregate price is:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηtj,t dj
] 1
1−ηt
=
[ ∞∑
k=0
(1− α)αk (P ∗t−k)1−ηt
] 1
1−ηt
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where the equality follows from grouping the firms into cohorts according to the
date at which they last reset their price and noting that the mass of firms that have
not reset their price since date t− k is (1− α)αk. This means that the aggregate
price level can be written as
Pt =
[
α (Pt−1)
1−ηt + (1− α) (P ∗t )1−ηt
] 1
1−ηt
so that
1 = α
(
1
pit
)1−ηt
+ (1− α) (p∗t )1−ηt (1.36)
Log-linearizing the pricing equation gives
Et
∞∑
k=t
(βα)k−t
[
pˆ∗t − Πˆt,k − wˆk +
η
η − 1 ηˆk
]
= 0
which can be rearranged to give:
pˆ∗t = (1− βα)
(
wˆt − η
η − 1 ηˆt
)
+ βαEtpˆit+1 + βαEtpˆ∗t+1
by using the law of iterated conditional expectations. Log-inearizing the expression
for the aggregate price level (1.36) implies that:
pˆ∗t =
α
1− αpˆit
Using this information in the log-linearized pricing equation gives:
pˆit =
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
wˆt − η
η − 1 ηˆt
)
+ βEtpˆit+1 (1.37)
1.B.3 Market clearing and the efficient allocation
Goods market clearing requires:
ct = yt −
ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
δ
bht
bhL,t
− 1
]2
− ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
− 1
]2
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Output for each variety j satisfies:
yjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ηt
yt
yjt = Anjt
Equating the previous expressions and integrating over j gives:∫ 1
0
Anjtdj =
∫ 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ηt
ytdj
which implies that:
Ant = Dtyt
where
Dt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ηt
dj (1.38)
is a measure of price dispersion.
As noted in the main text, market clearing in government bond markets implies
bˆht − bˆhL,t = −bˆhL,t = qt (1.39)
It is straightforward to show that in the absence of price-setting and imperfect
asset substitutability frictions, the efficient level of output is constant To see this,
note that in a flexible price equilibrium with no distortion from monopolistic com-
petition, the real wage will equal the marginal product of labor, which is constant
and equal to A. So the efficient allocations, denoted with an asterisk, can be found
from the labor supply relation (1.33):
ψnˆ∗t = −σ−1cˆ∗t
where wˆ∗t = 0 because the real wage is constant. Imposing market clearing (with
zero portfolio adjustment costs and price dispersion equal to 1) gives c∗t = n
∗
t = y
∗
t .
This in turn implies that cˆ∗t = nˆ
∗
t = yˆ
∗
t . Since the labor supply equation requires
that nˆ∗t = − (ψσ)−1 cˆ∗t , we must have cˆ∗t = nˆ∗t = yˆ∗t = 0.
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1.B.4 The ‘gap’ representation
The Phillips curve and Euler equation can be written in terms of the output gap,
defined as the deviation between output and the efficient level of output (yˆ∗t = 0).
Substituting the labor supply equation (1.33) into the Phillips curve (1.37) gives:
pˆit =
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψnˆt + σ
−1cˆt
)
+ βEtpˆit+1 − (1− βα) (1− α)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
=
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
((
ψ + σ−1
)
yˆt
)
+ βEtpˆit+1 − (1− βα) (1− α)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
=
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψ + σ−1
)
xˆt + βEtpˆit+1 + ut
where the second line uses market clearing and the third line uses the definition of
the output gap yˆt − yˆ∗t ≡ xˆt and defines the cost push shock, u, as:
ut ≡ −(1− α) (1− βα)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
The Phillips curve can therefore be written as:
pˆit = κxˆt + βEtpˆit+1 + ut (1.40)
where
κ ≡ (1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψ + σ−1
)
The Euler equation for consumption (1.32) can be written as:
yˆt = Etyˆt+1−σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 + Et∆φˆt+1
]
+σν˜ (1 + δ) qt+σξ˜ (1 + δ) [∆qt − βEt∆qt+1]
which incorporates the market clearing conditions for output and government bonds.
Collecting terms, this can be written as:
yˆt = Etyˆt+1−σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 + Et∆φˆt+1 − (ν + ξ (1 + β)) qt + ξqt−1 + βξEtqt+1
]
where
ν ≡ ν˜ (1 + δ)
ξ ≡ ξ˜ (1 + δ)
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In terms of the output gap we have:
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 − σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − γqt + ξqt−1 + βξEtqt+1 − r∗t
]
where
γ ≡ ν + ξ (1 + β)
and the efficient rate of interest r∗ satisfies
r∗t ≡ −Et∆φˆt+1 (1.41)
Appendix 1.C Utility-based loss function
Ignoring constants, the period utility function is:69
Ut =
[
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
− n
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
]
In what follows markup shocks are ignored (by setting ηt = η,∀t) to simplify
notation. Since these shocks are independent of policy this does not affect the
derivation.
To derive the loss function, first note that the percentage deviation of any variable
zt from steady state can itself be approximated to second order as:
zt − z
z
≈ zˆt + 1
2
zˆ2t
where zˆt ≡ ln zt − ln z.
Approximating the utility from consumption to second order gives:
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
≈ c
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ c1−
1
σ
(
ct − c
c
)
− 1
2σ
c1−
1
σ
(
ct − c
c
)2
69I also ignore the preference shock φt. The utility-based loss function is intended to provide a
preference ordering over allocations, rather than measure welfare per se. Preference orderings are
invariant to a positive monotonic transformation of the utility function. Taking logs of the period
utility function implies that φ enters in a purely additive manner and hence does not affect the
preference ordering.
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Ignoring (constant) terms that are independent of policy and denoting as ‘t.i.p.’
gives:
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
≈ c1− 1σ
(
ct − c
c
)
− 1
2σ
c1−
1
σ
(
ct − c
c
)2
+ t.i.p.
Using the second order approximation for the percentage changes in consumption
implies that:
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
≈ c1− 1σ
(
cˆt +
1
2
(
1− σ−1) cˆ2t)+ h.o.t.
where h.o.t. are higher order terms.
Following the same steps for the sub-utility function for labor supply gives:
n1+ψt
1 + ψ
≈n1+ψnt − n
n
+
ψn1+ψ
2
(
nt − n
n
)2
+ t.i.p.
≈ n1+ψ
[
nˆt +
(1 + ψ)
2
nˆ2t
]
+ h.o.t.
The steady-state labor supply relationship is
nψ = wc−1/σ = Ac−1/σ
which follows from the assumption that subsidies to firms are set to eliminate the
distortion from monopolistic competition. Steady-state market clearing is
c = y = An
since steady-state dispersion is D = 1.
With A = 1, this implies that
n1+ψ = c1−1/σ
so that the utility function can be written as
Ut ≈ c1− 1σ
[
cˆt +
1
2
(
1− σ−1) cˆ2t − nˆt − (1 + ψ)2 nˆ2t
]
(1.42)
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The goods market clearing condition is:
ct = yt −
ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
δ
bht
bhL,t
− 1
]2
− ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
[
bht
bht−1
bhL,t−1
bhL,t
− 1
]2
A second order approximation to the goods market clearing condition is:
cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t = yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t −
ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
q2t −
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
(∆qt)
2
where bˆht − bˆhL,t = qt has been imposed.
Substituting for cˆt in (1.42) gives
Ut ≈ c1− 1σ
[
yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t −
ν˜(bh+bhL)
2
q2t −
ξ˜(bh+bhL)
2
(∆qt)
2 − σ−1
2
cˆ2t
−nˆt − (1+ψ)2 nˆ2t
]
≈ c1− 1σ
[
yˆt +
1−σ−1
2
yˆ2t −
ν˜(bh+bhL)
2
q2t −
ξ˜(bh+bhL)
2
(∆qt)
2
−nˆt − (1+ψ)2 nˆ2t
]
+ h.o.t
A second order approximation to the aggregate production function is:
yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t = nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t − Dˆt
which uses the fact (shown below) that Dˆt is a second order term.
Using this result to substitute for nˆt in the utility function (and ignoring higher
order terms) gives:
Ut ≈ c1− 1σ
[
−Dˆt − ψ + σ
−1
2
yˆ2t −
ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
q2t −
ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
2
(∆qt)
2
]
Defining the discounted loss function to be minimized in terms of the approxim-
ated utility function and using the previous results gives:
L = −2c 1σ−1
∞∑
t=0
βtUt
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
2Dˆt +
(
ψ + σ−1
)
xˆ2t + ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
q2t + ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
(∆qt)
2
]
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which makes use of the fact that xˆt = yˆt.
To eliminate the price dispersion term, recall that:
Dt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)−η
dj
which in equilibrium is given by
Dt = αDt−1piηt + (1− α) (p∗t )−η
Using the price index (1.36), the optimal price can be written as
p∗t =
[
1− αpiη−1t
1− α
] 1
1−η
so the price dispersion is
Dt = αDt−1piηt + (1− α)
[
1− αpiη−1t
1− α
] η
η−1
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion gives
Dˆt ≈ α
(
Dˆt−1 + ηpˆit
)
+ (1− α)
[−αηpˆit
1− α
]
+
αη (η − 1)
2
pˆi2t +
1
2
[
α2η
1− α − αη (η − 2)
]
pˆi2t
≈ αDˆt−1 + αη
2 (1− α) pˆi
2
t
Noting that
∞∑
t=0
βtDˆt = α
∞∑
t=0
βtDˆt−1 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
αη
2 (1− α) pˆi
2
t
= αDˆ−1 + αβ
∞∑
t=1
βt−1Dˆt−1 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
αη
2 (1− α) pˆi
2
t
= αDˆ−1 + αβ
∞∑
t=0
βtDˆt +
∞∑
t=0
βt
αη
2 (1− α) pˆi
2
t
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reveals that
∞∑
t=0
βtDˆt = α
1− αβ Dˆ−1 +
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
αη
(1− αβ) (1− α) pˆi
2
t
Using this information in the definition of the loss function gives
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
αη
(1− αβ) (1− α) pˆi
2
t +
(
ψ + σ−1
)
xˆ2t + ν˜
(
bh + bhL
)
q2t + ξ˜
(
bh + bhL
)
(∆qt)
2
]
because the term in Dˆ−1 is independent of policy and can be ignored.
Appendix 1.D Rates of return and calibration of
stock and flow effects
The following results, shown by Woodford (2001) and Chen et al. (2012) are useful:
Yield to maturity ≡ Rt = V −1t + χ (1.43)
Duration ≡ Dt = RtRt − χ (1.44)
Log-linearizing the first expression gives:
RRˆt = − 1
V
Vˆt
By definition, the one-period return is also linked to the price of the long-term
bond. Log-linearizing that relationship gives:
RRˆ1L,t = −
1 + χV
V
Vˆt−1 + χVˆt =⇒ Rˆ1L,t = −Vˆt−1 +
χ
R1L
Vˆt
In a zero inflation steady state, with bond issuance in line with household pref-
erences, returns on short-term and long-term bonds are equalized at R = R1L = β
−1.
Hence:
Rˆ1L,t = −Vˆt−1 + χβVˆt
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Steady-state one-period returns can be used to pin down steady-state V
β−1 =
1 + χV
V
=⇒ V (β−1 − χ) = 1 =⇒ V = 1
β−1 − χ =
β
1− βχ
In steady state, the yield to maturity is:
R = V −1 + χ = 1− βχ
β
+ χ = β−1
which implies yield to maturity and one period returns are equalized.
So the yield to maturity can be related to the price of the bond by:
Rˆt = −β 1− βχ
β
Vˆt = − (1− βχ) Vˆt (1.45)
This expression can also be used to compute the yield to maturity from model
outcomes. Note first that the expected one-period return satisfies:
EtRˆ1L,t+1 = −Vˆt + χβEtVˆt+1
or
Vˆt = −EtRˆ1L,t+1 + χβEtVˆt+1
which can be written in terms of the yield to maturity:
Rˆt = (1− χβ)EtRˆ1L,t+1 + χβEtRˆt+1
Recall that arbitrage between short-term and long-term bonds implies:
EtR1L,t+1 =Rˆt − ν˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
bˆht − bˆhL,t
]
− ξ˜δ−1 (1 + δ)2
[
∆
(
bˆht − bˆhL,t
)
− βEt∆
(
bˆht+1 − bˆhL,t+1
)]
Imposing bond market clearing and the parameter definitions ν ≡ ν˜ (1 + δ) and
ξ ≡ ξ˜ (1 + δ) gives:
EtR1L,t+1 =Rˆt − νδ−1 (1 + δ) qt − ξδ−1 (1 + δ) [∆qt − βEt∆qt+1]
=Rˆt − νδ−1 (1 + δ) qt − ξδ−1 (1 + δ) [qt − qt−1 − βEtqt+1 + βqt]
=Rˆt − δ−1 (1 + δ) γqt + ξδ−1 (1 + δ) qt−1 + βξδ−1 (1 + δ)Etqt+1
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where γ ≡ ν + ξ (1 + β) as before.
This implies that the yield to maturity is given by:
Rˆt =χβEtRˆt+1
+ (1− χβ)
(
Rˆt − δ−1 (1 + δ) γqt + ξδ−1 (1 + δ) qt−1 + βξδ−1 (1 + δ)Etqt+1
)
These relationships are used to generate model-consistent measures of the re-
sponses of bond yields to QE auctions found by D’Amico and King (2013). Specific-
ally, D’Amico and King (2013, p441) note that $1bn of asset purchases generates
a price increase of around 0.02% for the targeted assets. They argue that this
translates into a yield effect of around 0.3 basis points for a representative ten year
security.
Equation (1.45) generates a similar result. Given the model calibration, a simple
calculation gives:
Rˆt − Et−1Rˆt = − (1− βχ)
(
Vˆt − Et−1Vˆt
)
= − (1− 0.9918× 0.975) 0.0002
= −0.000006599
which when multiplied by 400 to convert into an annualized rate of return gives
−0.00264, which is approximately 0.3 basis points.
Average QE auctions were around $5bn, so the target bond yield change is
−0.00264 × 5 = −0.013. Repeating the same calculation for the price changes
implied by the point estimate of the elasticity of price to QE purchases plus and
minus one standard deviation gives the target range used in Figure 1.2.
Appendix 1.E Profits and losses on the central
bank’s asset portfolio
This appendix derives approximate expressions for the revaluation of the central
bank’s asset portfolio under the assumption that asset purchases are financed by
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issuing interest-bearing reserves. Reserves earn the same (risk free) nominal interest
rate as short-term bonds. They are therefore perfect substitutes for short-term
bonds and (in equilibrium) households will willingly hold whatever supply of reserves
is created by the central bank. Any profits/losses on the central bank’s portfolio
are transferred to/from the government. At the start of period t the central bank’s
balance sheet is assumed to have a simple structure. The central bank holds Vt−1Q˜t−1
of previously purchased long-term bonds on the asset side, which is matched by Zt−1
of central bank reserves on the liabilities side.
The revaluation effect (or capital gain) on the central bank’s existing portfolio
is defined as:
Kt ≡ [1 + χVt − Vt−1] Q˜t−1 − [Rt−1 − 1]Zt−1
which is the change in the value of the assets minus the change in the cost of
the liabilities. The former includes the coupon payment on the long-term bond
holdings and the latter includes the risk free interest rate payment on previously
issued reserves.
The revaluation effect can be written as:
Kt =
[
R1L,t − 1
]
Qt−1 − [Rt−1 − 1]Zt−1
=
[
R1L,t −Rt−1
]
Qt−1
where the first line uses the definition of the value of assets
(
Qt−1 ≡ Vt−1Q˜t−1
)
and
the one-period return on long bonds
(
R1L,t ≡ V −1t−1 [1 + χVt]
)
and the second line uses
the fact that the central bank balance sheet satisfies Zt−1 = Vt−1Q˜t−1 at the end of
period t− 1.
Since steady-state output is normalized to unity, Kt can be interpreted as a ratio
to steady-state output. Given the assumed debt issuance policy, the revaluation
effect can be written in real terms as:
Kt ≡ Kt
Pt
=
[
R1L,t −Rt−1
]
δbqt−1 ≈ δ (b+ bL)
1 + δ
[
Rˆ1L,t − Rˆt−1
]
qt−1
Using the relationships derived in Appendix 1.D, the ex post one-period return
on long-term bonds can be written:
Rˆ1L,t = −Vˆt−1 + χβVˆt = (1− χβ)−1 Rˆt−1 − χβ (1− χβ)−1 Rˆt
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Appendix 1.F The optimal policy problem
The policymaker sets policy under discretion, with no ability to commit to future
policy plans. I seek a Markov perfect policy in which optimal decisions are a function
only of the payoff relevant state variables in the model. The policymaker at date t is
treated as a Stackelberg leader with respect to both private agents and policymakers
in dates t+ i, i ≥ 1.
Under this interpretation, the policymaker understands that future policymakers
will choose allocations according to time-invariant Markovian policy functions. I use
upper case bold letters to denote these policy functions. For example, inflation at
date t+ j is given by the function:
pˆit+j = Π (qt+j−1; zt+j) , j ≥ 1 (1.46)
where zt+j ≡ [ut+j rt+j]′ are the exogenous state variables. To simplify notation, I
present the policy functions as dependent only on q in what follows.
The loss function that the policymaker minimizes is therefore given by:
L˜t = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
ωx
2
xˆ2t+i +
ωpi
2
(pˆit+i − pi∗)2
+ωq
2
(qt+i − q∗)2 + ω∆q2 (qt+i − qt+i−1)2
)
=
ωx
2
xˆ2t +
ωpi
2
(pˆit − pi∗)2 + ωq
2
(qt − q∗)2 + ω∆q
2
(qt − qt−1)2 + βEtL˜t+1
where I consider the variant analyzed in Section 1.6 because it nests the loss function
derived in Appendix 1.C when pi∗ = q∗ = 0.
The problem can therefore be expressed as a Lagrangean:
min
{pˆit,xˆt,Rˆt,qt}
ωx
2
xˆ2t +
ωpi
2
(pˆit − pi∗)2 + ωq
2
(qt − q∗)2 + ω∆q
2
(qt − qt−1)2 + βEtL˜t+1
− λpit (pˆit − κxˆt − βEtΠ (qt)− ut)
− λxt
(
xˆt − EtX (qt)
+σ
(
Rˆt − EtΠ (qt)− γqt + ξqt−1 + βξEtQ (qt)− r∗t
) )
− λRt
(
Rˆt − β−1 + 1
)
− λq¯t (qt − q¯)− λ¯
q
t
(
qt −
¯
q
)
(1.47)
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The first order conditions are:
0 = ωpi (pˆit − pi∗)− λpit (1.48)
0 = ωxxˆt + κλ
pi
t − λxt (1.49)
0 = ωq (qt − q∗) + ω∆q (qt − qt−1) + β∂EtL˜t+1
∂qt
+ β
∂EtΠ (qt)
∂qt
λpit
+
[
∂EtX (qt)
∂qt
+ σ
∂EtΠ (qt)
∂qt
+ σγ − βσξ∂EtQ (qt)
∂qt
]
λxt − λq¯t − λ¯
q
t (1.50)
0 = − σλxt − λRt (1.51)
The first order condition for quantitative easing, (1.50), indicates that the poli-
cymaker accounts for the effects of current QE decisions on the losses incurred by
future policymakers.
The solutions for a number of cases corresponding to whether or not the con-
straints on the instruments are binding are considered in turn. Expectations are
taken as given (i.e., known). As described in Appendix 1.F.3, the solution proced-
ure uses the previous guess of the policy functions to compute expectations and then
refines the policy function guess conditional on those expectations, iterating in this
way until the policy functions converge.
1.F.1 Interior optimum for the policy instruments
Note that we can write the Euler equation as
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 − σ
[
R˜t − Etpˆit+1 − r˜∗t
]
(1.52)
where
R˜t ≡ Rˆt − γqt (1.53)
denotes the ‘effective’ policy rate and
r˜∗t ≡ r∗t − ξqt−1 − βξEtqt+1 (1.54)
is the ‘effective’ efficient real interest rate.
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This variant of the model is isomorphic to the standard New Keynesian model,
conditional on past QE and expected future QE. When the zero bound on the short
term interest rate Rˆ does not bind, the multipliers on the zero bound constraint and
IS curve are zero:
λRt = λ
x
t = 0
In this case, the optimal effective policy rate can be computed using the following
steps.
1. When λxt = 0 the first order conditions imply a targeting criterion:
xˆt = −ωpiκ
ωx
(pˆit − pi∗) (1.55)
2. Using (1.55) to eliminate the output gap from the Phillips curve implies a
solution for inflation:
pˆit =
(
1 +
ωpiκ
2
ωx
)−1 [
κ
ωpiκ
ωx
pi∗ + βEtpˆit+1 + ut
]
3. A solution for the output gap can be computed by plugging the solution for
inflation derived in Step 2 into the targeting criterion (1.55).
4. With these solutions in hand, the optimal effective policy rate can be computed
from the Euler equation as:
R˜t = σ
−1 (Etxˆt+1 − xˆt) + Etpˆit+1 + r˜∗t
5. The next step is to determine whether the optimal effective policy rate can
be delivered as an interior optimum for the policy instruments. Under the
assumption that the solution for q is an interior solution (
¯
qt ≤ qt ≤ q¯t), it is
the case that λq¯t = λ¯
q
t = 0 and so the first order condition for q can be solved
to give:70
qt =
ωq
ωq + ω∆q
q∗ +
ω∆q
ωq + ω∆q
qt−1
− β
ωq + ω∆q
[
∂EtΠ (qt)
∂qt
ωpi (pˆit − pi∗) + ∂EtL˜t+1
∂qt
]
(1.56)
70Recall also that at this stage in the solution process, it is assumed that the zero bound on the
policy rate does not bind, so that λxt = 0.
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6. If the solution for qt from equation (1.56) is indeed an interior solution, the
optimal policy rate can be computed as Rˆt = R˜t + γqt. If this value of Rˆt is
greater than the zero bound, the solution computed from these steps represents
the equilibrium.
1.F.2 Bounded instruments
The steps presented in Appendix 1.F.1 may fail to deliver a valid equilibrium for two
reasons: the implied level of quantitative easing may violate the upper and lower
bounds on q; or the implied level of the policy rate required to deliver the desired
effective policy rate may violate the zero bound.
Suppose first that Step 5 in Appendix 1.F.1 delivers a solution for qt which
violates the bounds. In this case, the solution for qt is set to the relevant bound
value.71 If the optimal policy rate Rˆt = R˜t + γqt computed using this value for qt is
greater than the zero bound, then this represents the equilibrium.
In the event that the value of Rˆt computed in Step 6 in Appendix 1.F.1 is below
the zero bound, the system is solved as follows. I first assume that, even though the
zero bound on the policy instrument is binding, there is an interior solution for QE
71If the solution to (1.56) is less than
¯
q, then set qt =
¯
q. If the solution is greater than q¯, set
qt = q¯.
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(so that λq¯t = λ¯
q
t = 0).
72 In this case, the equilibrium solves the following system:
ωpi 0 0 0 0 −1
0 ωx 0 0 −1 κ
0 0 0 ωq + ω∆q Dxˆ + σDpˆi + σγ − βσξDq βDpˆi
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 σ −σγ 0 0
1 −κ 0 0 0 0

×

pˆit
xˆt
Rˆt
qt
λxt
λpit

=

ωpipi
∗
0
ωqq
∗ + ω∆qqt−1 − β ∂EtL˜t+1∂qt
1− β−1
Etxˆt+1 + σ [Etpˆit+1 + r˜∗t ]
βEtpˆit+1 + ut

where the following notation for derivatives of expectations of variable zt+1 with
respect to qt is used to simplify the expressions:
Dz ≡ ∂Etzt+1
∂qt
This system can be solved by matrix inversion. If the solution for qt is an interior
solution, then the equilibrium allocations have been found. Otherwise the solution
is found by setting qt to the relevant bound value and solving the following recursive
solutions.
1. The output gap is
xˆt =
{
Etxˆt+1 − σ [1− β−1 − γq¯ − Etpˆit+1 − r˜∗t ] if qt = q¯ binds
Etxˆt+1 − σ
[
1− β−1 − γ
¯
q − Etpˆit+1 − r˜∗t
]
if qt =
¯
q binds
2. Inflation is:
pˆit = κxˆt + βEtpˆit+1 + ut
72The reasoning is the following. The solution computed in the previous subsection assumed
that there was an interior solution. Therefore the solution for qt was derived conditional on λ
x
t = 0.
If the zero bound on Rˆt is binding, the multiplier λ
x
t is non-zero and hence the solution for qt implied
by the general first order condition (1.50) may admit an interior solution.
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1.F.3 Solution algorithm details
The preceding subsections detailed the optimal policy problem and elements of the
solution. To solve for policy functions X,Π,Q,R a simple policy function iteration
scheme is used. The policy functions are defined over a grid for the state vector
s ≡ {u, r∗, q−1} formed as a tensor product of three linearly spaced vectors. The
vector for q−1 is defined on the range
[¯
q, q¯
]
with 101 nodes and the grids for ut and
rt are specified across ±4 standard deviations with 25 and 101 nodes respectively.
The state space is therefore S ≡ Su × Sr∗ × Sq−1 with typical element s.
The iteration scheme to update the estimates of the policy functions is as follows,
where the superscript j indexes the iteration number (j = 1, . . . ):
1. Form P j ≡ {Xj,Πj,Qj,Rj}. To do so:
a) For each s ∈ S compute solutions for {xˆ, pˆi, q, rˆ} by using the procedure
set out in Appendix 1.F.1 and (if necessary) the steps set out in Appendix
1.F.2.
b) These solutions are conditional on expected outcomes, which are com-
puted using Gauss-Hermite quadrature for the shocks to exogenous states
(εu and εr) using five nodes for each shock.
c) Expectations are computed by integrating over the estimated policy func-
tions from the previous iteration: {Xj−1,Πj−1,Qj−1,Rj−1}.
d) Derivatives are computed using a finite difference method on Sq−1 . Linear
interpolation is used to estimate the value of the derivative conditional
on the value of the current stock of QE (i.e., q, which is the relevant state
variable for expected outcomes) using the previous estimate of the policy
function Qj−1.
2. Update the estimate of the loss function using
L˜t = ωx
2
xˆ2t +
ωpi
2
(pˆit − pi∗)2 + ωq
2
(qt − q∗)2 + ω∆q
2
(qt − qt−1)2 + βEtL˜t+1
a) The loss function is computed for each s ∈ S. Expectations are computed
using the quadrature scheme described above.
b) Convergence of the solution for the loss function is very slow, so the
solution algorithm performs policy function iteration a number of times
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(up to 10 depending on whether successive iterations are within solution
tolerance) for each iteration on the policy functions.
3. If min |vec (P j − P j−1)| <  then stop, otherwise return to Step 1. I set
 = 10−6.
One thing to note about this solution approach is that it does not involve solving
a fixed point problem in step 1(a). For example, the first order condition for q for
an interior solution, (1.56), implies that q is a function of the derivative of expected
inflation with respect to q. So the right hand side of the equation for q is itself a
function of q. One approach would be to solve for q as the fixed point of the equation
for each point in S. However, such an approach is computationally intensive, so
instead I use derivative of expected inflation with respect to q evaluated using the
previous iteration of the q policy function (that is, Qj−1). As the policy functions
converge, Qj−1 → Qj and the derivative is computed at the fixed point value of
q. Approximations for the policy functions for the yield to maturity are computed
using a simple variant of the policy function iteration approach.
Appendix 1.G Equilibrium without the zero
bound
In the case in which there is no zero bound on the short term interest rate, the
model is linear and it is possible to derive analytical expressions for the endogenous
variables in terms of the state variables r∗ and u.
The model is solved for the general case, in which the policymaker may be
minimizing a delegated loss function so that q∗ and pi∗ may be non-zero. The initial
stock of QE inherited by the monetary policymaker is assumed to be q−1 = q∗.
In this case, the subsequent choices of QE satisfy qt = q
∗,∀t. This follows from
inspection of the first order condition (1.50). First note that an interior solution for
QE implies λq¯t = λ¯
q
t = 0 and the absence of a zero bound on Rˆt implies that λ
R
t = 0.
The remaining condition for the conjectured policy qt = q
∗ to be optimal is that
∂Etpˆit+1
∂qt
= 0. This is indeed the case if Rˆt can always be freely chosen. In that case,
equilibrium outcomes for the output gap and inflation are uniquely pinned down
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by the effective policy rate R˜t which in turn can be set to any required value by
an appropriate choice of Rˆt. This implies that qt−1 ceases to be a meaningful state
variable in the model, because monetary conditions can be chosen independently of
the level of quantitative easing.
If qt = q
∗, then the optimal allocations for inflation and the output gap satisfy:
xˆt = −κωpi
ωx
(pit − pi∗)
which can be substituted into the Phillips curve (1.9) to give:
pit = βEtpˆit+1 − κ
2ωpi
ωx
(pit − pi∗) + ut
or
pit =
βωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
Etpˆit+1 +
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi
pi∗ +
ωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
ut
=
∞∑
i=0
(
βωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
)i(
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi
pi∗ +
ωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
ut+i
)
=
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ +
ωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
∞∑
i=0
(
βωxρu
ωx + κ2ωpi
)i
ut
=
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ +
ωx
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
where we make use of the fact that:
∞∑
i=0
(
βωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
)i
=
1
1− βωx
ωx+κ2ωpi
=
ωx + κ
2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωx
and similarly
∞∑
i=0
(
βρuωx
ωx + κ2ωpi
)i
=
1
1− βρuωx
ωx+κ2ωpi
=
ωx + κ
2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρu
The targeting criterion implies that the output gap is:
xˆt = −κωpi
ωx
(
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ +
ωx
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut − pi
∗
)
= −κωpi
ωx
(
κ2ωpi − ωx − κ2ωpi + βωx
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωx pi
∗ +
ωx
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
)
=
(1− β)κωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ − κωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
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To solve for the nominal interest rate, note that:
Etxˆt+1 =
(1− β)κωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ − κωpiρu
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
Etpit+1 =
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ +
ωxρu
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
Using this in the IS curve (1.8) gives:
− κωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut =−
κωpiρu
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
− σ
(
Rˆt − νδq∗ − κ2ωpiωx+κ2ωpi−βωxpi∗
− ωxρu
ωx+κ2ωpi−βωxρuut − r∗
)
So
σ
(
Rˆt − νq∗ − κ
2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ − ωxρu
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut − r
∗
)
=
κωpi (1− ρu)
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρuut
Or
σ
(
Rˆt − νq∗ − κ
2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ − r∗
)
=
σωxρu + κωpi (1− ρu)
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρu ut
Which implies that the nominal interest rate satisfies:
Rˆt = r
∗
t +
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ + νq∗ +
σωxρu + κωpi (1− ρu)
σ (ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρu)ut (1.57)
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With qt = q
∗,∀t, the yield to maturity is given by:
Rˆt = (1− χβ)
(
Rˆt − νδ−1 (1 + δ) q∗
)
+ χβEtRˆt+1
= (1− χβ)Et
∞∑
j=0
(χβ)j
(
Rˆt − νδ−1 (1 + δ) q∗
)
=− νδ−1 (1 + δ) q∗
+ (1− χβ)Et
∞∑
j=0
(χβ)j
[
r∗t+j +
κ2ωpi
ωx+κ2ωpi−βωxpi
∗ + νδq∗
+ σωxρu+κωpi(1−ρu)
σ(ωx+κ2ωpi−βωxρu)ut+j
]
=− νδ−1 (1 + δ) q∗ + 1− χβ
1− χβρr r
∗
t +
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ + νδq∗
+
1− χβ
1− χβρu
σωxρu + κωpi (1− ρu)
σ (ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρu)ut
Collecting terms gives:
Rˆt = 1− χβ
1− χβρr r
∗
t +
κ2ωpi
ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxpi
∗ − νδ−1q∗
+
1− χβ
1− χβρu
σωxρu + κωpi (1− ρu)
σ (ωx + κ2ωpi − βωxρu)ut
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Chapter 2
Monetary financing with
interest-bearing money∗
Abstract
Recent results suggesting that monetary financing is more expansionary than
bond financing in standard New Keynesian models rely on a duality between
policies specified in terms of money growth and the short-term bond rate,
rather than a special role for money. Two features are added to a simple sticky-
price model to generalize these results. First, that money may earn a strictly
positive rate of return, motivated by recent debates on central bank digital
currencies and interest-bearing reserves. This allows money-financed transfers
to be used as a policy instrument at the effective lower bound, without giving
up the ability to use the short-term bond rate to stabilize the economy in
normal times. Second, a simple financial friction generates a wealth effect on
household spending from government liabilities. Though temporary money-
financed transfers to households can stimulate spending and inflation when the
short-term bond rate is at the lower bound, similar effects could be achieved
by bond-financed tax cuts.
2.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis prompted macroeconomic policymakers to employ a range
of unconventional policies to stabilize economic activity and inflation, as short-term
policy rates hit the effective lower bound. Despite these dramatic policy actions, the
∗This chapter is co-authored with Ryland Thomas.
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protracted effects of the crisis and the potential limits to unconventional measures
have prompted proposals for fiscal stimulus as a policy tool. In particular, many
have argued that this stimulus should be financed by money creation, as money-
financed deficits are argued to have some direct effect on spending and lead to a
smaller crowding out effect via higher interest rates.
Recent research has analyzed the effects of money-financed fiscal policies using
conventional New Keynesian models (Gal´ı, 2014a; English, Erceg, and Lo´pez-Salido,
2017), under the standard assumption that money earns no interest. In such models
there is no wealth effect from a money-financed deficit even if money earns no interest
and does not require higher future taxes to meet the servicing costs of conventional
government debt (Weil, 1991).
In this chapter, a small sticky price model is used to study the possible advantages
of money-financed transfers to households, relative to conventional fiscal policy,
when the economy is in a temporary liquidity trap. The model is standard in most
respects. Firms maximize profits, subject to price adjustment costs. Households
maximize utility. Money alleviates transactions frictions faced by households.
However, the model includes two important features that permit previous results
to be extended. First, money may earn a strictly positive rate of return. This is
motivated by the recent debates on the introduction of central bank digital currencies
(which in some forms could be remunerated) and the introduction of interest-bearing
central bank reserves in many economies following the financial crisis. Second, a
simple financial friction implies that households regard government liabilities as net
wealth (Weil, 1991; Ireland, 2005).
The first feature allows policymakers to control the stock of money independ-
ently of the nominal interest rate on short-term government bonds. In contrast,
conventional monetary models assume that the rate of interest on money is zero.
Monetary policy in these models is implemented either by a policy rule for the evol-
ution of the money stock or by a policy rule for the rate of interest on short-term
nominal bonds. The latter can be implemented by supplying whatever quantity of
money is required (via open market operations in short-term bonds) to deliver the
rate of interest implied by the rule. This conventional approach implies a duality
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between the rate of money growth and the short-term bond rate.1 This approach
therefore allows a comparison of the effects of monetary and bond-financed transfers
for a given monetary policy rule.
The second feature of the model implies that expansions of government liabilities
(money and one-period government bonds) do have the potential to increase aggreg-
ate demand through a wealth effect. To incorporate this effect it is assumed that
each period households face a constant probability of a default-like event that re-
stricts participation in asset markets (Castelnuovo and Nistico`, 2010; Nistico`, 2012;
Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson, 2015a). The presence of this friction implies
that, in equilibrium, households ‘over-discount’ future income streams. One implic-
ation is that changes in real money balances can stimulate spending by increasing
households’ net wealth. This implementation implies that the wealth effect also ap-
plies to bond-financed stimulus, which permits an assessment of whether there are
specific benefits to money-financed fiscal actions.
Simulations using the model show that recent proposals for money-financed fiscal
stimulus (in particular, Gal´ı, 2014a) rely on the conventional duality between the
rate of money growth and the short-term bond rate.2 The results confirm the find-
ings of English et al. (2017), who show that the stimulative effects of such policies
are determined by the fact that the money supply rule implies that the short-term
bond rate responds weakly to inflation, rather than because of any special property
of money itself. These results are extended to demonstrate that the macroeconomic
responses to non-fiscal shocks may be undesirable when this type of monetary policy
rule is used.
With interest-bearing money, the policymaker can control the money stock in-
dependently of the short-term bond rate. This allows monetary transfers to be used
as a policy instrument at the effective lower bound, without giving up the ability
to use the short-term bond rate to stabilize the economy in response to shocks in
normal times.
1This duality is a well-known feature of conventional monetary models. A textbook analysis
can be found in Woodford (2003, Chapter 2).
2Since this chapter was completed, a revised version of Gal´ı (2014a) has been published (as Gal´ı,
2019). The published version of the paper acknowledges that the money financing rule requires
abandonment of control of the short-term nominal interest rate.
101
2.1. Introduction
The potential quantitative effects of such policies are explored by simulating
the effects of a temporary increase in the rate of money growth. Monetary policy
continues to be governed by a rule for the short-term bond rate. So for households
to willingly hold the additional money balances, the rate of interest on money must
be increased. Under these conditions, the simulations show that money-financed
transfers to households can increase output and inflation when the economy is in a
temporary liquidity trap. Moreover, such transfers increase household wealth and
hence spending and inflation, even if they are implemented in the form of a temporary
increase in the stock of money.
However, these results reveal three reasons to be cautious about the use of money-
financed transfers to stimulate the economy at the lower bound. First, the scale of
the monetary transfers required to deliver a meaningful increase in aggregate demand
and inflation is likely to be extremely large. Second, the frictions in the model
suggest that equivalent effects could be achieved by an increase in government debt,
without requiring interest-bearing money. Finally, the stimulative effect of money-
financed transfers is likely to be sensitive to the precise nature of the frictions that
give rise to a meaningful role for money and the policy rule used to set the short-term
bond rate.
The simulation results represent a quantitative contribution to the recent de-
bate on the potential efficacy of money-financed policy measures in a liquidity trap.
Many recent contributions refer to the idea of ‘helicopter drops’, named for Milton
Friedman’s famous thought experiment in which “a helicopter [. . . ] drops an addi-
tional $1,000 in bills from the sky”.3 These contributions follow Bernanke (2002)
and interpret Friedman’s thought experiment as “essentially equivalent” to a money-
financed tax cut. Prominent recent proponents of such policies include Bernanke
(2016), Buiter (2014) and Turner (2015).4
Other recent work has studied the implications of interest-bearing money or
reserves (see, for example, Ireland, 2014). The primary interest for this chapter is the
3Friedman (1969).
4Many economists have used blog posts to set out the arguments for and against helicopter
drops. See, for example, Bossone, Fazi, and Wood (2014), Bossone (2013), Cabellero (2010), Gal´ı
(2014b), Grenville (2013), Reichlin, Turner, and Woodford (2013), Wren-Lewis (2014) and Yates
(2014).
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extent to which an additional policy instrument expands the set of possible outcomes
achievable by monetary and fiscal policies, under the conventional New Keynesian
assumption that the government adjusts taxes to stabilize the real present value of its
nominal liabilities, for all possible paths of the price level.5 This approach abstracts
from potential implications of interest-bearing money operating via the government’s
present value budget constraint as studied by Buiter (2014) and Cochrane (2014),
among others.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the model.
Section 2.3 analyzes money-financed government spending shocks, following Gal´ı
(2014a) and English et al. (2017). Section 2.4 examines the efficacy of money-
financed transfers to households when the return on money is adjusted to ensure
that households willingly hold the additional money. Section 2.5 investigates the
sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about the specification of money
demand. Section 2.6 relates the results to several issues raised in recent discussions
of the likely efficacy of monetary-financed fiscal stimulus, including the importance
of allowing the rate of return on money to be adjusted. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The model
This section provides a description of the baseline model, focusing on the innova-
tions. A full derivation is presented in Appendix 2.B.
The infinite-horizon model is cast in discrete time, with time periods indexed by
t = 1, . . . ,∞. Agents in the model have perfect foresight.
A simple financial friction causes households to regard government liabilities
as net wealth. Similarly to Castelnuovo and Nistico` (2010), Nistico` (2012) and
Del Negro et al. (2015a), among others, households are assumed to face a risk of
a default-like event that restricts participation in asset markets. Specifically, each
household is subject to a fixed per-period probability of experiencing an ‘asset reset’
event that causes the household’s previously accumulated assets to be lost. After
5That is, fiscal policy is ‘passive’ in the sense of Leeper (1991).
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a household experiences an ‘asset reset’ they must reformulate a new consumption
plan starting from a zero asset position.6
The asset reset friction effectively causes households to discount the future more
heavily than otherwise. The fact that previously accumulated assets may be lost
creates a disincentive to save for future consumption and a stronger incentive to use
assets to finance current consumption, given the risk that those assets may be lost in
future periods. These properties of the model imply that even temporary increases
in holdings of government liabilities can have net wealth effects that stimulate con-
sumption.
2.2.1 Individual households
The population consists of a continuum of households of measure one. A household
that last experienced an asset reset at date j faces a budget constraint in period
t ≥ j given by:
Mpj,t
Pt
+
Bpj,t
Pt
= γ−1
[
RMt M
p
j,t−1
Pt
+
RtB
p
j,t−1
Pt
]
+ w˜j,t−
(
1 + ϕ
(
cj,t
Mpj,t/Pt
))
cj,t (2.1)
The household invests in money (M) and short-term government bonds (B) and
receives interest income from its portfolio of money and bonds (at gross nominal
rates RM and R respectively) and real net labor income (w˜, defined below). Net
labor income and net proceeds from portfolio changes are used to finance expenditure
on consumption, c, which is measured inclusive of transactions costs (ϕ, discussed
below). The price of consumption is denoted by P .
Throughout, nominal quantities and prices are denoted using upper case letters,
real valued quantities and relative prices (relative to P ) are denoted using lower case
letters. Similarly to the notation of Buiter (2005), the p superscript denotes private
sector demand for assets. Interest rates are defined so that Rt+1 is the (gross) rate of
6This approach is similar to the perpetual youth model of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985),
in which a randomly selected fraction of the population dies each period and is replaced by a
cohort of newborn households. The ‘asset reset’ interpretation is preferred because it allows the
calibration of the asset reset probability to be tied to factors (other than mortality) that are likely
to cause households to discount the future more heavily. Section 2.2.8 discusses this in more detail.
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return on a bond held between periods t and t+1. So Rt+1 and R
M
t+1 are determined
at date t. The net rate of return on money may be positive (so that RM > 1) and
vary over time.
The total returns on assets reflect the presence of the asset reset mechanism.
Returns on bonds and money are adjusted by 0 < γ ≤ 1, which is the (constant)
probability that the household reaches the following period without losing their
accumulated assets. This reflects the presence of an actuarially fair insurance market
that pools the risk of asset resets across households.7
By definition, an asset reset means that the household has no previously accu-
mulated assets. So Mt−1,t = Bt−1,t = 0, for a household that experienced an asset
reset in the previous period (j = t− 1).
The real net income of the household is defined as:
w˜j,t ≡ wtnj,t + dj,t − τj,t
where the household receives labor income (real wage w times labor supply, n) and
lump sum transfers (either positive or negative) in the form of real dividends (d)
and tax/transfer payments from the government, τ . All elements are expressed in
real terms (i.e., nominal income/expenditures deflated by the price level, P ).
Money provides transactions services (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2010; Del Negro
and Sims, 2015). The transaction cost, ϕ, associated with each unit of consump-
tion is a declining function of the household’s holdings of money relative to their
consumption. That is, ϕ = ϕ (vj,t), with ϕ
′ (vj,t) > 0 and vj,t ≡ Ptcj,t/Mpj,t.
Following Del Negro and Sims (2015), the transactions cost function is given by:
ϕ (vj,t) = Z exp
[
− ζ
vj,t
]
where Z, ζ > 0.
7Assets taken from those households who are randomly selected for an asset reset (with prob-
ability 1 − γ) are redistributed among those households who do not experience an asset reset in
proportion to their asset holdings.
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The household maximizes a time-separable and additively separable lifetime util-
ity function specified over consumption and hours worked:
max
∞∑
t=0
(γβ)t ϑt
[
ln cj,t − χj,t
1 + ψ
n1+ψj,t
]
(2.2)
where ϑt and χj,t are exogenous shocks to utility. The first order conditions are
derived in Appendix 2.B.1.
The effective discount factor for the household has two components. The factor
0 < β < 1 captures the standard assumption that households discount future utility
relative to current utility. The additional factor 0 < γ ≤ 1 reflects the fact that
previously accumulated assets are reset to zero with a probability of 1 − γ each
period. Thus γ is the probability that a current consumption plan is still in effect
next period.8
Variations in ϑt generate fluctuations in output and inflation that the monetary
policymaker will seek to stabilize in the simulations studied in Section 2.4. The
exogenous process for ϑt, common to all households, is:
∆ lnϑt+1 = ρϑ∆ lnϑt + ε
ϑ
t (2.3)
where ρϑ ∈ [0, 1) governs the persistence of ϑ and εϑ is an exogenous disturbance.
The disutility of labor supply is also subject to a preference shifter, χj,t. Al-
though χj,t depends on the households’ last reset date j as well as t, each individual
household treats χj,t parametrically as it is a function of cohort-j aggregates rather
than an individual household’s decisions.
The first order conditions for labor and consumption derived in Appendix 2.B.1
can be combined to give a labor supply relationship:
χj,tn
ψ
j,t =
wt
cj,t
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)] (2.4)
8The only state variables in the household’s problem are asset stocks. Since these are are not
carried forward in the event that the household’s assets are reset, utility flows when the household
experiences a reset are independent of the expected utility flow enjoyed until the point that a reset
does occur. This means that the relevant maximand for the household is the latter.
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where v denotes the aggregate velocity of circulation.9
While all households that last experienced an asset reset on the same date make
identical decisions, the consumption levels of households that experienced resets at
different dates will vary depending on the assets that have been accumulated in the
meantime. If χ was fixed then, in principle, some households could accumulate a
stock of assets to support a level of consumption sufficiently large that the solution
to (2.4) implies an arbitrarily small number of hours worked (nj,t → 0), which
complicates aggregation.10
This choice of preferences is intended to be simple and conventional, particularly
for the case in which γ = 1. However, when γ < 1, each household’s consumption
will increase over time, even in the steady state. If labor supply decisions depend
on consumption, then a household’s expected labor income and human wealth will
depend on the date of their last asset reset, which complicates aggregation. In order
to simplify, it is therefore assumed that χj,t evolves over time in a way that offsets
the effects of cohort-specific consumption on labor supply decisions.
Specifically, the preference shifter is given by:
χj,t = χ
ct
c¯j,t
(2.5)
where c¯j,t denotes the average consumption level of households that last experienced
an asset reset in period j and ct is aggregate consumption. This specification of pref-
erences therefore includes a “consumption externality in labor supply” similar to the
method used by Gal´ı, Smets, and Wouters (2011) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)
to reduce wealth effects on labor supply in business cycle models. However, equation
(2.5) is designed not to mitigate wealth effects, but rather to remove distributional
effects generated by differences in the date on which households last experienced an
asset reset.
9Appendix 2.B.1 shows that the chosen form of the transactions cost function generates a
money demand function with the property that velocity is identical for all households.
10Ascari and Rankin (2007) note that for some utility functions this effect may even imply that
some households wish to supply a negative quantity of hours. The authors demonstrate how a
generalization of the preferences proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) can be
used to avoid the problem.
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In equilibrium, all households that experienced a reset in the same period will
make identical decisions, so that cj,t = c¯j,t,∀j. This implies that the labor supply
relationship becomes
χnψj,t =
wt
ct
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)] (2.6)
so that all households will supply the same labor, regardless of when they last
experienced an asset reset. This means that the human wealth of all households is
the same, facilitating aggregation.11
2.2.2 Firms
A set of monopolistically competitive producers indexed by j ∈ (0, 1) produce differ-
entiated products that form a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle that is purchased by households.
Preferences over differentiated products are given by
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y1−η
−1
j,t dj
] 1
1−η−1
where yj is firm j’s output.
Firms produce using a constant returns production function in the single input
(labor):
yj,t = Anj,t
where A is a productivity parameter.
Firms are subject to Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment costs, so that the real
profit of producer j is:
Pj,t
Pt
yj,t−wtnj,t−Φ
2
(
Pj,t
pi∗Pj,t−1
− 1
)2
=
(
Pj,t
Pt
− wt
A
)(
Pj,t
Pt
)−η
yt−Φ
2
(
Pj,t
pi∗Pj,t−1
− 1
)2
where Φ ≥ 0 is the parameter governing the strength of price adjustment costs, which
are indexed to the steady-state inflation rate (the inflation target, pi∗). Profits are
distributed lump sum as dividends to households with each household receiving an
equal share, regardless of the date at which they last experienced an asset reset.
11In a version of the model in which there are no asset resets (γ = 1), there is a single rep-
resentative household and there is no distinction between individual consumption, average cohort
consumption and aggregate consumption. That is, ct = c¯j,t = cj,t. In that case χj,t = χ and so
equations (2.6) and (2.4) are equivalent.
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2.2.3 Monetary policy
The short-term bond rate is adjusted according to a simple rule, similar to that
examined by Taylor (1993), subject to an effective lower bound:
Rt+1 = max
{
R
ϑt
ϑt+1
( pit
pi∗
)θpi ( yt
yft
)θy
,
¯
R
}
(2.7)
where R denotes the steady-state bond rate and
¯
R ≥ 1 is the effective lower bound.
Away from the effective lower bound, the policy rate is adjusted in response
to deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap. The output gap is
computed relative to the level of output that would prevail under flexible prices,
yft .
12 The coefficients θpi > 1 and θy > 0 determine the strength of the policy
response. The inclusion of the term ϑt
ϑt+1
in the rule incorporates an approximation
to exogenous variations in the natural rate of interest that the policymaker seeks to
offset.13
2.2.4 Fiscal policy
The period government budget constraint is:
M gt +B
g
t = R
M
t M
g
t−1 +RtB
g
t−1 + Pt (gt − τt) (2.8)
where the g superscript indicates that the quantities refer to government choices of
liabilities. The flow budget constraint says that the government issues money and
bonds to finance its interest payments on existing liabilities and the primary deficit.
The government budget constraint is written in terms of economy-wide aggregates.
12As is common in models with transactions frictions, flexible price allocations are not inde-
pendent of the levels of the nominal interest rates on bonds and money. Following Kim and
Subramanian (2006) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), a ‘supply side’ flexible price equilibrium
concept, conditional on steady-state nominal returns on money and bonds is used. See Appendix
2.B.5 for a full derivation.
13In the absence of transactions frictions and the asset reset mechanism, the aggregate Euler
equation would be ct =
pit+1
β
ϑt
ϑt+1
1
Rt+1
ct+1. Under flexible prices with inflation at target, the rate
of interest that keeps consumption stable is: Rt+1 =
pi∗
β
ϑt
ϑt+1
. As noted previously, the presence of
transactions frictions complications the definition of the flexible price equilibrium. See Appendix
2.B.5.
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We assume that the pattern of government spending is determined exogenously
by:
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + (1− ρg) ln g∗ + εgt (2.9)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1) controls the persistence of the process, g∗ > 0 is the steady state
level of government spending and εgt is an exogenous disturbance.
As the focus of this chapter is the effects of money-financed fiscal policies, for
the simulations in Section 2.4 the government is assumed to hold the real debt stock
constant:
bgt = b
∗
where, bgt = B
g
t /Pt, though other experiments relax this assumption.
2.2.5 Money-financed transfers
Two specifications for the determination of equilibrium money holdings are con-
sidered.
In the first specification, no interest is paid on money: RMt = 1,∀t. The pattern
of money holdings is determined by the demand for money, given the short-term
bond rateRt set according to the policy rule (2.7). This is the conventional approach.
The second specification is to allow the monetary authority to directly control
the stock of money Mt. This permits an analysis of the effects of a money-financed
transfer to households. In this case, the stock of money is determined by a rule
and the central bank adjusts RMt to ensure that households are willing to hold that
stock. In Section 2.4 this specification is used to analyze the effects of money-
financed transfers when the short-term bond rate is constrained by the effective
lower bound.
The baseline assumptions for fiscal policy in those experiments are that govern-
ment spending and debt are held fixed in real terms. Inspection of the government
budget constraint (2.8) indicates that, if the short-term bond rate is fixed at
¯
R, an
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increase in M gt requires a reduction in nominal lump sum taxes Ptτt. This observa-
tion shows that expansions in the money stock can be interpreted as money-financed
net transfers, such that the overall level of lump sum taxation falls.14
These observations show that a money-financed transfer is a fiscal policy action.
However, since central banks generally have operational responsibility for the cre-
ation of base money, there is a debate over the feasibility of such policies under
traditional institutional relationships between the central bank and fiscal authority.
For example, Benigno and Nistico (2015) and Del Negro and Sims (2015) study
cases in which the composition of public sector liabilities might have an effect on
equilibrium allocations. These authors focus on cases in which the central bank and
government have separate intertemporal budget constraints. While these issues are
indeed likely to be of practical importance, the model sidesteps such concerns by
assuming that there is a single consolidated (government and central bank) budget
constraint for two reasons.
First, the model is configured so that there is as much chance as possible for
money-financed fiscal policies to be effective. Even advocates of monetary finan-
cing in principle acknowledge the potential institutional difficulties with implement-
ation.15 These concerns are set aside here to focus on the potential efficacy of
monetary-financed fiscal policy under the assumption that such institutional diffi-
culties can be solved.
Second, there are real-world examples of mechanisms to ensure that capital in-
jections from the government to cover potential losses on the central bank’s balance
sheet arising from unconventional policies are guaranteed ex ante.16 So the as-
sumption of a single consolidated government budget constraint is not necessarily
unrealistic.
14For a sufficiently large expansion in Mgt , τt may become negative so that the government
makes gross transfers to households.
15See, for example, Turner (2015, Chapter 14).
16One example of such an arrangement is the indemnity provided by the UK government on
any losses sustained by the Asset Purchase Facility used by the Bank of England to conduct
quantitative easing.
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2.2.6 Market clearing
Asset market clearing requires equality between government supply of assets and
private sector demand. Superscripts are removed for market clearing equilibrium
asset stocks:
bpt = b
g
t = bt (2.10)
mpt = m
g
t = mt (2.11)
Goods market clearing requires that output, net of adjustment costs, is purchased
by the government or consumed by households:
yt = ct + gt +
Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
(2.12)
which implies that the dividend paid by firms to each household is:
dt = yt − Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
− wtnt (2.13)
2.2.7 Aggregation
The heterogeneity across households’ asset reset dates requires aggregation across
these cohorts to obtain aggregate quantities. Each variable x is aggregated as follows:
xt ≡
t∑
j=−∞
γt−j (1− γ)xj,t
where xt is the aggregate quantity, xj,t is the quantity chosen by each household
that last experienced an asset reset at date j ≤ t and γt−j (1− γ) is the share of
that cohort in the population.
Appendix 2.B.2 demonstrates that the aggregate money demand equation is:
mt = ζ
−1
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
]
ct (2.14)
and that aggregate consumption satisfies:
c˜t =
pit+1
βRt+1
ϑ˜t
ϑ˜t+1
[
c˜t+1 + (1− γ) γ−1µt+1pi−1t+1
(
RMt+1mt +Rt+1bt
)]
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where µ is the marginal propensity to consume from wealth, c˜t = (1 + ϕ (vt)) ct
denotes consumption inclusive of transactions costs and
ϑ˜t ≡ ϑt (1 + ϕ (vt))
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)
2.2.8 Parameter values
Table 2.1 summarizes the parameter values for the baseline version of the model.
Each time period is interpreted as one quarter of a year. The parameters A and χ
are used to normalize steady-state output and labor supply to 1.17 Most parameter
values are set with reference to those in other studies, or to deliver the same steady-
state allocations as those studies. Appendix 2.B.6 provides details of the required
calculations. The discussion focuses on the parameters of most relevance to the
present inquiry.
Table 2.1: Model parameters
Value Source/motivation
pi∗ 1.005 Annual inflation target of 2%
β 0.99917 Steady-state annual real interest rate ≈ 1.5%
γ 0.97 Del Negro et al. (2015a)
g∗ 0.2 Sims and Wolff (2013)
b∗ 2 Reinhart et al. (2012) (advanced economies, pre-crisis)
Z 20.33 m
c
= 0.428 (Del Negro and Sims, 2015)
ζ 25.75 Del Negro and Sims (2015)
η 7.88 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
Φ 80.83 Calvo (1983) price adjustment probability ≈ 0.25
ψ 0.55 Smets and Wouters (2007)
θpi 1.5 Taylor (1993)
θy 0.125 Taylor (1993)
¯
R 1.0006 Effective lower bound of 25bp (annualized)
The central bank’s inflation target is 2% per year, consistent with the inflation
targeting regimes in many economies. The discount rate, β, is chosen to be consistent
with a steady-state risk free real interest rate of 1.5% per year. This is somewhat
lower than assumptions often used in analysis before the financial crisis. This reflects
17Appendix 2.B.6 derives the required values to deliver these normalizations.
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the notion that risk-free real interest rates may be somewhat lower, relative to
the pre-crisis period (see, among others, King and Low, 2014; Bean, 2017; Fischer,
2016, 2017; Williams, 2017). Given the chosen value for γ (discussed below), this
parameterization requires a discount factor (β) very close to unity.
The parameters governing money demand (Z and ζ) are chosen to deliver the
same steady-state velocity and elasticity of real money balances with respect to the
nominal interest rate estimated by Del Negro and Sims (2015) using US data.18
The most important parameter for generating net wealth effects is 1 − γ, the
probability that a household transitions to a state in which it has no assets. Follow-
ing Del Negro et al. (2015a), the probability of an asset reset is set at 3% per quarter
so that γ = 0.97. Del Negro et al. (2015a) reach this calibration for γ by studying
the frequency of events that lead households to transition to a state of default or in
which there are other constraints on using assets to finance spending.
There is ample empirical evidence that households discount the future even more
heavily than implied by the baseline calibration. Experimental evidence generates
a wide range of estimates. The averages of the lower and upper bound estimates
surveyed by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) suggests values for γ
of 0.86 and 0.95 respectively. The posterior mean estimated by Castelnuovo and
Nistico` (2010) using macroeconomic data implies γ = 0.87.
2.2.9 Simulation approach
The simulations of the model considered in later sections are consistent with the
perfect foresight assumption under which the model is derived. The perfect foresight
assumption captures non-linear effects (in particular of money demand when the
return on money approaches that on bonds) without requiring the use of projection
methods to solve the model.
In the simulations, it is assumed that in period t = 0 the economy is at its
deterministic steady state. At the beginning of period t = 1 information about
the exogenous disturbances and the behavior of policy is revealed. In particular,
18The value for ζ is one quarter of the value reported by Del Negro and Sims (2015) because
their estimation uses annualized interest rates.
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announced temporary policies (such as an expansion of the monetary base) are re-
garded as fully credible by private agents. Perfect foresight implies that equilibrium
outcomes are consistent with the information revealed at the beginning of period
t = 1. The TROLL modeling software is used to compute the equilibrium outcomes.
2.3 Pitfalls of money-financed government
spending
This section explores experiments in which monetary policy is configured so that
changes in government spending are financed by money creation.
2.3.1 Stimulus from money-financed government spending
The first experiment considers the effect of financing a (temporary, exogenous) gov-
ernment spending increase by money creation (rather than debt issuance) in a similar
manner to Gal´ı (2014a). Government spending is determined by (2.9) and we set
εg1 = 0.05 and ε
g
t = 0, t = 2, . . . . The persistence parameter is set to ρg = 0.9
which corresponds to the “high persistence” calibration used by Gal´ı (2014a). This
calibration is chosen because it is associated with large effects of money-financed
government spending increases in Gal´ı’s model.
The experiments in this section adopt the conventional assumption that money
earns no interest (so that RMt = 1,∀t). The macroeconomic effects of a government
spending increase are considered for two alternative assumptions about the conduct
of monetary and fiscal policy.
In the first case (‘debt financing’), higher government spending is financed by
issuing short-term debt. A fiscal rule adjusts the lump sum tax to ensure that
real government debt returns to b∗ in the long run. However, this adjustment is
not immediate so that, in the short run, government debt rises as the government
borrows to finance the additional spending. A simple fiscal rule for the lump sum
tax acts to stabilize the value of government liabilities in the long run:
τt = τ
∗ + θb (bt−1 − b∗) (2.15)
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where θb > 0 determines the strength of the fiscal feedback and τ
∗ is the steady-state
value of the tax. However, this rule is only activated K + 1 periods (K ≥ 0) after
the initial increase in government expenditure, so that τt = τ
∗, t = 1, . . . , K. For the
simulations, it is assumed that K = 12, which mimics Gal´ı’s analysis with fixed tax
rates.19 The short-term interest rate, Rt, is determined by the Taylor rule, (2.7).
The second case (‘money financing’) assumes that government debt is held con-
stant: bt = b
∗,∀t. In this case it is assumes that lump sum taxes are held constant
indefinitely: τt = τ
∗,∀t. For the government’s budget constraint to hold, money
balances must be adjusted according to:
mt = R
M
t pi
−1
t mt−1 +
(
Rtpi
−1
t − 1
)
b∗ + gt − τ ∗ (2.16)
Because both taxes and government debt are held fixed in this case, real money
balances must be adjusted to satisfy the government budget constraint. For house-
holds to willingly hold the required level of real money balances, the interest rate
on short-term government debt must adjust. So the money creation rule (2.16) is
used in place of the Taylor rule (2.7). Thus Gal´ı’s experiment amounts to consider-
ing a government spending shock under alternative policy rules that determine the
short-term bond rate, Rt, as well as those that determine debt and taxes.
Figure 2.1 shows the results. An expansionary government spending shock gen-
erates much more stimulus under ‘money financing’ than under ‘debt financing’,
replicating Gal´ı’s results. However, Figure 2.1 also reveals that the additional stim-
ulus generated by money financing is not associated with stronger wealth effects (via
higher real asset values). Indeed, real assets fall in this case (bottom right panel).
Instead, money financing is associated with a lower path for real interest rates which
stimulates spending through the Euler equation for consumption.
19Specifically, the fiscal rule is assumed to be inactive for K periods (during which time τt = τ
∗)
and from period K + 1 taxes are set according to (2.15) with θb = 0.1. Gal´ı (2014a) abstracts
from changes in tax rates. Since he uses a model with γ = 1, it is legitimate to assume that
taxes are held fixed for an arbitrary period, as long as there is an eventual adjustment in taxes
to ensure that the government’s solvency condition is satisfied. The nature of Gal´ı’s model means
that equilibrium allocations are invariant to the pattern of taxes as long as government liabilities
are eventually stabilized. The model used for the experiments in this section features net wealth
effects, so in principle the horizon K over which taxes are held fixed will matter. Quantitatively,
however, results are almost identical to those shown here for choices of K > 12. Appendix 2.A.1
shows results for the case in which γ = 1, which replicates Gal´ı’s set up.
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Figure 2.1: A government spending increase under debt financing and money finan-
cing
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state. Government spending is given by (2.9).
The panels show the responses to εg1 = 0.05 (with ε
g
t = 0, t ≥ 2). In the Taylor rule case, the tax
rate fiscal rule is initially inactive so that τt = τ
∗ for t = 1, . . . ,K, where K = 12. From period
t = K + 1 taxes are set according to (2.15) with θb = 0.1. The short-term interest rate is set
according to (2.7). In the money rule case, the tax rate and debt stock are held constant and the
government spending increase is financed by money creation according to equation (2.16). There
is no interest paid on money (RMt = 1,∀t) so the short-term bond rate Rt adjusts to ensure that
(2.16) holds.
To see this, recall that consumption satisfies:
c˜t =
pit+1
βRt+1
ϑ˜t
ϑ˜t+1
[
c˜t+1 + (1− γ) γ−1µt+1pi−1t+1at+1
]
where at+1 ≡ RMt+1mt +Rt+1bt represents real financial assets.
This means that current consumption can be increased by reductions in the real
interest rate Rt+1
pit+1
and increases in the real value of assets at+1. As noted above,
real asset values fall in response to the government spending increase under money
financing. However, the real interest rate also falls: inflation rises materially, but
the short-term bond rate increases by (slightly) less.20
20In Figure 2.1 inflation rises by around 7 percentage points and the short-term bond rate by
around 6 percentage points (both measured as annualized percentage point deviations from steady
state).
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To confirm this intuition Appendix 2.A.1 repeats this experiment for a version
of the model with γ = 1, so there are no net wealth effects. The results in Figure
2.9 are virtually indistinguishable from those in Figure 2.1. This underscores the
fact that the key mechanism at work is the real interest rate channel, since the
consumption equation collapses to c˜t =
pit+1
βRt+1
ϑ˜t
ϑ˜t+1
c˜t+1 when γ = 1.
In a recent paper, English et al. (2017) also replicate Gal´ı’s result and note the
importance of the extent to which monetary policy accommodates the inflationary
impetus of the government spending increase. Importantly, they demonstrate that
the money-financing rule (a variant of (2.16)) can be represented as a rule for the
short-term bond rate (R) that responds to the deviation of the price level from a
target path. The target path is determined by the level of government spending
such that small increases in spending generate a large rise in the target path. As a
result, monetary policy accommodates a temporary but substantial rise in inflation
so that the price level moves up to the new target path.
The analysis of English et al. (2017) uses the well-known result that in standard
models (with no interest on money) there is an equivalence between a policy rule
written in terms of the money stock (such as (2.16)) and a policy rule written in
terms of the short-term bond rate, R. Indeed, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003,
p147) use this result to develop “an irrelevance proposition for open-market oper-
ations in a variety of types of assets that the central bank might acquire, under
the assumption that the open-market operations do not change the expected future
conduct of monetary or fiscal policy”. Their result implies that any macroeconomic
effects that can be generated by a particular type of policy rule specified in terms
of the money stock can also be achieved by an appropriately specified interest rate
rule. From this perspective, Gal´ı’s policy prescription can be viewed as advocacy of
a particular rule for the short-term bond rate, the form of which is uncovered and
analyzed by English et al. (2017).
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2.3.2 Financing government spending with
interest-bearing money
To demonstrate the importance of policy behavior in determining the effects of
money-financed government spending, this subsection examines a case in which the
short-term bond rate continues to be determined by the Taylor rule (2.7). To im-
plement this variant, real money balances must therefore satisfy (2.16) while the
short-term bond rate satisfies (2.7). To achieve this, the interest rate on money,
RM , is adjusted to ensure that the additional money created to finance the addi-
tional government spending increase is willingly held.
Figure 2.2: Government spending increase financed via interest-bearing money vs
debt
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state. Government spending is given by (2.9).
The panels show the responses to εg1 = 0.05 (with ε
g
t = 0, t = 2, . . . ). In the debt financed case,
the tax rate fiscal rule is initially inactive so that τt = τ
∗ for t = 1, . . . ,K, where K = 12. From
period t = K + 1 taxes are set according to (2.15) with θb = 0.1. In the money financed case,
the tax rate and debt stock are held constant and the government spending increase is financed
by money creation according to equation (2.16). The return on money is adjusted to ensure that
households willingly hold the additional money balances.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates that, when the return on money (RM) adjusts, the
effects of the government spending increase are much more similar, regardless of
whether it is financed through debt or money creation. The bottom row reveals
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that the two financing arrangements have markedly different implications for the
paths of government debt and real money balances. However, the path for total
real assets (at), which is the relevant determinant of consumption expenditure in
the model, is very similar for the two financing approaches.
A key reason for the (relatively small) difference between the responses for debt-
financed and money-financed government spending increases in Figure 2.2 is that
the consumption Euler equation is ‘tilted’ by the change in the transactions costs
associated with holding money.21 Appendix 2.A.2 demonstrates that in a variant
of the model in which the demand for money is additively separable, the responses
from money and debt financed government spending are almost identical.
These results show that the effects of a money-financed government spending
increase depend on the precise monetary policy arrangements in place. If the short-
term bond rate R is set using a rule with a strong response to inflation (as in (2.7)),
then the inflationary effects of the government spending increase are contained (as in
Figure 2.2). This result is only achievable if the rate of return on money is allowed
to rise, so that the additional money created to finance the spending increase is
willingly held. If no interest is payable on money, then the Taylor rule (2.7) must be
abandoned to allow the short-term bond rate R to adjust to deliver the monetary
financing rule (2.16). In that case, the implicit interest rate feedback rule has a
weak response to inflation (as in Figure 2.1).
2.3.3 Broader implications of a weak policy response to
inflation
The preceding results indicate that the ability of money-financed government spend-
ing increases to stimulate demand and inflation stems from the fact that such policies
imply a weak response of the short-term bond rate to inflationary developments. In-
deed, part of the rationale for such policies is that such a response may be beneficial
in some circumstances: if the economy is stuck at the effective lower bound, then
pursuing a policy that increases inflation expectations (and ultimately inflation) may
be very desirable. However, replacing the Taylor rule (2.7) with the money financing
21Since ϑ˜ depends on velocity, v.
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rule (2.16) will affect the equilibrium responses to all shocks, not just those that
provide stimulus such as an increase in government spending.
Figure 2.3: Responses to a preference shock under alternative monetary policy rules
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Notes: The panels show responses to an unanticipated preference shock εϑ in period 1. In the
‘Taylor rule’ case, taxes are set according to (2.15) with θb = 0.1. The short-term bond rate is set
according to (2.7). In the ‘money rule’ case, the tax rate and debt stock are held constant and the
government budget constraint is enforced by money creation according to equation (2.16). There
is no interest paid on money (RMt = 1,∀t) so the short-term bond rate Rt adjusts to ensure that
(2.16) holds.
For example, Figure 2.3 compares the responses to a preference shock, εϑ, when
the short-term rate R is determined by the money rule (2.16) (red lines with diamond
markers) and the Taylor rule (2.7) (black dash-dot lines).22 Under the Taylor rule,
the short-term policy rate is cut sharply to offset the variation in the natural real
interest rate generated by the preference shock. Inflation stays close to target and
output is barely changed.23 In contrast, under the money rule, the short-term bond
rate rate is determined by (2.16), which ensures that the debt stock is held fixed
by adjusting the rate of money growth. In equilibrium, this generates a a rise in
the real interest rate, leading to a recession and prolonged undershoot of inflation.
22In both cases, the model starts in steady state in period 0. The preference shock is determined
by equation (2.3), with ρϑ = 0.85. In period 1, the preference shock is ε
ϑ
1 = 0.005 (with ε
ϑ
t = 0, t =
2, . . . ).
23Full stabilization is not achieved because the measure of flexible price output in the policy
rule is computed conditional on the assumption that the short-term bond rate is fixed.
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This example illustrates the far-reaching implications of permanently replacing a
standard Taylor-type monetary policy rule with a monetary financing rule.
2.4 Money-financed transfers at the effective
lower bound
While many recent policy proposals have focused on money-financed government
spending increases, similar to those investigated in the previous section, Friedman’s
original thought experiment was cast as a direct monetary transfer to households.
Whether or not such a transfer stimulates spending depends on households’ reaction
to an increase in nominal income and the extent to which the transfer is permanent.
The original ‘helicopter drop’ experiment assumed a one-off, permanent, increase
in the supply of money. This section explores the consequences of experiments in
which the money stock is increased with varying degrees of permanence.
Importantly, we assume that the rate of return on money is adjusted to ensure
that the monetary injection is willingly held by households and that the short-
term bond rate is determined by the Taylor rule (2.7). The objective is to explore
whether it is possible to achieve a stimulative effect from expanding the stock of
money without requiring a permanently weak response of the short-term bond rate
to inflation. As demonstrated in section 2.3.3, such a weak response to inflation
may be beneficial in some circumstances, but not others.
2.4.1 A recessionary scenario
A baseline simulation in which the short-term bond rate hits the zero bound is used
to explore the potential for money-financed transfers to stimulate the economy. As
in previous sections a shock arrives in period t = 1, with the model at steady state
in period t = 0. Specifically, a large preference shock (ϑ) generates a recession large
enough to constrain the monetary policy rule (2.7) at the effective lower bound
¯
R.
The shock sequence is εϑ1 = 0.0115 and ε
ϑ
t = 0, t = 2, . . . . The preference disturbance
evolves according to equation (2.3), with ρϑ set to 0.95 to generate a persistent spell
at the effective lower bound.
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The effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate is set at 0.25%.24 This is
broadly consistent with the experience of some advanced economies (e.g., the United
Kingdom and United States) but not for those economies that have implemented
negative policy rates (including the Euro area and Japan). The effective lower bound
must be strictly positive, otherwise the demand for money (in the baseline simula-
tion) would be infinite. From a practical perspective, the fact that large economies
have successfully implemented negative policy interest rates without explosive in-
creases in the demand for money suggests that the true rate of return on money is
likely to be slightly negative (for example, reflecting storage and security costs that
do not appear in the model).25
In the baseline recessionary scenario, the return on money is fixed at RMt = 1,∀t
and that the short-term bond rate R evolves according to the monetary policy rule
(2.7). The subsequent experiments explore the extent to which money-financed
transfers could stimulate spending and inflation.
2.4.2 Money-financed transfers with interest-bearing
money
This section considers the effects of a temporary money-financed transfer to house-
holds announced in period t = 1. The temporary transfer is determined by the
following process for the aggregate nominal money stock:
Mt
Mt−1
=
(
Mt−1
Mt−2
)ρm
(pi∗)(1−ρm) exp (εmt ) (2.17)
for periods t = 1, . . . , K. For the duration of the monetary expansion, money growth
follows an autoregressive process, which is assumed to be weakly persistent by setting
ρm = 0.33. The process is driven by a disturbance term ε
m, with εm1 = 1.01 and
εmt = 0 for t = 2, . . . , K. The value of ε
m
1 is chosen to deliver an increase in the money
stock similar to that observed following the global financial crisis. The calibration
is discussed further below. A two-year monetary expansion (K = 8) is considered:
24For the annualized net interest rate.
25Alternatively, there may be a zero bound on deposit rates (again abstracted from in our
model) that does not apply to the overnight policy rate.
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for periods t = 1, . . . , K, the policymaker adjusts the rate of return on money (RMt )
to ensure that the additional money stock is willingly held by households.
The assumption of a temporary monetary expansion is intended to facilitate
comparisons with variants of the model that contain alternative monetary frictions
(analyzed in Section 2.5). Moreover, a temporary monetary expansion during a
period in which the short-term bond rate is constrained by the effective lower bound
may be sufficient to stimulate spending and inflation by ensuring that the policy
response to higher inflation expectations is temporarily weaker than usual. A more
permanent monetary expansion is analyzed in Section 2.4.3.
The size of the monetary injection is calibrated with reference to the quantitative
easing experiences of the United Kingdom and United States following the financial
crisis. While this experiment does not analyze the effects of quantitative easing,
calibrating the transfer with reference to the scale of money expansion associated
with those policies is intended to deliver a policy intervention that is ‘large’, but not
unprecedented in recent economic history.
Reis (2016) documents the evolution of the balance sheets of major central banks
between 2007 and 2015. If ‘money’ in the model is interpreted as a composite of
currency and interest bearing reserves, then Reis (2016, Figure 1) suggests that the
stock of money increased by around 25 percentage points of (annual) GDP between
2007 and 2015 in both the United States and United Kingdom. In the simulation,
the monetary injection is measured relative to steady-state GDP and calibrated to
be approximately 25pp.26
Figure 2.4 shows the results. The black (dash-dot) lines show the baseline sim-
ulation, without a monetary transfer. The short-term bond rate is immediately cut
from its steady-state level of 3.5% to the lower bound of 0.25% and remains there
for nine quarters. Given the scale of the shock, however, this policy response is
insufficient to stabilize spending and inflation. Consumption falls by 4% in period
1 and quarterly inflation undershoots the target by 1.5 percentage points.
26Reis reports stocks of assets and liabilities as a proportion of actual GDP. The change in GDP
over the period in question is small relative to the observed changes in reserves and currency, so
little is lost by calibrating the monetary injection with reference to steady-state output.
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Figure 2.4: A money-financed transfer at the effective lower bound
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state and a recessionary shock εϑ1 = 0.0115
arrives in period 1. The black dot-dashed lines show the effects of the recessionary shock. The
solid red lines show the case in which a temporary money-financed transfer is used to combat the
effects of the recessionary shock. For periods t = 1, . . . , 8, the money stock is determined by (2.17).
The value of εm1 is chosen to deliver the desired total increase in the money stock and ε
m
t = 0 for
t = 2, . . . , 8. For the duration of the money-financed transfer, the rate of return on money RM is
endogenously determined. From period 9 onwards, the rate of return on money is fixed at unity
and the quantity of money is determined by households’ demand for money.
The solid red lines in Figure 2.4 show the effect of the shock when a money-
financed transfer is also announced at the start of period 1. The transfer ends in
period 8, so that from period 9 onwards no interest is paid on money and the level
of real money balances is determined by household demand. This would be akin to
central banks that did not pay interest on reserves prior to the crisis temporarily
paying interest on reserves, before reverting to the pre-crisis policy as the economy
recovers.
The expansion in the money stock requires an increase in the return on money
(bottom left panel, dashed red line) so that households are willing to hold the
additional money balances. The monetary transfer increases consumption by around
2 percentage points in period 1. Quarterly inflation is around 0.8 percentage points
higher in period 1. The monetary transfer stimulates the economy via a direct
wealth effect as the real money balances held by households increase. Because
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there is no conventional monetary policy response to the stimulus (the short-term
bond rate does not change relative to the baseline simulation), inflation expectations
increase and the expected real interest rate falls. This provides a further boost to
consumption.
As discussed in Section 2.2.5, an expansion of M at the lower bound leads to a
reduction in taxes Pτ , given the assumed behavior of government spending and debt.
Because the expansion inM is temporary, there is a sharp fall inM when the transfer
ends, corresponding to a rise in Pτ . In the absence of the asset reset mechanism,
households would save the additional income from the temporary transfer, to pay the
subsequent increase in taxes. However, in the presence of the asset reset mechanism
there is a risk that households will experience an asset reset before the tax rise
occurs. In that case, they will experience the increase in taxes without having
additional assets from which to finance it. This creates an incentive to spend some
of the additional income generated by the money-financed transfer.
These results show that when the short-term bond rate is temporarily constrained
at the lower bound, it does not rise to counteract the stimulative effects of the money-
financed transfer. As in the experiments of Section 2.3.1, a policy intervention that
increases inflation has more effect when the short-term bond rate responds weakly.
However, in this case the lack of a short-term bond rate response is a temporary
consequence of the lower bound constraint rather than a permanent change in the
monetary policy rule. As discussed above, one of the main reasons for advocating
money-financed policies is to provide stimulus when other monetary policy instru-
ments are constrained.
2.4.3 A ‘permanent’ money-financed transfer
It is generally argued that monetary transfers that are permanent (as in Friedman’s
original thought experiment) are more effective than temporary transfers. Indeed,
some authors argue that achieving any stimulus via monetary transfers at the zero
bound requires those transfers to be permanent (Krugman, 1998; Eggertsson and
Woodford, 2003).
The monetary transfer in Section 2.4.2 lasts for just eight quarters. After the
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policy intervention, the interest rate on money returns to zero and the monetary
policymaker supplies whatever quantity of money is demanded by households at this
rate. As described in Section 2.4.2, there is a withdrawal of money from households
(via higher taxes) when the policy ends.
The fact that a temporary transfer stimulates spending reflects the fact that it
operates via a wealth channel and can be implemented without changing the path
of the short-term bond rate (because the interest rate on money is adjusted appro-
priately).27 Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider whether a more permanent
money-financed transfer would be more powerful.
In this section, the experiment is one in which the policymaker never withdraws
the stock of money initially transferred to households. To implement this experiment
the nominal money stock is determined by:
Mt =
 Mt−1
(
Mt−1
Mt−2
)ρm
(pi∗)(1−ρm) exp (εmt ) t = 1, . . . , K
max
{
Mt−1 , ζ−1
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+1−1
Rt+1
]
Ptct
}
t = K + 1, . . .
(2.18)
Again, K = 8 and the same value of εm1 as in Section 2.4.2 is used. These
assumptions mean that the monetary expansion follows the same path as the ex-
periment in Section 2.4.2 for t = 1, . . . , K. Equation (2.18) specifies that the
money stock is held constant for periods t = K + 1, . . . unless that value exceeds
ζ−1
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+1−1
Rt+1
]
Ptct. Inspection of (2.14) reveals that this quantity corres-
ponds to the demand for nominal money when the net interest rate on money is
zero (RMt+1 = 1). So this specification requires that the initial increase in the money
stock is maintained as long as the rate of return required for the money stock to be
willingly held is non-negative.
Figure 2.5 shows the results of this experiment. Comparing the top row with
the top row of Figure 2.4 reveals that the permanent money-financed transfer has a
27The results of Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) rely on the duality
between the operation of a policy in terms of a path for the short-term bond rate and the quantity of
money. A policy that delivers a permanently higher stock of money must also deliver a permanently
higher price level. In forward-looking models that is achieved by a temporarily higher inflation
rate generated by a path for the short-term bond rate that responds weakly (if at all) to higher
inflation.
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Figure 2.5: A permanent money-financed transfer at the effective lower bound
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state and a recessionary shock εϑ1 = 0.0115
arrives in period 1. The black dot-dashed lines show the effects of the recessionary shock. The
solid red lines show the case in which a permanent money-financed transfer is used to combat the
effects of the recessionary shock. In this case the money stock is determined by (2.18). Responses
in the bottom right panel are plotted for 275 quarters. The nominal money stock is normalized to
1 in period 0.
much larger macroeconomic effect than a temporary transfer. Other things equal,
the permanent transfer has a larger net wealth effect and hence a more expansion-
ary effect on aggregate demand and inflation. Indeed, the permanent transfer is
sufficiently stimulative that it brings forward the date at which the short-term bond
rate lifts off from the zero bound.
The bottom right panel of Figure 2.5 (showing the long-run implications of the
transfer) shows that the permanent monetary transfer requires a strictly positive
rate of return on money for more than 65 years. The ‘hump shaped’ response on
the return on money reflects the strength of the wealth effects in the near term.
This drives up the short-term bond rate (which rises to offset the wealth effects on
consumption and hence output) and hence the return on money required to induce
households to hold the additional money balances. In the longer term, the price
level rises in line with the inflation target and the return on money required for
households to hold a given nominal stock of money falls.
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Much of the power of the permanent money-financed transfer is in fact driven by
the nature of the reaction function for the short-term bond rate, R. As described
in Section 2.2.3, the reaction function responds to a measure of the output gap
based on a ‘supply side’ concept of flexible price equilibrium. As a result, the
policy rule (2.7) does not fully stabilize spending and inflation away from the lower
bound. Indeed, the money-financed transfer is sufficient in this case to generate a
small, but persistent, overshooting of the inflation target. Section 2.5.2 considers
a variant of the model in which the reaction function for the short-term bond rate
does completely stabilize spending and inflation away from the lower bound. In that
case there is a limit to the extent to which a permanent money-financed transfer
can provide additional stimulus.
Finally, it is worth noting that a bond-financed transfer of a similar magnitude
could generate similar stimulative effects on consumption and inflation at the zero
bound. The primary friction through which the stimulus operates is the asset reset
friction, which applies to all government liabilities.
2.5 Robustness to alternative monetary frictions
This section examines the robustness of the results to alternative assumptions about
the underlying frictions that give rise to the demand for money.
2.5.1 A cash in advance friction
Appendix 2.C develops a variant of the model in which the demand for money arises
from a cash in advance constraint. This approach greatly reduces the sensitivity of
money demand to the interest differential between money and bonds. On the other
hand, a simple cash in advance assumption typically implies much larger average
money holdings than observed in the data.28
The cash in advance variant assumes that consumption spending must be fin-
anced by existing money holdings brought forward from the previous period, income
28One modification to address this is to assume that only a subset of consumption goods are
subject to the cash in advance constraint with the remainder being ‘credit goods’.
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from maturing bonds (net of new bond purchases) and a transfer from the govern-
ment. Money earns no interest.
The cash in advance constraint will bind if the rate of return on bonds is strictly
positive: households will hold only the money balances required to finance con-
sumption, allocating the remainder of their portfolio to bonds. However, when the
return on bonds is zero, the cash in advance constraint will not bind and households
are indifferent between allocating their portfolios between money and bonds. This
means that an expansion in the stock of money beyond the level required to finance
consumption expenditures is willingly held.
These assumptions give rise to a model with almost identical behavioral equations
to the baseline variant. The key differences are in the consumption equation and
the Phillips curve, which Appendix 2.C shows to be:
ct = (1− µt)−1
[
γpit+1
Rt+1
µt
µt+1
ct+1 + (1− γ)R−1t+1µt (Rt+1b∗ +mt)
]
Φpit
ytpi∗
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηχyψt ctRt+1 +
Φ
yt
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
The consumption equation, while very similar to the baseline model, contains a
slightly different term that gives rise to the wealth effect from government liabilit-
ies.29 However, it is also clear that the wealth effects disappear when γ = 1, as in the
baseline version of the model. The Phillips curve equation has the feature that mar-
ginal cost is an increasing function of the interest rate on short-term bonds: there is
a ‘cost channel’ (Barth and Ramey, 2002). This arises because the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure depends on the Lagrange multiplier
on the cash in advance constraint and (hence) the nominal interest rate.30
29This difference implies that a slightly different calibration for β is required to deliver the same
steady state return on bonds as the baseline model. All other parameter values in the simulations
below are unchanged from the baseline model.
30The baseline model includes a similar effect since the labor supply relationship depends on
velocity, v.
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Figure 2.6 shows the results of an experiment similar to that considered in Figure
2.4 using the cash in advance variant. Specifically, the model begins in period t = 0
in steady state. In period t = 1, a shock to ϑ generates a fall in demand, prompting
a cut in the interest rate on short-term bonds via the Taylor rule. The shock is
sufficiently large that the short-term interest rate is constrained by the effective
lower bound. In this variant of the model, the lower bound on the net short-term
bond rate is set to zero (
¯
R = 1).
Figure 2.6: A money-financed transfer at the effective lower bound: cash in advance
model
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state and a recessionary shock εϑ1 = 0.005
arrives in period 1, which drives the economy to the zero lower bound in the baseline simulation
(black dash-dot lines) for 9 quarters. In the baseline simulation, while the economy is at the zero
bound the money stock is adjusted to the level at which the cash in advance constraint would
(just) bind if operative. In the case of a money-financed transfer (red dashed lines with diamond
markers), for periods t = 1, . . . , 8 the path of the money stock delivers a 25pp increase in nominal
money balances relative to steady-state annual GDP. From period 9 onwards, the money stock is
determined by the cash in advance constraint, which binds.
When the lower bound is binding, the cash in advance constraint will be slack
and households will be willing to hold money balances in excess of the minimum
quantity required for consumption purposes. The baseline assumption in Figure 2.6
is that the government monetary transfer is adjusted to ensure that households hold
the minimum quantity of money required to financed consumption expenditure.
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This assumption is intended to be a neutral benchmark against which to assess
alternative policy options.
The baseline recessionary scenario is plotted as black dash-dotted lines in Figure
2.6. As in the experiment in Section 2.4.2, the shock generates a substantial fall in
consumption and inflation and the interest rate on short-term bonds remains at the
zero bound for ten quarters before rising very gradually. The recession is associated
with a small reduction in the money stock. That reflects the fact that the level of
money balances required to satisfy the cash in advance constraint responds more
strongly to the level of economic activity than to the nominal return on short-term
bonds.
The dashed red lines with diamond markers in Figure 2.6 depict the effect of a
temporary monetary-financed transfer to households. This monetary expansion is
calibrated to deliver the same increase in nominal money balances as the experiment
in Section 2.4.2, which implies a smaller proportionate increase in money balances
given the larger steady state money stock in this variant of the model. The results
indicate that large monetary expansions can be effective at the zero lower bound even
without interest-bearing money, though in this case the duration of the monetary
transfer is limited by the length of the liquidity trap.
While the effects appear to be somewhat larger than the baseline specification of
the model (Figure 2.4), this mainly reflects the differences in behavior in response
to the underlying recessionary shock. In particular, there are three key differences
between the two model variants. First, the baseline model exhibits a small increase
in money demand as the short-term bond rate is reduced in response to the reces-
sionary shock. Other things equal, higher real money balances support consumption
spending via a wealth effect. This means that a somewhat larger shock is required
to drive the baseline model to the zero bound. Second, the cash in advance vari-
ant implies that steady-state money balances are larger than in the baseline model,
so that a given proportionate change in money generates a larger wealth effect on
consumption. Third, the cash in advance variant features a cost channel which
suppresses inflation when nominal interest rates are low.
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To aid the comparison between the two variants, Figure 2.7 plots the marginal
effects of the policy experiments simulated in Figures 2.4 and 2.6, normalizing each
variable in a way that facilitates the comparison of the effects. Figure 2.7 shows
that the stimulatory effects of a money-financed transfer are slightly larger in the
cash-in-advance variant of the model, but the pattern and order of magnitude of the
effects are very similar.
Figure 2.7: Marginal effects of money-financed transfers in different model variants
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Notes: Each panel plots the marginal effect of the experiments shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.6. The
dot-dashed black lines depict the responses from Figure 2.4, using the baseline model. The red
dashed lines with diamond markers show the results from 2.6, using the cash in advance variant.
In each case, the marginal effects are computed as the differences between the baseline simulation
and the simulation in which a temporary money-financed transfer is undertaken. The right panel
shows the marginal effect on the money stock as a fraction of steady-state annual output.
2.5.2 Additively separable money demand
To illustrate the importance of the monetary frictions, we consider a variant of the
model with additively separable money demand. This assumption delivers a tract-
able specification for money demand, consistent with much of the recent literature
(notably Buiter (2005, 2014)). Importantly, it implies that flexible price allocations
are independent of monetary developments and hence the monetary policy rule can
be parameterized to deliver complete stabilization of the output gap and inflation
away from the zero bound. This in turn is important in isolating the importance
of the policy rule for the short-term bond rate in determining the effects of monet-
ary transfers. Of course, this variant also has some weaknesses. In particular, the
elasticity of money demand to changes in the relative returns on money and bonds
is implausibly large.
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Appendix 2.D sets out a variant of the model in which (log) real money balances
enter the utility function in an additively separable manner. The consumption
equation, Phillips curve and monetary policy rule in this case are:
ct = (1− µt)−1 γpit+1
Rt+1
[
µt
µt+1
ct+1 + (1− α)µt (1− γ) γ−1at+1
]
Φpit
pi∗yt
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηχcty
ψ
t
1− α + Φ
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗yt
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
Rt+1 = max
{
Rft+1
( pit
pi∗
)θpi ( yt
yft
)θy
,
¯
R
}
(2.19)
where Rf is the nominal interest rate prevailing under flexible prices (derived in
Appendix 2.D) and the marginal propensity to consume satisfies:
µ−1t = 1 + γβ
ϑt+1
ϑt
µ−1t+1
The main differences between the baseline model and this variant are that there
is no direct impact of money demand (or transactions frictions) in either the Phillips
curve or the intertemporal substitution components of the consumption equation.31
This means that the flexible price allocations can be derived independently of mon-
etary frictions. As a result, it is possible to specify the monetary policy rule so
that, away from the lower bound, fluctuations in inflation around target and output
around flex-price output are completely stabilized. This is achieved in the rule used
in this model variant via its response to the flexible price interest rate Rft+1.
31That is, while assets appear on the right-hand side of the consumption equation, reflecting
the net wealth effect, the slope of the consumption equation (in particular the marginal propensity
to consume) does not depend on real money balances.
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Figure 2.8: Money-financed transfers at the lower bound: additively separable
money
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state and a recessionary shock εϑ1 = 0.0185 arrives
in period 1, which drives the economy to the effective lower bound in the baseline simulation (black
dash-dot lines) for 9 quarters. Solid red lines show the effect of a permanent monetary transfer
and dashed green lines with square markers show the effect of a temporary monetary transfer.
Figure 2.8 demonstrates the importance of the specification of the Taylor rule by
comparing the effects of a temporary and permanent monetary transfer at the lower
bound. The baseline (black dash-dot lines) is a recessionary scenario that drives
the short-term bond rate to the effective lower bound (which is set at 25bp on an
annualized basis). Two money-financed transfers are considered. The solid red lines
show the case of a permanent transfer, calibrated in the same way as the experiment
in Section 2.4.3.32 The dashed green lines with square markers show an 8 quarter
temporary transfer of the same size. In each case, for the duration of the transfer,
the interest rate on money is adjusted to ensure that the additional money balances
are willingly held.
The results show that the additional stimulus from the permanent transfer is
extremely small. The reason is that the monetary policy rule (2.19) delivers complete
stabilization of inflation at target when not constrained by the zero bound. The
32The transfer is calibrated to deliver the same increase in the nominal money stock (measured
as a fraction of steady-state GDP) relative to the baseline response of money balances.
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additional stimulus from the permanent money transfer causes the short-term bond
rate to lift off from the lower bound earlier. However, inflation is fully stabilized after
the liftoff date, limiting the extent to which the real interest rate can be reduced
by higher inflation expectations. In contrast, for the baseline model, the results in
Figure 2.5 generated a small but extremely persistent inflation overshoot, depressing
real interest rates and providing additional stimulus to spending. That result was
driven by the fact that the monetary policy rule in the baseline model does not
deliver full stabilization of preference shocks away from the lower bound.
The results in Figure 2.8 suggest that there may be a limit to the degree of
stimulus that can be provided by a money-financed transfer, when the money stock
and short-term bond rate are both used as policy instruments. For an appropriately
specified rule for the short-term bond rate, a money-financed transfer may not gen-
erate a sustained reduction in real interest rates via a prolonged increase in inflation
expectations. In the variant of the model with additively separable money demand,
a permanent money-financed transfer cannot achieve this when the short-term bond
rate is determined by (2.19) because this rule will offset the inflationary effects of
the transfer when not constrained by the zero bound.
2.6 Discussion
This section relates the results from preceding sections to the recent debate on the
use of monetary-financing to stimulate spending and inflation.
2.6.1 Interest-bearing money and bank deposits
A key assumption underpinning many of the results is that money-financed trans-
fers are implemented by varying the rate of interest paid on money. In this way,
policymakers can influence the stock of real money balances in the economy while
retaining control over the interest rate on short-term bonds because these balances
are willingly held by households at the prevailing interest rates on short-term bonds
and money.
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While this approach differs from the textbook assumption of non-interest bear-
ing money, it seems appropriate in the context of recent discussions of monetary
financing. Such discussions often focus on the effects of the increased supply of
money generated by such a policy. However, the effects of increased money holdings
on spending depend on the extent to which households are willing to hold the ad-
ditional money balances. For a given rate of return on short-term bonds, ensuring
that households willingly hold a particular level of real money balances requires the
interest rate on money to adjust.
If money is interpreted as banknotes and coins, then the concept of a variable,
non-zero rate of return on money is unrealistic. However, money in the model is
interpreted in the context of the post-crisis practice of remunerating commercial
bank reserves at the policy rate and the fact that the vast majority of the money
stock is held in the form of bank deposits (see, McLeay, Radia, and Thomas, 2014).
Many central banks began paying interest on reserves as policy rates approached a
(positive) effective lower bound on rates and quantitative easing policies allowed a
marked increase in reserves without forcing short-term market rates below that level.
Moreover, any monetary transfer from government to households, even if made in
the form of notes, would quickly result in an increase in reserves.33 However, unlike
Ireland (2014), the model does not explicitly include the demand for bank deposits
by households independently of the (derived) demand for reserves by the banking
system.
A further implication of paying interest on money is that as that rate approaches
the short-term bond rate, money becomes virtually indistinguishable from short-
term government debt as a means of financing a deficit. However, the quantitative
results hinge on a particular friction that generates net wealth effects – the asset-reset
mechanism – which applies equally to bonds and interest-bearing money. Features
of real-world economies that are likely to make money-financed transfers effective
are also likely to make other policies effective, for example a debt-financed tax cut.
This implies that the focus on money financing options as a ‘special’ policy tool may
be misguided, though there are other frictions and attributes of central bank money
33Households would be expected to deposit their notes in the banking system. Those notes in
turn would be exchanged by the banking system for interest-bearing reserves at the central bank.
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that could generate a greater efficacy of money financing, as discussed below.34
2.6.2 Wealth effects via ‘irredeemable’ money
Several recent papers have explored the notion that central bank money is special
because it is viewed as “irredeemable” by the issuing government (Buiter, 2005, 2014;
Buiter and Sibert, 2007). In this approach, households still view interest-bearing
money as an asset but, in equilibrium, they do not expect future taxes to be raised
to ensure the that the principal of the reserve liability is ‘paid off’ in present value
terms (unlike bonds).35
This setup implies an asymmetry in which the present value of the terminal
stock of irredeemable reserves will be positive whereas that of redeemable govern-
ment bonds will be zero. A permanent helicopter drop of money in such an economy
could stimulate spending through a type of wealth effect. However for that irredeem-
ability belief to be credible requires a commitment to permanently expand the stock
of money at a rate equal to the the nominal interest rate (Buiter, 2014), while ex-
panding the stock of government bonds at a rate below the rate of interest. This
setup has several interesting practical implications.
First, a helicopter drop policy of this type would require a shift to a new equi-
librium and institutional mode of operation for central banks. Current institutional
arrangements imply that central banks and governments do not regard money as
irredeemable. In the model, the public sector budget constraint is consolidated,
so there is no distinction between the balance sheet of the central bank and wider
fiscal authority. In practice, however, the payment of interest on reserve liabilit-
ies are typically financed by the interest from central bank holdings of government
34One reason why monetary financing may be interpreted as ‘special’ is that, under some cir-
cumstances, it operates through mechanisms that could be regarded as unique to monetary policy.
For example, monetary financing as modeled by Gal´ı (2014a) implies that government spending is
financed using the inflation tax and the resulting high inflation leads to a reduction in real interest
rates.
35This result holds in equilibrium by combining the household sector intertemporal budget
constraint (which treats both money and bonds as redeemable) and the government intertemporal
budget constraint (in which money is treated as irredeemable).
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bonds, which in turn are financed by taxes and government borrowing. This implies
that money is regarded as redeemable from the perspective of the government.36
Second, even if such a policy could be implemented, it is not clear that moving
to an equilibrium in which the nominal money stock grows at the nominal interest
rate is achievable. For example, Buiter and Sibert (2007) present a general equi-
librium treatment which shows that the existence of irredeemable money can rule
out deflationary bubbles.37 However, that result also implies that the limiting value
of the present discounted value of real money balances is zero in equilibrium. This
rules out the use of policies that involve expanding the money supply at the rate of
interest as advocated by Buiter (2014) in equilibrium.
2.6.3 Debt versus money finance
One argument in favor of money-financed rather than debt-financed fiscal expansions
is that increases in the government debt stock may increase the real interest rates at
which the government can finance that debt (see, for example, Smets and Trabandt,
2012).38 Modeling such effects typically involves a friction whereby some agents have
a preference or requirement for holding longer term government liabilities rather than
short-term liabilities (such as one-period government bonds or money). A long-term
bond-financed deficit will increase the term or risk premium on such debt and crowd
out private sector spending. Such frictions are similar to those that are often used
to motivate a role for quantitative easing (as in Chapter 1, for example). In these
cases, a money-financed fiscal expansion could be regarded as the equivalent of a
bond-financed expansion plus a quantitative easing operation.
These observations raise the possibility that there may be some circumstances
in which a combined bond-financed expansion plus a quantitative easing operation
36One way to make money irredeemable would be for the government to cancel the debt used
to ‘back’ reserves. In that case, to implement a helicopter drop, the central bank would need to
finance interest payments on reserves by the creation of more reserves. This raises questions of
central bank solvency and whether such a concept has any practical relevance (Cumming, 2015;
Reis, 2015).
37Transversality conditions on the total value of government liabilities alone are not sufficient
to rule out equilibria in which the real values of money and bonds diverge in opposite directions.
38In the limit, it may become impossible for a government to borrow more if its current debt
level is sufficiently high.
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would be more effective than either policy alone.
Finally, the quantitative results hinge on the precise friction that generates net
wealth effects: the asset-reset mechanism. As explained in Section 2.2, this device is
used for analytical convenience rather than realism. In practice, there are distortions
in the economy that are likely to lead to more substantial departures from stark
Ricardian equivalence results. For example, in a model without interest on money,
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) show that monetary expansions at the zero bound
can be effective when taxes are distortionary rather than lump sum.
The extent to which different frictions apply to debt versus money financing is
likely to have implications for the optimal mix of these financing methods and is a
topic that deserves further research.
2.6.4 Welfare implications
Much of the debate on money-financed fiscal actions takes it for granted that increas-
ing spending and inflation in response to a recessionary shock is welfare improving.
However, as Ireland (2005) shows in a similar model, if net wealth effects from real
money balances are generated through a redistributional channel then policies that
rely heavily on that channel may reduce welfare for many households. Similarly,
a money-financed fiscal stimulus implemented in the same way as studied by Gal´ı
(2014a) generates a large gap between output and its flexible price counterpart. As
Gal´ı (2014a) notes, a more appropriate metric of welfare is the efficient level of out-
put.39 He shows that, under some conditions, a policy rule in which government
spending is financed by money creation can improve welfare. More broadly, the
transactions friction in the baseline model would (other things equal) suggest that
the returns on money and bonds be equalized, so that transactions costs vanish. A
full welfare analysis of money-financed transfers is beyond the scope of this chapter,
but is an interesting topic for future research.
39That is, the level of output that would prevail when distortions from monopolistic competition
are eliminated.
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2.6.5 Permanent liquidity trap versus temporary lower
bound episode
The focus of this chapter is the potential efficacy of money-financed fiscal policy
during a period in which the short-term interest rate is temporarily constrained by
the effective lower bound. This is in line with most of the literature studying policy
options at the zero lower bound, much of it inspired by the seminal contributions
of Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). It is also consistent
with much of the recent commentary on the use of helicopter drops as a temporary
measure to provide stimulus.40
The extent to which monetary-financing may be useful in a permanent liquidity
trap, in which the short-term bond rate remains at the zero bound forever is analyzed
by Buiter (2014) in a partial equilibrium context. Ireland (2005) studies the property
of a very similar model in a liquidity trap environment, but in his case the liquidity
trap is a policy choice.41 Again, an assessment of the efficacy of money-financed fiscal
policy in a permanent liquidity trap as an interesting avenue for future research.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter assesses recent proposals for the use of money-financed transfers to
stimulate economic activity and inflation using a simple sticky-price model. The
efficacy of these policies is studied in the context of a recessionary shock that tem-
porarily forces the short-term policy rate to the effective lower bound. The model
allows for net wealth effects and, in this case, money-financed transfers can stimu-
late spending and inflation. However, the scale of the transfers required to generate
meaningful effects is very large and could also be achieved by a bond-financed deficit.
In the baseline model, money may earn a non-zero rate of return and may there-
fore be interpreted as a digital currency rather than cash. Exploring this interpret-
ation of the framework used here is an interesting topic for future research.
40Though Turner (2015) argues that monetary financing may become a conventional monetary
policy tool in a world of secular stagnation.
41The short-term nominal interest rate remains permanently at zero if the government chooses
to expand the money stock at a sufficiently low rate.
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Appendix 2.A Additional results
2.A.1 Money vs debt financing when γ = 1
Figure 2.9 shows the results of replicating the experiment in Figure 2.1 when there
are no real balance effects (i.e., setting γ = 1). The results are virtually identical to
those shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.9: Money-financed and debt-financed government spending with γ = 1
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state. Government spending is given by (2.9).
The panels show the responses to εg1 = 0.05 (with ε
g
t = 0, t ≥ 2). In the Taylor rule case, the tax
rate fiscal rule is initially inactive so that τt = τ
∗ for t = 1, . . . ,K, where K = 12. From period
t = K + 1 taxes are set according to (2.15) with θb = 0.1. The short-term interest rate is set
according to (2.7). In the money rule case, the tax rate and debt stock are held constant and the
government spending increase is financed by money creation according to equation (2.16). There
is no interest paid on money (RMt = 1,∀t) so the short term interest rate Rt adjusts to ensure
that (2.16) holds. The experiment is conducted in a version of the model without asset resets (i.e.,
γ = 1).
2.A.2 Additively separable money demand
This Appendix reports the results of the experiment shown in Figure 2.2 in a version
of the model with additively separable money demand (derived in Appendix 2.D)
and without asset resets (γ = 1). This variant is closest to the one analyzed by Gal´ı
(2014a), with the key difference being that money may earn interest.
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Figure 2.10: Financing government spending with interest-bearing money: addit-
ively separable case
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Notes: The model starts in period 0 at the steady state. Government spending is given by (2.9).
The panels show the responses to εg1 = 0.05 (with ε
g
t = 0, t = 2, . . . ). In the debt financed case, the
tax rate fiscal rule is initially inactive so that τt = τ
∗ for t = 1, . . . ,K, where K = 12. From period
t = K + 1 taxes are set according to (2.15) with θb = 0.1. In the money financed case, the tax
rate and debt stock are held constant and the government spending increase is financed by money
creation according to equation (2.16). The return on money is adjusted to ensure that households
willingly hold the additional money balances. The experiment is conducted in a version of the
model with (additively separable) money in the utility function and without asset resets.
Figure 2.10 repeats the experiment shown in Figure 2.2. As in Figure 2.2,
the government spending increase is financed either using short-term debt (with
the short-term nominal interest rate adjusting according to the Taylor rule) or by
interest-bearing money (with the interest rate on money adjusting to ensure that
households willingly hold the additional real money balances). In the variant with
additively separable money demand, the outcomes for output, inflation and total
real assets are identical. Inflation does not respond to this shock because the policy
rule in this variant of the model responds to a measure of the flexible price output
gap, which is fully stabilized in response to the government spending shock.
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Appendix 2.B Derivation of the baseline model
2.B.1 Households
The maximization problem is:
max
∞∑
t=0
(γβ)t ϑt
[
ln cj,t − χj,t
1 + ψ
n1+ψj,t
]
subject to
mpj,t+b
p
j,t = (γpit)
−1 [RMt mpj,t−1 +Rtbpj,t−1]+wtnj,t+dt−τt−(1 + ϕ( cj,tmpj,t
))
cj,t
where the budget constraint is written in real terms and
ϕ (vj,t) = Z exp
[
− ζ
vj,t
]
Z, ζ > 0.
The first order conditions are:
λj,t − βpi−1t+1Rt+1λj,t+1 = 0
ϑtc
−1
j,t − λj,t (1 + ϕ (vj,t) + ϕ′ (vj,t) vj,t) = 0
λj,t
(
1− ϕ′ (vj,t) v2j,t
)− βpi−1t+1RMt+1λj,t+1 = 0
χj,tϑtn
ψ
j,t − λj,twt = 0
This functional form of ϕ implies that
ϕ′ (vj,t) = ϕ (vj,t) ζv−2j,t
This implies that the set of first order conditions can be written as:
λj,t − βpi−1t+1Rt+1λj,t+1 = 0 (2.20)
ϑj,tc
−1
j,t − λj,t
[
1 + ϕ (vj,t)
(
1 + ζv−1j,t
)]
= 0 (2.21)
λj,t (1− ζϕ (vj,t))− βpi−1t+1RMt+1λj,t+1 = 0 (2.22)
χj,tϑtn
ψ
j,t − λj,twt = 0 (2.23)
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Combining the first order conditions for bonds and money gives:
1− ζϕ (vj,t) = R
M
t+1
Rt+1
which shows that velocity is determined entirely by the difference between the rates
of return on money and bonds. Since these rates of return are the same for all
households, velocity is the same for each household:
vj,t = vt ∀j, t
where vt denotes aggregate velocity (total consumption divided by total real money
balances). This result is imposed for the rest of the derivation.
The previous result means that
ϕ (vt) = ζ
−1Rt+1 −RMt+1
Rt+1
which in turn implies that
lnZ − ζ
vt
= − ln ζ + ln Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
so that the demand for real money balances is given by:
mpj,t = ζ
−1
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
]
cj,t
which implies that aggregate money demand satisfies
mt = ζ
−1
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
]
ct
Rearranging the first order condition for consumption gives:
λj,t =
ϑt
cj,t
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)]
which can be combined with the first order condition for bonds to give an Euler
equation
c˜j,t+1 = βpi
−1
t+1Rt+1
ϑ˜t+1
ϑ˜t
c˜j,t (2.24)
145
2.B. Derivation of the baseline model
where c˜j,t denotes consumption inclusive of transactions costs,
c˜t ≡ (1 + ϕ (vt)) cj,t
and
ϑ˜t ≡ ϑt (1 + ϕ (vt))
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)
Combining the first order conditions for consumption and hours worked gives:
χj,tn
ψ
j,t =
wt
cj,t
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)]
Given the specification of χj,t we have:
χnψj,t =
wt
ct
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)]
2.B.2 Derivation of the aggregate consumption equation
For the derivation it is useful to define a household’s total financial assets:
Apj,t+1 ≡ RMt+1Mpj,t +Rt+1Bpj,t (2.25)
which represents the total effective monetary and non-monetary obligations of the
government, including interest due, in period t+ 1.
Using the definition of assets and c˜, the household budget constraint can be
written as:
Apj,t+1
PtRt+1
+
Mpj,t
Pt
− R
M
t+1M
p
j,t
Rt+1Pt
=
Apj,t
γPt
+ w˜j,t − c˜j,t
apj,t+1pit+1
Rt+1
+
(
Rt+1 −RMt+1
)
Mpj,t
Rt+1Pt
= γ−1apj,t + w˜j,t − c˜j,t
where the first line uses the fact that (2.25) implies that Bpj,t = R
−1
t+1A
p
j,t+1 −
R−1t+1R
M
t+1M
p
j,t+1 and the second line uses the definition of real assets a
p
j,t ≡ Apj,t/Pt
and the inflation rate pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1. The final line can be written as:
apj,t =
γapj,t+1pit+1
Rt+1
+ γ
[
c˜j,t − w˜j,t + Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
mpj,t
]
(2.26)
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The real discount factor is defined recursively as:
Dt+i = γpit+i
Rt+i
Dt+i−1 (2.27)
from Dt = 1.
The household’s no-Ponzi condition is assumed to be:
lim
i→∞
Dt+iapj,t+i ≥ 0 (2.28)
Iterating the household budget constraint (2.26) gives:
apj,t = lim
i→∞
Dt+i
γapj,t+ipit+i+1
Rt+i+1
+γ
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
c˜j,t+i − w˜j,t+i + Rt+i+1 −R
M
t+i+1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i
)
so that, if the no Ponzi constraint binds with equality (as it will if marginal utility
is positive in the limit):
apj,t = γ
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
c˜j,t+i − w˜j,t+i + Rt+i+1 −R
M
t+i+1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i
)
(2.29)
Using the definition of post-tax income in (2.29) gives:
apj,t = γ
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
c˜j,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τj,t+i + Rt+i+1 −R
M
t+i+1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i
)
(2.30)
The household’s money demand equation can be substituted into (2.30) to give
apj,t = γ
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (c˜j,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τj,t+i + Ξt+ic˜j,t+i)
where
Ξt+i ≡ Rt+i+1 −R
M
t+i+1
Rt+i+1
(1 + ϕ (vt+i))
−1 ζ−1
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+i+1 −R
M
t+i+1
Rt+i+1
]
is determined by the relative rates of return on bonds and money.
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Rearranging the intertemporal budget constraint gives:
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i [1 + Ξt+i] c˜j,t+i = γ−1apj,t +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (wt+inj,t+i + dj,t+i − τj,t+i) (2.31)
The Euler equation (2.24) implies that
c˜j,t+i = (γβ)
iD−1t+i
ϑ˜t+i
ϑ˜t
c˜j,t (2.32)
Using (2.62) allows us to write (2.61) in terms of current consumption:
c˜j,t = µt
[
γ−1apj,t +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (wt+inj,t+i + dj,t+i − τj,t+i)
]
(2.33)
where µ is the marginal propensity to consume from wealth, given by:
µt =
( ∞∑
i=0
(γβ)i
ϑ˜t+i
ϑ˜t
[1 + Ξt+i]
)−1
(2.34)
which implies that:
µ−1t = 1 + Ξt + γβ
ϑ˜t+1
ϑ˜t
µ−1t+1 (2.35)
The consumption function (2.63) now aggregates straightforwardly. This follows
from the fact that future income flows are identical for all households. Identical
income flows are delivered by the assumption of identical lump sum taxes and di-
vidends for all households together with the specification of the preference shifter
χj,t to eliminate cohort-specific labor supply effects.
This implies that
c˜t = µt
[
at +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (wt+int+i + dt+i − τt+i)
]
(2.36)
where market clearing for assets is also imposed. The coefficient on assets on the
right hand side of (2.36) is unity (rather that γ−1) because it represents a weighted
average of the assets held by households that experience an asset reset and those
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that do not. The former group has a weight of 1− γ and hold no assets. The latter
group has a weight γ and average asset holdings of γ−1at.
Substituting the definition of dividends into the consumption function gives:
c˜t =µt
[
at +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
yt+i − Φ
2
(pit+i
pi∗
− 1
)2
− τt+i
)]
=µt
[
at +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (c˜t+i + gt+i − τt+i)
]
where the second line uses the market clearing condition to substitute for output.
The final equation implies that aggregate consumption in period t + 1 is given
by:
c˜t+1 = µt+1
[
at+1 +D−1t+1
∞∑
i=1
Dt+i (c˜t+i + gt+i − τt+i)
]
The consumption functions at dates t + 1 and t can be combined to eliminate
discounted future income flows:
Dt+1 µt
µt+1
c˜t+1 − c˜t =Dt+1µtat+1 − µtat − µt (c˜t + gt − τt)
=Dt+1µtat+1 − µt (c˜t + at + gt − τt) (2.37)
To proceed, the intertemporal budget constraints of the household and the gov-
ernment are combined. In parallel with households, define the total stock of gov-
ernment liabilities as:
Agt+1 ≡ RMt+1M gt +Rt+1Bgt
Again using lower case notation to denote real-valued asset stocks, these defini-
tions can be used to write the government budget constraint (2.8) as:
agt =
agt+1pit+1
Rt+1
− gt + τt + Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
mgt (2.38)
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This implies that
at + gt − τt = γ−1Dt+1at+1 + Ξtc˜t
which can be used in (2.37) to give:
Dt+1 µt
µt+1
c˜t+1 − c˜t = Dt+1µtat+1 − µt
(
c˜t + γ
−1Dt+1at+1 + Ξtc˜t
)
The government budget constraint (2.38), can be written in aggregate terms
(imposing asset market equilibrium agt = a
p
t = at,∀t) as:
at =Dgt+1at+1 − gt + τt +
Rt+1 −RMt+1
Rt+1
mt
=γ−1Dt+1at+1 − gt + τt + Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
mt
=γ−1Dt+1at+1 − gt + τt + Ξtc˜t
where the final line substitutes for money demand.
Collecting terms gives:
Dt+1 µt
µt+1
c˜t+1 = Dt+1µt
(
1− γ−1) at+1 + [1− (1 + Ξt)µt] c˜t
which implies that
c˜t = [1− (1 + Ξt)µt]−1 γpit+1
Rt+1
[
µt
µt+1
c˜t+1 + µt (1− γ) γ−1at+1
]
(2.39)
which also uses the fact that Dt+1 = γpit+1Rt+1 .
When γ = 1, equation (2.39) becomes:
c˜t = [1− (1 + Ξt)µt]−1 pit+1
Rt+1
µt
µt+1
c˜t+1
and the dependence on assets at+1 (the real balance effect) disappears.
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The terms in the marginal propensities to consume can be simplified as follows:
[1− (1 + Ξt)µt]−1 µt
µt+1
=
[
µt+1
µt
(1− (1 + Ξt)µt)
]−1
=
[
µ−1t
µ−1t+1
− 1 + Ξt
µ−1t+1
]−1
=
1 + Ξt + γβ ϑ˜t+1ϑ˜t µ−1t+1
µ−1t+1
− 1 + Ξt
µ−1t+1
−1
=
[
γβ
ϑ˜t+1
ϑ˜t
]−1
Similarly,
[1− (1 + Ξt)µt]−1 µt =
[
γβ
ϑ˜t+1
ϑ˜t
]−1
µt+1
Using these results in the aggregate consumption equation gives
c˜t =
pit+1
βRt+1
ϑ˜t
ϑ˜t+1
[
c˜t+1 + (1− γ) γ−1µt+1at+1
]
or
c˜t =
pit+1
βRt+1
ϑ˜t
ϑ˜t+1
[
c˜t+1 + (1− γ) γ−1µt+1pi−1t+1
(
RMt+1mt +Rt+1bt
)]
(2.40)
which also uses the definition of total assets:
at+1 = pi
−1
t+1
(
RMt+1mt +Rt+1bt
)
When γ = 1, this can be written as:
c˜t+1 = βpi
−1
t+1Rt+1
ϑ˜t+1
ϑ˜t
c˜t
which coincides with the individual household Euler equation (2.24).
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2.B.3 Firms and supply side
The objective function for the firm is:
max
∞∑
k=t
λ¯kβ
k−t
[(
Pj,k
Pk
− wk
A
)(
Pj,k
Pk
)−η
yk − Φ
2
(
Pj,k
pi∗Pj,k−1
− 1
)2]
where λ¯ is a stochastic discount factor used to value the flow of profits. In general,
there are heterogeneous households (which differ by their date of asset resets) so
there is not a unique stochastic discount factor that can be used for valuing the
profit flows paid to households. However, the first order condition (2.20) implies
that the discount factors of all households satisfy:
λj,t
λj,t+1
= β
Rt+1
pit+1
so a discount factor is chosen that satisfies:
λ¯t+1 = λ¯t
pit+1
βRt+1
The first order condition for the firm’s price is:
0 =− η
(
Pj,t
Pt
− wt
A
)(
Pj,t
Pt
)−η−1
λ¯tyt
Pt
+
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−η
λ¯tyt
Pt
− Φλ¯t
pi∗Pj,t−1
(
Pj,t
pi∗Pj,t−1
− 1
)
+ β
Φλ¯t+1Pj,t+1
pi∗P 2j,t
(
Pj,t+1
pi∗Pj,t
− 1
)
which reveals that optimal pricing decisions depend on the stochastic discount factor
only through the ratio λ¯t+1/λ¯t.
In a symmetric equilibrium in which Pj,t = Pt,∀j, t, the first order condition
simplifies to:
Φpit
pi∗yt
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηwt
A
+ Φ
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗yt
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
(2.41)
The supply side of the model is unchanged from the baseline variant, so the
pricing equation is given by:
Φpit
pi∗yt
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηwt
A
+ Φ
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗yt
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
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as before.
Noting that A = 1 and that the first order conditions imply that the wage is
given by:
wt = χn
ψ
t ct
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)]
allows the pricing equation to be written as:
Φpit
pi∗yt
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1−η+ηχyψt ct
[
1 + ϕ (vt)
(
1 + ζv−1t
)]
+Φ
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗yt
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
which also uses the fact that the production function implies that nt = yt.
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2.B.4 The model equations
Collecting together the previously derived equations gives:
yt = (1 + ϕt) ct + g
∗ +
Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
Φpit
ytpi∗
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηχyψt ct
[
1 + ϕt
(
1 + ζv−1t
)]
+ Φ
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗yt
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
c˜t =
pit+1
βRt+1
ϑ˜t
ϑ˜t+1
[
c˜t+1 + (1− γ) γ−1µt+1pi−1t+1
(
RMt+1mt +Rt+1bt
)]
µ−1t = 1 + Ξt + γβ
ϑ˜t+1
ϑ˜t
µ−1t+1
Ξt =
ϕt
1 + ϕt
[
ln (ζZ)− ln Rt+1 −R
M
t+1
Rt+1
]
c˜t = (1 + ϕt) ct
ϑ˜t =
ϑt (1 + ϕt)
1 + ϕt
(
1 + ζv−1t
)
ϕt = ζ
−1Rt+1 −RMt+1
Rt+1
ϕt = Z exp
[
− ζ
vt
]
vt =
ct
mt
Rt+1 = max
{
R
( pit
pi∗
)θpi ( yt
yft
)θy
,
¯
R
}
∆ lnϑt = ρϑ∆ lnϑt−1 + εϑt
Conditional on the behavior of flex price output, yft (derived below), the re-
turn on money, RMt , and government debt, bt, this system determines the variables
yt, ct, pit, Rt+1,mt, vt, ϕt, ϑt,ϑ˜t,c˜t,µt,Ξt.
The model is closed by assumptions about the return on money and government
debt. The gross rate of return on money, RMt+1, is either held fixed at unity in the
conventional approach (RMt+1 = 1,∀t) or adjusted to ensure that households willingly
hold a stock of money that is determined by a rule, as in the baseline version of the
model. The baseline assumption for government debt is that it is fixed, bt = b
∗ ≥ 0,
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while the ‘debt financing’ experiments in Section 2.3.1 incorporate the government
budget constraint with temporarily fixed taxes, τt = τ .
2.B.5 Flexible price allocations
Models with transactions frictions present some challenges for defining flexible price
allocations. In particular, even if prices and wages are fully flexible, allocations still
depend on the level(s) of nominal interest rate(s). Kim and Subramanian (2006)
and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) define a ‘supply side’ flexible price equilibrium,
conditional on steady-state nominal returns on money and bonds. An analogous
concept is used here.
If nominal returns on bonds and money are at their steady-state levels, of R and
1 respectively, then flexible price velocity and transactions costs are constant, at ϕ¯
and v¯ respectively, where these values satisfy:
ζϕ¯ =
R− 1
R
ϕ¯ = Z exp
[
−ζ
v¯
]
Conditional on flexible price velocity and transactions costs, market clearing and
the pricing equation can be used to solve for flexible price output and consumption
as follows:
yft = (1 + ϕ¯) c
f
t + gt
0 = 1− η + ηχcft
(
yft
)ψ (
1 + ϕ¯
(
1 +
ζ
v¯
))
where the pricing equation does not feature price adjustment costs under the as-
sumption that inflation is constant at target in the flexible price equilibrium.
2.B.6 Steady state
Steady-state allocations are indicated by the absence of time subscripts.
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Long-run government policies are treated as exogenous. This includes the value
of the inflation target pi∗ and the steady-state levels of debt and government spend-
ing. Steady-state government spending is set exogenously at g = g∗y, with g∗ ∈
[0, 1).
The utility parameter χ and the productivity parameter A are chosen to nor-
malize steady-state hours worked and output at unity: n = y = 1. Conditional on
n = 1, the required value of A is 1. The required value of χ is found by noting that
the steady-state Phillips curve implies that:
0 = 1− η + ηχ1− g
∗
1 + ϕ
[
1 + ϕ
(
1 + ζv−1
)]
so that delivering n = 1 requires:
χ =
η − 1
η
1 + ϕ
(1− g∗) [1 + ϕ (1 + ζv−1)]
and hence the required value of χ depends on steady-state velocity and (hence)
transactions costs. These variables will be targeted by an appropriate choice of the
transaction cost parameters Z and ζ (detailed below).
In steady state, the consumption equation implies
βc˜ =
pi∗
R
[
c˜+ µ (1− γ) 1
γpi∗
(
RMm+Rb
)]
or
βR
pi∗
= 1 +
1− γβ
1 + Ξ
(1− γ) R
Mm+Rb
γpi∗c˜
(since µ = 1−γβ
1+Ξ
). This illustrates that the steady state real interest rate is increasing
in the steady state ratio of (the value of) government liabilities to consumption.
The steady-state net interest rate on money is assumed to be zero so that RM =
1. As noted above, steady-state velocity, v ≡ c/m, is also treated as a calibration
target and is therefore ‘known’.
This means that the steady-state interest rate satisfies:
βR
pi∗
= 1 +
(1− γβ) (1− γ)
(1 + Ξ) (1 + ϕ) vγpi∗
+
1− γβ
1 + Ξ
(1− γ) Rb
γpi∗c˜
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The steady-state target level of government debt is assumed to satisfy b = b∗y,
where b∗ ≥ 0 and y = 1. This implies that the steady-state interest rate satisfies:
βR
pi∗
= 1 +
(1− γβ) (1− γ)
(1 + Ξ) (1 + ϕ) vγpi∗
+
1− γβ
1 + Ξ
(1− γ) Rb
∗
γpi∗ (1− g∗)
which also uses the fact that c˜ = 1− g∗ in steady state.
Collecting terms implies that, conditional on steady-state government spending,
government debt, the inflation target and steady-state velocity (which determines ϕ
and Ξ), the value of β consistent with a desired steady state nominal interest rate
can be found by setting:
β =
[
R
pi∗
+
1− γ
(1 + Ξ) (1 + ϕ) vpi∗
+
(1− γ)Rb∗
(1 + Ξ) pi∗ (1− g∗)
]−1
×
[
1 +
1− γ
(1 + Ξ) (1 + ϕ) vγpi∗
+
(1− γ)Rb∗
(1 + Ξ) γpi∗ (1− g∗)
]
Conditional on ζ, Z is chosen to deliver a target level of steady-state real money
balances. This implies that:
Z = exp
[
ζ
v
− ln ζ + ln (1−R−1)]
where steady-state velocity v is chosen based on the target real money balance level.
Finally, to calibrate the price adjustment costs, note that log-linearizing the
Phillips curve gives:
pˆit = βpˆit+1 +
η − 1
Φ
wˆt
so that the slope of the linearized Phillips curve with respect to marginal cost is
η−1
Φ
. In a model with Calvo (1983) contracts, the slope is:
(1− p) (1− pβ)
p
where p is the probability that the price is not adjusted in each quarter (see Gal´ı,
2008). The slope of the linearized Phillips curve can be replicated for a desired value
of p by setting:
Φ =
p (η − 1)
(1− p) (1− pβ)
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Appendix 2.C Cash in advance variant
This appendix derives a cash in advance variant of the model similar to that used by
Ireland (2005). Because in this variant money is held for its transactions services,
the net interest rate on money is assumed to be zero in all periods. This permits
consideration of cases in which the nominal interest rate on bonds is also equal to
zero.
2.C.1 Overview of the differences from the baseline model
In this variant of the model households are subject to a cash in advance constraint
so that purchases of consumption goods are constrained by the quantity of cash
holdings that the household has access to. The government, monetary policy and
firms are modeled in the same was as in the baseline model, so are not discussed in
detail here.
The main changes to the model structure affect the timing of events within each
period. Such timing assumptions are required to clarify how the cash in advance
constraint limits the spending power of the household. These timing assumptions,
require a more explicit treatment of the tax and transfer payments made to house-
holds. It is also convenient to redefine the price of a one period bond (so that
households are assumed to purchase a bond that pays one unit of money in the
following period for a price equal to the reciprocal of the gross return on the bond).
This renormalization does not have any implications for the equilibrium conditions
of the model, but simplifies the exposition and derivation. As noted above, it is also
assumed that money pays no interest (that is RMt = 1, ∀t).
2.C.2 Household budget constraints and timing
As in Ireland (2005), the timing protocol is based on the worker-shopper setup in-
troduced by Lucas (1980). At the start of period t, a household born in period
j receives a monetary transfer from the government, Tmt,s ≥ 0. In addition to this
transfer, the household also receives income from maturing one-period bonds pur-
chased in the previous period. Similarly, the household also carries over any money
balances that were not used for consumption in the previous period.
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Asset markets open at the beginning of the period and the household decides how
to allocate its asset income between money and bonds. Only the amount allocated
to money can be used to purchase consumption goods, so that the cash in advance
constraint is written as:
Mpj,t−1 + B˜
p
j,t−1 + T
m
j,t −
B˜pj,t
Rt+1
≥ Ptcj,t (2.42)
The left-hand side of (2.42) is the quantity of money held at the start of period t.
As described above, the first two terms represent the stock of previously accumulated
money and (matured) one-period bonds, the second term is the monetary transfer
from the government and the third term is the households investment in one period
bonds that will mature at the start of period t + 1. As noted above, the notation
for bond pricing is such that a bond that pays one unit of money in period t+ 1 is
purchased at price R−1t+1 in period t. For this reason the notation B˜ denotes bond
holdings, to make it clear that they are distinct from the variable B in the baseline
version of the model. As in the baseline variant of the model, the rate of return
between periods t and t+ 1 is determined in period t.42
The right hand side of (2.42) represents the consumption expenditure of the
household. Consumption is carried out by the ‘shopper’ who splits from the ‘worker’
at the beginning of the period. At the end of period t, the worker and shopper reunite
and pool resources. This pooling of resources gives rise to the end of period budget
constraint:
Mpj,t ≤Mpj,t−1 + B˜pj,t−1 + Tmj,t −
B˜pj,t
Rt+1
− Ptcj,t +Wtnj,t +Dj,t − T gj,t
which shows that the quantity of money carried forward to period t + 1 can be no
greater than the residual from the cash in advance constraint (that is, the quantity
of money remaining after consumption) plus net income. Net income consists of the
42The model implicitly allows households to borrow from each other using one period nominal
bonds. In equilibrium, the absence of arbitrage opportunities will imply that these bonds trade at
the same price as government bonds and the net supply of such bonds across all households will be
zero. In fact, given the nature of the equilibrium in the model and the cash in advance constraint,
households will typically need to borrow (that is choose B˜pj,t < 0) in the periods immediately
following an asset reset in order to be able to finance the optimal level of consumption. A similar
effect arises in the model studied by Ireland (2005).
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wage income and dividends paid to the worker by firms, net of taxes T gt levied by
the government to finance government spending and its liabilities.
The household budget constraint can be written in real terms as:
mpj,t ≤ pi−1t
(
mpj,t−1 + b˜
p
j,t−1
)
+ τmj,t −
b˜pj,t
Rt+1
− cj,t + wtnj,t + dj,t − τ gj,t (2.43)
where lower case letters denote nominal variables deflated by the price level Pt,
inflation is denoted pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 as in the main text and τxj,t ≡ T xj,t/Pt, x = m, g.
Defining total assets as a˜pj,t ≡ pi−1t
(
mpj,t−1 + b˜
p
j,t−1
)
(the household’s assets at the
start of period t) and assuming that the budget constraint binds gives:
pit+1R
−1
t+1a˜
p
j,t+1 = a˜
p
j,t + τ
m
j,t −
Rt+1 − 1
Rt+1
mpj,t − cj,t + wtnj,t + dj,t − τ gj,t
which implies that
a˜pj,t =
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
[
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i + cj,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τ gj,t+i − τmj,t+i
]
+ lim
i→∞
Dt+ipit+i+1R−1t+i+1a˜pj,t+i
where the discount factor Dt+i is defined as in the main text. Assuming that the
household’s no Ponzi condition holds with equality, we have limi→∞Dt+ia˜pj,t+i = 0
so that the intertemporal budget constraint is:
a˜pj,t =
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
[
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i + cj,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τ gj,t+i − τmj,t+i
]
(2.44)
2.C.3 Household optimization
Analogous to the assumptions in the baseline model, the household solves:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtϑt
[
ln cj,t − χj,t
1 + ψ
n1+ψj,t
]
(2.45)
so that preferences correspond to those in a variant of the baseline model with γ = 1.
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Utility maximization subject to the cash in advance constraint and the budget
constraint (2.43) gives first order conditions with respect to bonds, labor supply,
consumption and money:
ωj,t + ξj,t
Rt+1
= β
ωj,t+1 + ξj,t+1
pit+1
(2.46)
ϑtχj,tn
ψ
j,t = ωj,twt (2.47)
ϑt
cj,t
= ωj,t + ξj,t (2.48)
ωj,t = β
ωj,t+1 + ξj,t+1
pit+1
(2.49)
where ωj,t is the multiplier on the budget constraint and ξj,t is the multiplier on the
cash in advance constraint.
Under the assumption that the budget constraint binds (so that ωj,t 6= 0,∀t) the
first order conditions can be rearranged to give:
ϑt
cj,t
= β
Rt+1
pit+1
ϑt+1
cj,t+1
(2.50)
χc¯tn
ψ
j,t =
wt
Rt+1
where the second equation is the labor supply equation. Note that because the
marginal value of consumption is affected by the multiplier on the cash in advance
constraint, the labor supply relationship depends on the short-term bond rate (the
opportunity cost of holding cash) giving rise to a Tobin effect.
As long as the short-term bond rate is strictly positive, the cash in advance
constraint binds. This means that (2.43) and (2.42) (written in real terms) can be
combined to give:
mpt,j = wtnt,j + dj,t − τ gj,t (2.51)
which can be written as a money demand equation by using the labor supply con-
dition to eliminate hours worked:
mpt,j = wt
(
wt
χc¯tRt+1
) 1
ψ
+ dj,t − τ gj,t
161
2.C. Cash in advance variant
Under the assumption that dividends are distributed equally to all households
and taxes are levied equally on all households, this implies that all households will
hold an identical stock of real money balances, given by:43
mpj,t = m¯
p
t = wt
(
wt
χc¯tRt+1
) 1
ψ
+ d¯t − τ¯ gt
which is useful for aggregation purposes.
2.C.4 The government budget constraint, monetary and
fiscal policies
The period budget constraint of the government in real, aggregate, terms is given
by:
mgt +R
−1
t+1b˜
g
t = pi
−1
t
(
mgt−1 + b˜
g
t−1
)
+ gt + τ
m
t − τ gt
Monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated. There is a fiscal rule for τ gt that
ensures that the government’s solvency condition is satisfied. The short-term bond
rate is set according to a monetary policy rule, subject to a lower bound:
Rt+1 = max
{
R
( pit
pi∗
)θpi (yt
y
)θy
, 1
}
(2.52)
which is similar to the monetary policy rule for the baseline version of the model,
with
¯
R = 1. The only difference in the specification of the rule is that the output
gap is measured relative to the steady state level of output. As described below,
the presence of the cash in advance constraint generates a ‘cost channel’ effect in
the Phillips curve which means that the flexible price allocations in this model are
affected by the behavior of monetary policy.
When the monetary policy rule (2.52) prescribes a strictly positive interest rate
on bonds (Rt+1 > 1), the cash in advance constraint binds and the monetary transfer
τmt is chosen to deliver the value of Rt+1 implied by the monetary policy rule.
43Note that this implies that all households hold the same quantity of money at the end of the
period. Differing consumption levels can be financed while satisfying the cash in advance constraint
through the appropriate trading of bonds.
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When the policy rule is constrained at Rt+1 = 1, the cash in advance constraint
does not bind and the monetary transfer τmt is chosen to ensure that the total money
stock satisfies:
Mt
Mt−1
=
(
Mt−1
Mt−2
)ρm
(pi∗)(1−ρm) exp (εmt ) (2.53)
Fiscal policy is the same as the baseline model. Real government spending and
debt are held fixed in current value terms:
gt =g
∗
b˜t =Rt+1b
∗
where the second equation imposes the same fiscal policy as in the baseline model.
2.C.5 Aggregation
Some care is required when aggregating asset stocks because of the alternative timing
notation for total assets and the stocks of money and bonds.
To derive the consumption function for the individual household, first note that
the Euler equation (2.50) implies that:
cj,t+1 = β
Rt+1
pit+1
ϑt+1
ϑt
cj,t
and hence that
cj,t+i = (γβ)
iD−1t+i
ϑt+i
ϑt
cj,t (2.54)
where the discount factor Dt+i is defined in (2.27), identically to the baseline model.
Substituting into the household’s intertemporal budget constraint (2.44) gives:
a˜pj,t =
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
[
Rt+i+1−1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i + (γβ)
iD−1t+i ϑt+iϑt cj,t
−wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τ gj,t+i − τmj,t+i
]
=
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
[
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τ gj,t+i − τmj,t+i
]
+
∞∑
i=0
(γβ)i
ϑt+i
ϑt
cj,t
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which implies that
cj,t = µt
[
a˜pj,t + wt+inj,t+i + dj,t+i + τ
m
j,t+i − τ gj,t+i −
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i
]
where the marginal propensity to consume satisfies
µ−1t =
∞∑
i=0
(γβ)i
ϑt+i
ϑt
= 1 + γβ
ϑt+1
ϑt
µ−1t+1
These conventions imply that aggregating the consumption function across house-
holds gives:
ct = µt
[
a˜pt +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
wt+int+i + dt+i + τ
m
t+i − τ gt+i −
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mpt+i
)]
which is valid because all households make identical labor supply decisions, all di-
vidends and taxes are distributed equally across all households and (hence) all house-
holds hold the same real money balances.
2.C.6 Equilibrium and parsimonious model representation
The goods market clearing condition and production function equations are identical
to the baseline model:
yt = ct + gt +
Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
= ct + g
∗ +
Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
yt = nt
The labor supply condition and production function can be combined to show
that the real wage satisfies:
wt = χy
ψ
t ctRt+1
Using this expression in the pricing equation (which is identical to the baseline
model), gives:
Φpit
ytpi∗
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηχyψt ctRt+1 +
Φ
yt
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
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which implies that the cash in advance constraint gives rise to a ‘cost channel’ in
the Phillips curve.
Using the definition of dividends and imposing goods and asset market clearing
conditions to the consumption function gives:
ct = µt
[
a˜t +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
yt+i − Φ
2
(pit+i
pi∗
− 1
)2
+ τmt+i − τ gt+i −
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mt+i
)]
= µt
[
a˜t +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
ct+i + gt+i + τ
m
t+i − τ gt+i −
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mt+i
)]
so that
ct+1 = µt+1
[
a˜t+1 +D−1t+1
∞∑
i=1
Dt+i
(
ct+i + gt+i + τ
m
t+i − τ gt+i −
Rt+i+1 − 1
Rt+i+1
mt+i
)]
and hence
Dt+1 µt
µt+1
ct+1 − ct =Dt+1µta˜t+1 − µta˜t − µt
(
ct + gt + τ
m
t − τ gt −
Rt+1 − 1
Rt+1
mt
)
=Dt+1µta˜t+1 − µt
(
ct + a˜t + gt + τ
m
t − τ gt −
Rt+1 − 1
Rt+1
mt
)
Evaluating the government budget constraint at asset market equilibrium gives:
mt +R
−1
t+1b˜t = pi
−1
t
(
mt−1 + b˜t−1
)
+ gt + τ
m
t − τ gt = a˜t + gt + τmt − τ gt
which implies that
Dt+1 µt
µt+1
ct+1 − ct =Dt+1µta˜t+1 − µt
(
ct +mt +R
−1
t+1b˜t −
Rt+1 − 1
Rt+1
mt
)
=Dt+1µtpi−1t+1
(
b˜t +mt
)
− µt
[
ct +R
−1
t+1
(
b˜t +mt
)]
=γR−1t+1µt
(
b˜t +mt
)
− µt
[
ct +R
−1
t+1
(
b˜t +mt
)]
= (γ − 1)R−1t+1µt
(
b˜t +mt
)
− µtct
Re-arranging for c and using the definition of Dt+1 gives:
ct = (1− µt)−1
[
γpit+1
Rt+1
µt
µt+1
ct+1 + (1− γ)R−1t+1µt
(
b˜t +mt
)]
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Pinning down equilibrium in the money market, requires explicit assumptions
about how the fiscal policy instruments τ g and τm are determined. Specifically,
τ gt is adjusted to finance government spending and the interest payments on debt
required to hold the debt stock constant. That is:
τ gt = g
∗ +
(
pi−1t Rt − 1
)
b∗
which implies that τm is used to finance money creation:
τmt = mt − pi−1t mt−1
When the cash in advance constraint binds, aggregating equation (2.51) and
imposing market clearing gives:
mt = wtnt + dt − τ gt = yt −
Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
− τ gt = ct + gt − τ gt
and imposing the rule for τ gt gives:
mt = ct −
(
pi−1t Rt − 1
)
b∗
The model equations can be collected into two blocks. The first block of equations
hold in all periods (assuming that the household budget constraint binds):
yt = ct + g
∗ +
Φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
Φpit
ytpi∗
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηχyψt ctRt+1 +
Φ
yt
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
ct = (1− µt)−1
[
γpit+1
Rt+1
µt
µt+1
ct+1 + (1− γ)R−1t+1µt (Rt+1b∗ +mt)
]
µ−1t = 1 + γβ
ϑt+1
ϑt
µ−1t+1
∆ lnϑt = ρϑ∆ lnϑt−1 + εϑt
which provide solutions for the sequences {yt, ct, pit, µt, ϑt}∞t=0, conditional on
{
εϑt
}∞
t=0
and solutions for the sequences {mt, Rt+1}∞t=0.
The second block of equations can be solved for the sequence {mt, Rt+1}∞t=0.
There are two variants, depending on whether the monetary policy rule is con-
strained by the zero bound. If the monetary policy rule is unconstrained by the zero
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bound, then the interest rate is determined by the Taylor rule. In this case, the cash
in advance constraint binds and this determines real money balances:
Rt+1 = R
( pit
pi∗
)θpi (yt
y
)θy
mt = ct −
(
pi−1t Rt − 1
)
b∗
Alternatively, the short-term bond rate may be constrained by the zero lower
bound, in which case the cash in advance constraint does not bind and the quantity
of real money balances is determined by the rule (2.53), which can be written as:
Rt+1 = 1
mtpit
mt−1
=
(
mt−1pit−1
mt−2
)ρm
(pi∗)(1−ρm) exp (εmt )
2.C.7 Steady state
As for the baseline model, government policy is considered as exogenous, so the
steady state is conditional on g∗ ∈ [0, 1), b∗ > 0 and pi∗. The steady state is
one in which the zero bound is not binding (by virtue of the inflation target being
sufficiently high). In steady state, ϑ = 1 and µ = 1− β. The monetary policy rule
ensures that pi = pi∗.
The parameter χ is chosen to normalize steady-state output to unity (y = 1, so
that c = 1− g∗), which requires:
0 = 1− η + ηχ (1− g∗)R
or
χ =
η − 1
η
1
R (1− g∗)
In a steady state with a positive interest rate, the cash in advance constraint will
bind, implying that
m = c− ((pi∗)−1R− 1) b∗
= 1− g∗ − ((pi∗)−1R− 1) b∗
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As for the baseline model, the calibration approach is to calibrate β with reference
to a target rate of return on short-term bonds. Treating R as a ‘parameter’ therefore
implies that steady-state real money balances are fully determined.
In steady state, the consumption equation implies:
c = (γβ)−1
[
γpi∗
R
c+ (1− γ)R−1 (1− γβ) (Rb∗ +m)
]
so that
γβ =
γpi∗
R
+ (1− γ) (1− γβ)
(
b∗
1− g∗ +
m
R (1− g∗)
)
which implies that:
β =
γpi∗
R
+ (1− γ)
(
b∗
1−g∗ +
m
R(1−g∗)
)
γ
(
1 + (1− γ)
(
b∗
1−g∗ +
m
R(1−g∗)
))
Appendix 2.D Additively separable money
demand
This variant of the model abstracts from transactions frictions and assumes that
household derive utility from holding real money balances. The maximization prob-
lem is:
max
∞∑
t=0
(γβ)t ϑt
[
(1− α) ln cj,t + α ln
(
Mpj,t
Pt
)
− χj,t
1 + ψ
n1+ψj,t
]
(2.55)
subject to:
Mpj,t
Pt
+
Bpj,t
Pt
= γ−1
[
RMt M
p
j,t−1
Pt
+
RtB
p
j,t−1
Pt
]
+ w˜j,t − cj,t (2.56)
The first order conditions deliver an Euler equation for consumption:
cj,t+1 = β
ϑt+1
ϑt
Rt+1
pit+1
cj,t (2.57)
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and a money demand function:
mpj,t =
α
1− α
Rt+1
Rt+1 −RMt+1
cj,t (2.58)
Making the same assumptions about the properties of χj,t as the baseline model
gives rise to the following labor supply relationship:
χnξj,t = (1− α)
wt
ct
(2.59)
As in the baseline model, the intertemporal household budget constraint is:
apj,t = γ
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
cj,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τj,t+i + Rt+i+1 −R
M
t+i+1
Rt+i+1
mpj,t+i
)
(2.60)
Substituting for the household’s money demand equation gives:
apj,t = γ
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i
(
cj,t+i − wt+inj,t+i − dj,t+i + τj,t+i + α
1− αcj,t+i
)
which can be rearranged to:
(1− α)−1
∞∑
i=0
Dt+icj,t+i = γ−1apj,t +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (wt+inj,t+i + dj,t+i − τj,t+i) (2.61)
The Euler equation (2.57) implies that
cj,t+i = (γβ)
iD−1t+i
ϑt+i
ϑt
cj,t (2.62)
Using (2.62) allows (2.61) to be written in terms of current consumption:
cj,t = (1− α)µt
[
γ−1apj,t +
∞∑
i=0
Dt+i (wt+inj,t+i + dj,t+i − τj,t+i)
]
(2.63)
where µ is the marginal propensity to consume from wealth, given by:
µt =
( ∞∑
i=0
(γβ)i
ϑt+i
ϑt
)−1
(2.64)
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which implies that:
µ−1t = 1 + γβ
ϑt+1
ϑt
µ−1t+1 (2.65)
The same aggregation and manipulation of the consumption function detailed in
Appendix 2.B.2 for the baseline model deliver an aggregate consumption equation:
ct = (1− µt)−1 γpit+1
Rt+1
[
µt
µt+1
ct+1 + (1− α)µt (1− γ) γ−1at+1
]
(2.66)
The aggregate pricing equation in this variant is given by:
Φpit
pi∗yt
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)
= 1− η + ηχcty
ψ
t
1− α + Φ
pit+1
Rt+1
pit+1
pi∗yt
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
)
where the difference from the baseline model reflects the change in the labor supply
relationship.
The flexible price economy is one in which there are no price adjustment costs
Φ = 0 and monetary policy is set to ensure that inflation is at target: pit = pi
∗,∀t.
Under these assumptions, the resource constraint and Phillips curve become:
yft = c
f
t + gt (2.67)
0 = 1− η + η
χcft
(
yft
)ψ
1− α (2.68)
where the f superscript denotes a quantity from the flexible price economy. These
two equations can be solved jointly for the levels of consumption and output that
would prevail under flexible prices. It is immediate that preference shocks ϑ have
no effect on flexible price output and consumption.
To ensure that consumption and output do not respond, the short-term nominal
interest rate and (flexible price) money demand must adjust accordingly. The re-
quired movements can be found by (jointly) solving flexible price analogues of the
consumption and money demand equations. In particular:
(1− µt) cft =
γpi∗
Rft+1
µt
µt+1
cft+1 + (1− α)µt (1− γ)
(
Rft+1
)−1 (
mft +R
f
t+1b
∗
)
mft =
α
1− α
Rft+1
Rft+1 −RMt+1
cft
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where flexible price allocations are computed under the assumption that the flexible
price return on money is the same as the actual return on money (RMt+1) and the
bond stock is held fixed.44
44These assumptions can be relaxed at the expense of increasing the size of the flexible price
block of the model.
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Chapter 3
Flexible inflation targeting under
fiscal dominance
Abstract
I study optimal time consistent monetary policy in a simple New Keynesian
model with long-term government debt. Fiscal policy is ‘active’ so that sta-
bilization of the government debt stock is a binding constraint on monetary
policy. Away from the zero bound, optimal monetary policy does not fully
offset the effects of shocks to the natural rate of interest, reducing welfare.
At the lower bound, recessionary shocks increase debt and generate the anti-
cipation of higher future inflation, to reduce real debt. These higher inflation
expectations mitigate the effects of recessionary shocks. For sufficiently long
debt duration, improved performance at the lower bound may outweigh the
welfare losses in normal times.
‘Central banks are often accused of being obsessed with inflation. This
is untrue. If they are obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy.’
Mervyn King, 1995.
3.1 Introduction
The interaction between monetary and fiscal policies has become an area of renewed
focus following the financial crisis. In particular, there have been intense debates
over the extent to which fiscal policy can or should support monetary policy when
the latter is constrained by the zero lower bound. While a number of countries
undertook discretionary fiscal stimulus in response to financial crisis, many of those
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policies were subsequently reversed. Concerns over rising government debt levels
were often cited as a key motivation for these ‘austerity’ policies (Blyth, 2013).
My focus is on how optimal monetary policy is affected by the nature of fiscal
policy behavior. Much of the literature on optimal monetary policy has assumed
that the monetary policymaker can safely ignore fiscal policy developments. I explore
the implications of relaxing this assumption. In doing so, this chapter contributes
to a long and rich literature studying the interactions between monetary and fiscal
policy, reviewed in Section 3.2.
My approach aims to explore the implications of two very stark assumptions
about fiscal policy. In the textbook New Keynesian model, fiscal policy is ‘passive’
(Leeper, 1991). It is assumed that the government will always take appropriate
action to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint in response to any changes in
financing costs or real debt generated by monetary policy decisions. So taxes and/or
spending are adjusted to ensure that the real government debt stock is stabilized
for any path of prices. This behavior means that the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint is irrelevant for the monetary policymaker.
In contrast, I study the polar opposite assumption: real tax revenues are held
fixed. This means that fiscal policy is ‘active’ and monetary policy decisions must
ensure that the real value of (nominal) government debt is stabilized. This policy
configuration is sometimes called ‘fiscal dominance’.
While stark, this assumption is a natural starting point for analyzing the implica-
tions of the so-called ‘fiscal theory of monetary policy’ (see Section 3.2.4) for optimal
monetary policy behavior. The simplicity of the assumed fiscal policy behavior also
enables me to derive some key results analytically. Moreover, this assumption has
some real world relevance as it implies all government spending changes are ‘un-
funded’, which has some parallels with recent fiscal policy behavior in the United
States.
The analytical framework for my analysis is a textbook New Keynesian model
(for example, Gal´ı, 2008; Woodford, 2003) extended to include long-term nominal
government debt. The presence of this debt has no implications for optimal monet-
ary policy under the textbook assumption of passive fiscal policy.
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However, as highlighted by Sims (2011) and Cochrane (2018b), under ‘active’
fiscal policy, the presence of long-term government debt allows the price level ad-
justments required to stabilize government debt to be spread out over time. Material
movements in long-term bond prices can be achieved by relatively small, but per-
sistent changes in the expected paths of inflation and short-term interest rates.
A loss function based on a quadratic approximation to household utility is used
to assess the welfare implications of alternative variants of the model. Under the
baseline assumption of active fiscal policy, monetary policy must be set in a way
that minimizes welfare losses (expressed in terms of squared inflation and output gap
deviations) subject to the additional constraint that the the real value of government
debt is stabilized. Two parameterizations of the model are studied. The baseline
parameterization sets the duration of government debt equal to an average across
OECD countries. An alternative ‘long duration’ parameterization is based on data
from the United Kingdom.
I study optimal time consistent policy in a log-linearized version of the model.
I first ignore the lower bound on the short-term interest rate. This gives rise to a
standard linear-quadratic optimal policy problem that can be studied analytically.
I demonstrate that there is a unique stable Markov perfect equilibrium.
I show that the equilibrium behavior of the output gap and inflation is determined
by a key coefficient: the equilibrium elasticity of the debt stock with respect to debt
in the previous period. This elasticity increases with the duration of the government
debt stock. As a result, the variant of the model with long-duration government debt
exhibits smaller initial responses in the output gap and inflation to shocks, but the
responses are more persistent. Achieving these outcomes typically requires larger
movements in the short-term nominal interest rate.
The duration of government debt in the model therefore underpins the extent
of the “debt stabilization bias” (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013; Leeper and Leith,
2016). Longer duration debt allows for a slower adjustment of debt to steady state
following a shock and reduces the extent of fluctuations in the output gap and
inflation required to stabilize the debt stock.
Two further results are evident by comparing the model to the textbook New
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Keynesian model with passive fiscal policy. First, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’
no longer holds. In the textbook model, shocks that affect the economy through
their effect on the natural rate of interest are perfectly stabilized under optimal
time-consistent policy. In my model, this result no longer holds because the mon-
etary policymaker must ensure that the government debt stock is stabilized. This
additional constraint requires the policymaker to allow deviations of output from
potential and inflation from target. These fluctuations generate welfare losses, so
that active fiscal policy incurs higher welfare costs in response to these shocks.
The second result is that welfare losses generated by cost-push shocks – that
generate a trade-off between stabilizing the output gap and inflation – may be smal-
ler under active fiscal policy than under the textbook assumption of passive fiscal
policy. This is because a positive cost-push shock that raises inflation in the near
term reduces the real value of existing nominal government debt. Stabilizing the
debt stock requires future policymakers to deliver lower inflation in the future. This
reduces expected inflation in the near term and makes the trade-off between stabil-
izing the output gap and inflation more favorable. In equilibrium, the policymaker
delivers smaller welfare losses in response to cost push shocks for both parameteriz-
ations of the model with active fiscal policy, relative to the textbook New Keynesian
model.
The results from the linear quadratic analysis also provide intuition for the be-
havior of the model under optimal time-consistent policy in the presence of the zero
lower bound on the short-term interest rate. The non-linearity induced by the zero
bound requires the model to be solved by projection methods.
Welfare losses are smaller in the variant of the model with long duration gov-
ernment debt than the textbook New Keynesian model with passive fiscal policy.
This result is driven by the balance between two effects. Away from the zero bound,
welfare losses are larger under active fiscal policy, since the ‘divine coincidence’
result of the textbook model described above does not hold. However, when the
economy is constrained by the zero bound, the combination of active fiscal policy
and long-duration debt reduces welfare losses. This is because deflationary shocks
that drive the policy rate to the zero bound raise the real value of government debt.
This requires future policymakers to generate higher inflation to stabilize the debt
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stock, which increases inflation expectations. Higher inflation expectations at the
zero bound reduces the real interest rate, stimulating spending and offsetting the
recessionary effects of the deflationary shock.
For the long duration parameterization, the reduction in welfare losses at the
zero bound is substantial enough to offset the larger losses away from the zero
bound (relative to the textbook model). However, for the baseline parameterization,
the improvement in outcomes at the zero bound is not sufficient to offset poorer
performance in normal times.
The equilibrium distribution of government debt plays an important role in de-
livering these results. For both the baseline model and long duration variant, the
average debt stock is above the deterministic steady state. This is because the
presence of the zero bound limits the degree to which monetary policy is able to
offset the effects of deflationary shocks that increase the real value of debt. How-
ever, the mean of the distribution of government debt is much higher for the long
duration parameterization than for the baseline model.1 The higher average debt
stock means that, on average, agents expect higher future inflation to return debt
to the steady state when the zero bound is encountered. The increase in average
inflation expectations helps to cushion the effect of the zero bound on expected real
interest rates, limiting the scale of recessions and generating a substantial reduction
in welfare losses.
Finally, I consider the effects of a risk that fiscal policy becomes active during a
debt reduction scenario. To do so, I use a variant of the model in which fiscal policy
behavior is characterized by empirically-motivated fiscal rules. I first demonstrate
that, under optimal monetary policy, a debt reduction program amounting to 10pp
of annual GDP can generate large inflationary effects when the fiscal policy rule is
active. In the textbook New Keynesian model with passive fiscal policy, the same
debt reduction program has no effects on the output gap or inflation.
This scenario is extended to consider the case in which fiscal policy is initially
1The debt stock is more persistent under the long duration parameterization, so that rises in
the real value of debt caused by low inflation outcomes at the zero bound are more persistent. In
contrast, falls in the real value of debt generated by high inflation outcomes are moderated by a
more aggressive (i.e., unrestricted) policy tightening.
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passive, but there is a risk that it will become active in future periods. I develop
a solution algorithm to solve for optimal policy in the presence of a time-varying
probability of switching permanently to an active fiscal policy rule in each period.
I first consider the case in which the probability of a switch to active fiscal policy
is exogenous and constant over time. Even when the probability is small enough that
it is most likely that fiscal policy will remain passive, a debt reduction program in
the presence of such fiscal risk generates an expectation that inflation will overshoot
the target. This is because a switch to active fiscal policy will generate a large
increase in inflation. Even though the probability of a switch to active fiscal policy
is small, the rise in inflation in those states of the world is large enough to increase
expected inflation by an economically meaningful amount.
For the baseline model, even a small probability of a switch to active fiscal policy
induces the monetary policymaker to accommodate some of the rise in expected
inflation and to allow actual inflation to increase. It is optimal to do so because this
inflation erodes the real value of debt and this reduces the losses incurred in states
of the world in which the fiscal policy rule becomes active.
However, for the long duration debt variant, the upward pressure on inflation
expectations acts like a cost push shock, increasing the rate of inflation consistent
with a closed output gap. The optimal response is to tighten monetary policy and
trade off a smaller rise in inflation with a slightly negative output gap. In this case,
the optimal monetary policy response to the rise in inflation expectations involves
tighter monetary policy than would be warranted in the absence of the risk. This
result is driven by the fact that output gap movements are much more persistent in
the long-duration debt variant. Thus expected positive output gaps in the distant
future are sufficient to increase inflation today, even if the output gap is negative
today. As such, the rise in inflation expectations more closely resembles a cost-push
disturbance.
I next consider the case in which the probability of a switch to active fiscal policy
is endogenous. Inspired by the literature on fiscal limits (for example Davig, Leeper,
and Walker, 2011; Bi, 2012; Leeper, 2013), the probability of a switch to active fiscal
policy is an increasing function of the primary surplus. One interpretation of this
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assumption is that higher primary surpluses entail a greater financial burden on
households, making it more likely that the fiscal authority will abandon its use of
taxation as the primary mechanism through which the level of debt is reduced. The
solution algorithm is extended to allow the monetary policymaker to account for the
effects of their actions on future probabilities of a switch to active fiscal policy.
I first study an example constructed so that the ex ante probability of a switch to
active fiscal policy in some future period is the same as the exogenous risk scenario.
Relative to the case of exogenous risk, the responses of output and inflation are more
‘front loaded’, since a switch to active fiscal policy is (relatively) more likely when
the primary surplus is higher, which occurs in the earlier part of the simulation.
This endogenous profile of fiscal risk implies that the switch to active fiscal policy is
relatively high in the first half of the debt reduction program, when the debt stock
is still relatively high. Since the inflationary impact of a switch to the active fiscal
rule is larger when the debt stock is high, inflation expectations are higher than the
exogenous uncertainty example. This makes the stabilization problem faced by the
monetary policymaker more difficult and a larger deviation of the output gap and
inflation are (optimally) accommodated.
I examine the role of time consistency in generating the observed behavior under
optimal monetary policy. Welfare losses are larger under time consistent policy
relative to a counterfactual case in which the monetary policymaker and private
sector make the decisions that would be optimal if there was no risk. This is the
case even though ignoring the risk generates a higher path for the primary surplus
(and hence a greater probability of a switch to active fiscal policy) and also increases
the welfare losses incurred when a switch does occur.
This result shows that the welfare cost of allowing some inflation along the most
likely path of the economy is not outweighed by the benefits of risk reduction because
monetary policy is constrained to be time consistent. It is not possible to coordinate
on a set of beliefs that would deliver the outcomes if policymakers and the private
sector ignored the risk. Unilaterally deviating to behave in this way generates higher
welfare losses than the time consistent policy.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief
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literature review, discussing the fiscal theory of the price level, the ‘fiscal theory of
monetary policy’ and jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policies. Section 3.3 sets
out the model, welfare-based loss function and the baseline and ‘long duration’ para-
meterizations. Section 3.4 presents the analysis of optimal time-consistent policy,
assuming that there is no lower bound on the short-term interest rate. Section 3.5
examines optimal time-consistent policy when the zero lower bound on the short-
term interest rate is accounted for. Section 3.6 extends the model to incorporate
empirically-motivated fiscal policy rules and studies the optimal monetary policy
responses to a debt reduction scenario. That model is used to consider the effects
of fiscal risk: the effects of the possibility that the fiscal policy rule may switch to
become ‘active’. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
The literature on the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies is vast. This
section aims to highlight some of the key contributions to that literature of particular
relevance for the focus of this chapter.
3.2.1 Government debt accumulation, sustainability and
stabilization
Government debt is central to the questions studied in this chapter. To fix ideas and
concepts, consider a simple model of government finance. Suppose the government
finances real government spending, g, using a combination of real (lump sum) taxes
τ and one period nominal bonds, B. The government’s debt accumulation in period
t is given by:
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt (gt − τt) (3.1)
where Rt is the nominal return on one-period bonds (payable in period t + 1) and
Pt is the price level.
Equation (3.1) is an extremely stylized representation of government debt accu-
mulation. In particular, it assumes that all government liabilities are in the form of
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one period bonds, thus abstracting from base money, longer-term bonds and index-
linked debt. It also abstracts from economic growth, which has been a key element
of the fiscal policy debate in recent years, given the slow recoveries from the global
financial crisis in many economies.2 Nevertheless, this representation contains the
key elements of government financing required for the following discussion. In par-
ticular, the evolution of government bonds will depend on the behavior of taxes,
government spending, the short-term nominal interest rate and the price level.
An important question in international public policy is whether government debt
stocks are sustainable. That is, conditional on the likely paths of taxes, spending,
interest rates and inflation, will government debt (relative to GDP) stabilize, shrink
or grow without bound? Indeed, a number of international institutions (for example,
the International Monetary Fund and European Commission) conduct regular as-
sessments of debt sustainability.
Importantly, the concept of debt sustainability encompasses a much broader
range of behavior of debt (and its determinants) than the concept of debt stabilization
used in much of the literature on monetary and fiscal policy (and in this chapter).
To see this, iterate (3.1) forward to give:
Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
= Et
∞∑
s=0
R˜−1t,t+s (τt+s −Gt+s) + Et lim
s→∞
R˜−1t,t+s
Bt+s+1
Pt
where R˜t,t+s represents the compounded real return between periods t and t+ s:
R˜t,t+s ≡
s∏
j=1
Rt+jPt+j−1
Pt+j
=
Rt+sPt+s−1
Pt+s
R˜t,t+s−1
with R˜t,t = 1 and Et represents the expectations operator, conditional on information
available in period t.
2A key question for debt sustainability is whether the average real interest rate is higher or
lower than the trend real growth rate of the economy. Since the financial crisis, both real interest
rates and real growth rates have been low by historical standards. If the average real interest
rate is lower than the trend real growth rate, then it may be possible for government debt to
have positive value even if the government runs primary deficits forever. Indeed Blanchard (2019)
argues that this constellation of interest rates and growth rates may be the norm. I abstract from
this possibility in this chapter, adopting the conventional assumption that the average real interest
rate is positive (and determined by the inverse of the household discount factor) and hence strictly
greater than the trend growth rate of zero.
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If the real debt stock grows more slowly than the real interest rate, the expected
discounted value of the terminal debt stock is zero:
Et lim
s→∞
R˜−1t,t+s
Bt+s+1
Pt
= 0 (3.2)
and the present-valued government budget constraint becomes:
Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
= Et
∞∑
s=0
R˜−1t,t+s (τt+s −Gt+s) (3.3)
Bohn (2007) studies the restrictions on spending, taxes and government debt that
are consistent with (3.2) and (hence) the intertemporal budget constraint (3.3). Per-
haps surprisingly, he demonstrates that the transversality condition is satisfied for
a wide variety of non-stationary debt processes. Specifically, an integrated process
for Bt of any (finite) order will satisfy (3.2).
3 Bohn (2007) uses this result to argue
that it is thus impossible to infer whether government debt is sustainable by using
unit root or cointegration tests.
Following the existing literature (reviewed below), I use a more restricted concept
that fiscal and/or monetary policy must ensure debt stabilization. This requires the
real value of the debt stock to be stationary and specifically to be returned to a
fixed steady-state target level of debt following a disturbance. Indeed, given the
difficulty of identifying sustainability from the stochastic properties of government
debt, Bohn (2007) argues for a similar criterion.4
A key focus of the debt sustainability analyses mentioned above is the likelihood
that a government may choose to default on its debt. Allowing for default gives
rise to a richer set of interactions between monetary and fiscal policy (where the
latter includes a decision on whether or not to default). For example, Uribe (2006)
3The result is driven by the fact that the discounting of future debt stocks in (3.2) is exponential.
In contrast, the expectation of an m-th order integrated stochastic processes at date t can be
written as an m-th order polynomial of t. The exponential rate at which the discount factor
shrinks dominates the polynomial growth of expected debt.
4“A second strategy [to assess debt sustainability] is to consider stronger conditions on policy,
e.g., upper bounds on debt motivated by a limited capacity to service debt. Then stationarity in
levels is the most relevant econometric condition, and additional restrictions may apply.” Bohn
(2007, p1846, emphasis added).
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presents a model in which strict adherence to an inflation target will ultimately drive
the government to default if government finances are unsustainable. Bi, Leeper,
and Leith (2018) examine the interplay of debt sustainability and default in a richer
setting.
In this chapter, I rule out default. It is assumed that the government will al-
ways repay its debt. This focuses attention on the additional constraints that fiscal
sustainability may place on the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
3.2.2 Monetary and fiscal policy configurations
It has been long understood that monetary and fiscal policies are intertwined. This
fact is evident from consideration of the government debt accumulation equation
(3.1). Tax and spending decisions affect the primary surplus. Nominal interest rate
decisions affect the cost of issuing nominal liabilities. The rate of inflation affects
the real value of nominal government liabilities. This suggests that not all types
of monetary and fiscal policy behavior will be compatible with stabilization of real
government debt and/or inflation.
Leeper (1991) confirms this logic and develops a taxonomy of policy configur-
ations that are consistent with stable real government debt and determinate infla-
tion. Leeper labels monetary and fiscal policies as ‘passive’ or ‘active’ depending on
whether or not they are constrained to respond to the level of (or disturbances to)
real government debt.
Two of the four possible policy configurations are compatible with real govern-
ment stabilization and determinate inflation. In an ‘active monetary, passive fiscal’
(AMPF) configuration, monetary policy stabilizes inflation without regard to gov-
ernment debt. In this configuration, fiscal policy passively adjusts taxes and/or
spending to ensure that the real government debt stock is stabilized. In contrast, a
‘passive monetary, active fiscal’ (PMAF) configuration is one in which the response
of taxes and spending to changes in the real value of government debt is insufficiently
strong to ensure that the real debt stock is stabilized. In this case, monetary policy
must passively adjust the short-term interest rate to ensure that the real government
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debt stock is stabilized.5
Leeper’s taxonomy of policy configurations has shaped much of the subsequent
research on monetary and fiscal policy interactions.6 Woodford (2001, 2003) dis-
tinguishes between ‘Ricardian’ and ‘non-Ricardian’ fiscal policies, which correspond
to Leeper’s passive and active specifications respectively. Although Woodford’s ter-
minology is well known, I use Leeper’s active/passive distinction in the remainder
of this chapter.
A passive monetary, active fiscal (PMAF) regime is sometimes referred to as
‘fiscal dominance’, reflecting the notion that the monetary policymaker must ensure
that their policy actions are consistent with stabilization of the real government
debt stock. This terminology has a long history: for example, (Sargent and Wallace,
1981, p2) and (King and Plosser, 1985, p172) discuss “[cases in which] fiscal policy
dominates monetary policy” and “fiscal dominance” respectively.
3.2.3 Monetary and fiscal policies and the ‘consensus
assignment’
Much of the ‘New Keynesian’ literature on optimal monetary policy assumes that
monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive. This is, for example, the
baseline assumption for the textbook treatments of Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı
(2008).7
5If both policies are passive (PMPF), then both fiscal and monetary policymakers attempt
to adjust their instrument to ensure that real government debt is stabilized. There are many
combinations of policy settings that are consistent with real debt stabilization. However, these
correspond to different paths of the price level, rendering the inflation rate indeterminate. If both
policies are active (AMAF), then real government debt is not stabilized, since neither policymaker
is constrained to adjust their policy instrument to ensure that it is. See Leeper (1991, p. 138–139).
6While this general taxonomy applies to a wide range of macroeconomic models, the details
may be model specific. For many models (as in Leeper (1991)) a simple monetary policy will be
active if the coefficient on inflation in a Taylor (1993) rule is greater than unity and fiscal policy
will be passive if the elasticity of the primary surplus with respect to the outstanding debt stock
is greater than the steady-state real interest rate. However, different restrictions may determine
regions of active and passive policy in other models.
7Woodford (2003, Chapter 4.4) does analyze the implications of Ricardian and non-Ricardian
(passive and active) fiscal regimes.
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This focus can be justified by appealing to the institutional arrangements in most
economies in the years preceding the financial crisis. Central banks were typically
assigned responsibility for price stability (often in the form of an inflation target).
Fiscal authorities were responsible for controlling public debt, often with explicit
targets for the government debt to GDP ratio. Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis
(2009) refer to this policy configuration as the “consensus assignment”.
The financial crisis called the consensus assignment into question. With short-
term policy rates forced to their effective lower bounds, monetary policy was unable
to respond to weak activity and inflation in the conventional manner. This prompted
consideration of whether an alternative policy configuration may be appropriate.
Much of this debate hinged on the extent to which the effects of government spending
on activity are larger than normal when economic activity is weak and/or monetary
policy is constrained by the zero bound (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011;
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; DeLong and Summers, 2012).
3.2.4 Fiscal theories
Leeper’s taxonomy of policy configurations implies that a combination of passive
monetary policy and active fiscal policy can deliver determinate inflation and stabil-
ize the real value of government debt. This policy configuration has been explored
in a strand of literature sometimes labeled as the ‘fiscal theory of the price level’
(FTPL).
Early expositions of the FTPL were often intended to to explain the idea clearly
(see, for example, Sims, 1994). These contributions often used a variant of equation
(3.3), which says that the real value of outstanding one period bonds must be equal to
the expected discounted value of real primary surpluses (tax revenue less government
spending). Under the simplifying assumption that prices are fully flexible, the real
discount factor R˜−1t,t+s is independent of the price level.
8 If spending and taxes are
exogenous, the only way that (3.3) can be satisfied in response to disturbances to
current and future taxes and spending is for the price level Pt to adjust.
8In a model with an optimizing representative household, the real discount factor will be pinned
down by disturbances that determine the household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
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The result that the price level must adjust to implement the government’s trans-
versality condition (3.2) is both striking and difficult to reconcile with the real-world
institutional arrangements consistent with the consensus assignment.
However, some of the results from early FTPL models are implications of the
specific assumptions employed. Sims (2011) demonstrates that the stark behavior of
the price level is driven by the (unrealistic) assumption that all government debt is
in the form of one period nominal bonds. Extending the model to include long-term
government debt means that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is
satisfied by adjustments in the entire sequence of price levels (which are important
determinants of the price of long-dated debt), rather than just the current price
level.
Cochrane (2018b) extends Sims’s model further and demonstrates that striking
neo-Fisherian results – that inflation rises in response to exogenous increases in the
short-term interest rate – stem from the assumption of flexible prices. Incorporating
standard sticky price assumptions (for example, Calvo (1983) or Rotemberg (1982)
pricing) delivers more conventional results in response to temporary changes in the
short-term nominal interest rate. Cochrane (2018b) argues that incorporating these
features delivers a fiscal theory of monetary policy (FTMP). Cochrane (2018a) ar-
gues that such a model provides a more convincing explanation of macroeconomic
dynamics in the recent (post-crisis) period. In particular, zero lower bound epis-
odes are not as costly as ‘New Keynesian’ (active monetary, passive fiscal) models
would suggest and prolonged interest rate ‘pegs’ have not generated indeterminacy
in inflation rates.
3.2.5 A new consensus?
The development of the FTMP may could be interpreted as a convergence of ap-
proaches that had previously been regarded as mutually exclusive. The inclusion of
New Keynesian modeling features into models with a FTPL focus (in particular the
assumption of a PMAF policy configuration) allows for a closer comparison of altern-
ative models. However, a key implication of this line of work is that the important
implications for macroeconomic variables stem primarily from the assumption of the
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policy configuration (i.e., AMPF versus PMAF). The remaining details of the model
(for example, the way that aggregate demand and inflation are determined) are not
critical features of the debate between ‘New Keynesians’ and ‘fiscal theorists’.9 So
‘fiscal theorists’ do not necessarily assume that prices are flexible or that demand is
determined by optimizing agents with rational expectations (see, for example, Sims,
2016).
This narrative of convergence between fiscal theorists and New Keynesians may
appear strange to those studying jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policies. In that
case, monetary and fiscal policies are chosen jointly to maximize welfare, subject to
the constraint imposed by the structure of the economy. The optimal policy con-
figuration emerges endogenously and may depend on the nature of the instruments
available to the policymaker. For example, Kirsanova et al. (2009) demonstrate that
jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy in their New Keynesian model typically
leads to a consensus assignment (i.e., an AMPF configuration). More generally,
surveys of the state of the art in monetary and fiscal policy coordination discuss at
length the importance of the monetary/fiscal policy configuration (see, for example,
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba, 2010; Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013).
3.3 Model
As in Chapter 1, the government issues both long-term and short-term bonds. How-
ever, in this chapter I abstract from portfolio frictions in government bond markets.
This section describes the key elements of the model structure. A detailed derivation
is provided in Appendix 3.A.
3.3.1 Households
The representative household maximizes a utility function defined over consumption,
c, and hours worked, n, subject to a budget constraint that defines how proceeds
9One exception is the emphasis on long-term government debt by advocates of the fiscal theory
(evidenced in the work of John Cochrane and Chris Sims discussed in Section 3.2.4). In a textbook
New Keynesian model with an AMPF policy configuration and lump sum taxation, the maturity
structure of government debt has no implications for macroeconomic outcomes.
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from wage and profit income, net of taxes are allocated to short-term and long-term
government bonds.
The optimization problem is
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtφt
{
c
1− 1
σ
t − 1
1− 1
σ
− n
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
}
subject to
VtDt +Bt = (%+ χVt)Dt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 +Wtnt − Tt + Ft − Ptct (3.4)
where P is the price of consumption, W is the nominal wage, T is a lump sum tax
and F represents dividend payments from firms. The household may invest in one
period government bonds B or long-term government debt, D. To keep the model
as close to the textbook New Keynesian benchmark, I abstract from money and
consider a ‘cashless limit’ economy, following Woodford (2003).10
As in Chapter 1, long-term debt is a security that pays a sequence of nominal
coupons that decay geometrically at rate χ < 1.11 The nominal value of a newly
issued bond at date t is Vt and such a bond pays a coupon stream of %, %χ, %χ
2, . . .
in periods t + 1, t + 2, t + 3, . . . . The importance of the initial coupon % > 0 is
discussed in Section 3.3.3.
Preferences are subject to an exogenous shock, φt which follows the process
lnφt = ρφ lnφt−1 + σφε
φ
t (3.5)
where εφt is an iid normally-distributed shock with unit variance.
10Early explorations of fiscal dominance studied the implications for money growth and sei-
gniorage (see, for example, Sargent and Wallace, 1981). More recent treatments have abstracted
from money as government debt represents the vast majority of outstanding government liabilities
in most countries (see, for example, Cochrane, 2018b).
11A key benefit of this setup is that the value of a bond issued at date t− j is equal to χjVt so
that holdings of all previously issued bonds can be summarized in terms of an equivalent quantity
of newly issued bonds, simplifying aggregation.
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3.3.2 Firms
There is a set of monopolistically competitive producers indexed by j ∈ (0, 1) that
produce differentiated products that form a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle that is purchased
by households. Preferences over differentiated products are given by
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
1−η−1t
j,t dj
] 1
1−η−1t
where yj is firm j’s output and the elasticity of demand ηt varies over time according
to
ln ηt − ln η = ρη (ln ηt−1 − ln η) + σηεηt (3.6)
Firms produce using a constant returns production function in the single input
(labor):
yj,t = Atnj,t
where At is an exogenous productivity process that follows:
lnAt − lnA = ρA (lnAt−1 − lnA) + σAεAt (3.7)
Firms set prices according to the a Calvo (1983) staggered pricing scheme, with a
probability 1−α of changing price each period. A fixed production subsidy ensures
that the steady state is efficient.
3.3.3 Government
The nominal government flow budget constraint is:
Bt + VtDt = Rt−1Bt−1 + (%+ χVt)Dt−1 +Gt − Tt
To focus on the case in which the government issues only long-term debt, I first
assume that short-term and long-term debt move in fixed proportions:
Bt = δ
−1Dt
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for δ > 1 and then take the limit as δ →∞. This gives:
VtDt = (%+ χVt)Dt−1 +Gt − Tt
which can also be written in terms of the primary surplus, S ≡ T −G:
VtDt = (%+ χVt)Dt−1 − St
Denoting real quantities with lower case letters means that the real-valued gov-
ernment budget constraint is :
Vtdt = (%+ χVt) pi
−1
t dt−1 − st (3.8)
Appendix 3.A.1 demonstrates that the steady-state value of price of debt, V , is
equal to unity if the initial coupon satisfies % = β−1 − χ. Invoking this assumption
allows me to interpret d as the (real) par value of long-term debt. This is useful
for calibration purposes, since most empirical data on government debt stocks are
measured at par, rather than market value.
The baseline assumption for fiscal policy is that lump sum taxes are held fixed
at τt = τ in real terms (with τt ≡ Tt/Pt). This means that the real primary surplus,
s is determined entirely by movements in real government spending, g (≡ G/P ).12
Real government spending is assumed to evolve according to a simple exogenous
process around its long-run steady state level, g (< τ):
g¯t = ρgg¯t−1 + ε
g
t (3.9)
where g¯t ≡ gt− g denotes the linear deviation of spending from steady state (rather
than the log-deviation).
12The experiments in Section 3.6 use empirically motivated rules for the primary surplus.
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3.3.4 Log-linearized model
Appendix 3.A contains the derivation of the log-linearized approximation of the
model around the efficient steady state. The log-linear model equations are:
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 − σ˜
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − r∗t
]
(3.10)
pˆit = κxˆt + βEtpˆit+1 + ut (3.11)
dˆt = β
−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
− (1− χ) Vˆt + ζ−1g¯t (3.12)
Vˆt = − Rˆt + χβEtVˆt+1 (3.13)
where ζ is the steady-state ratio of government debt to output (d
y
) and the para-
meters σ˜ and κ satisfy:
σ˜ ≡ σ (1− g)
κ ≡ (1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψ + σ˜−1
)
The natural real interest rate, r∗, and cost-push shock, ut, are given by:
r∗t = Et
[
−
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)
+
1 + ψ
1 + ψσ˜
(
Aˆt+1 − Aˆt
)
− ψ
1 + ψσ˜
(g¯t+1 − g¯t)
]
ut = − (1− βα) (1− α)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) are the familiar New Keynesian IS and Phillips curves
(Gal´ı, 2008; Woodford, 2003). Equation (3.12) is the government debt accumulation
equation. Equation (3.13) is a log-linearized version of the no-arbitrage condition
between long-term and short-term bonds.
When fiscal policy is active, the government budget constraint is a constraint on
monetary policy. Variations in the monetary policy instrument (the short-term bond
rate Rˆ) influence the evolution of long-term debt via their effects on the price of long-
term debt (Vˆ ) and inflation. Monetary policy must be set so that the government
debt stock is stabilized.
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3.3.5 Welfare-based loss function
Appendix 3.B derives a loss function based on a second-order approximation to
household utility. The model structure is the very similar to that considered in
Chapter 1, but without portfolio adjustment frictions. The resulting welfare-based
loss function is therefore identical to that considered in Chapter 1, but without
portfolio adjustment costs (that is, ν˜ = ξ˜ = 0) and accounting for the presence of
government spending (by replacing σ with σ˜):
Lt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
pˆi2t+i + ωxˆ
2
t+i
]
(3.14)
where
ω = κη−1
This result means that, relative to the standard New Keynesian assumption of
passive fiscal policy, active fiscal policy affects the constraints upon the monetary
policymaker, but not their objectives. Following Vestin (2006), I interpret the time-
consistent pursuit of (3.14) as representing ‘flexible inflation targeting’.
3.3.6 A ‘textbook New Keynesian’ benchmark
A textbook New Keynesian model is a natural benchmark against which to assess
the implications of active fiscal policy. In the textbook model, a fiscal policy reaction
function ensures that primary surpluses are adjusted to ensure that the trajectory
for government debt consistent with (3.12) does not explode. The fiscal solvency
condition is satisfied for any path of the price level, regardless of the actions of
the monetary policymaker. Since government spending is exogenous, passive fiscal
policy requires that lump sum taxes adjust to ensure that the intertemporal govern-
ment budget constraint is satisfied.
In the New Keynesian benchmark model, then, only the IS curve (3.10) and
Phillips curve (3.11) are constraints on the monetary policymaker. Indeed, in the
absence of the zero lower bound, the IS curve is not a binding constraint and, in this
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case, the optimal time-consistent monetary policy delivers the following targeting
rule
ωxˆt + κpˆit = 0 (3.15)
as will be demonstrated below (see also, Gal´ı, 2008; Woodford, 2003).
Under passive fiscal policy, the precise formulation of the fiscal reaction function
for the lump sum tax rate does not affect equilibrium outcomes for the output gap
and inflation. However, for the purposes of comparison, I assume that the lump sum
tax rate is adjusted to hold the stock of government debt constant at its steady-state
level at all times: dˆt = 0,∀t.
3.3.7 Parameter values
Table 3.1 shows the baseline values used in the experiments in the remainder of the
chapter. Given the similarity of the model to the one studied in Chapters 1 and 2, the
values for parameters that appear in those model are set with reference to the same
sources and motivations. The parameters governing the persistence of the exogenous
shocks (ρa, ρg, ρφ) are set equal to the posterior mean estimates of the analogous
shocks in Burgess, Fernandez-Corugedo, Groth, Harrison, Monti, Theodoridis, and
Waldron (2013) and Del Negro, Giannoni, and Schorfheide (2015b) as appropriate.
The persistence of the markup shock ρη is set to 0, given that Burgess et al. (2013)
assume that markup shocks are white noise.
The parameter χ is important for the present study as it determines the maturity
of government debt in the model. I consider two values for this parameter using the
OECD data on the Macaulay duration of domestic government debt shown in Table
3.2. The table shows that the United Kingdom is a clear outlier, issuing longer-term
debt relative to the rest of the sample (Ellison and Scott (2017) show that this
is a long-standing feature of UK debt issuance). Indeed, data from the UK debt
management office (DMO) suggests that the duration of UK government debt may
be even longer than implied by Table 3.2.13
13The DMO report estimates of modified duration. While Macaulay duration and modified
duration are different concepts – measuring the weighted average time in years until repayment
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Table 3.1: Baseline parameter values
Value Source/motivation
σ 1 Log utility (as in Chapter 1)
β 0.9926 Steady-state annual real interest rate ≈ 3%
g 0.2 Sims and Wolff (2013)
ζ 2 Reinhart et al. (2012) (advanced economies, pre-crisis)
η 7.88 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
α 0.855 Implies κ ≈ 0.05 (as in Chapter 1)
ψ 0.55 Smets and Wouters (2007)
ρη 0 Burgess et al. (2013)
ρg 0.91 Burgess et al. (2013) (ρG)
ρA 0.96 Del Negro et al. (2015b) (ρz)
ρφ 0.71 Burgess et al. (2013) (ρB)
χ
0.945 (≡ χ¯) ‘Average duration’ variant (see text)
0.976 (≡ χL) ‘Long duration’ variant (see text)
Table 3.2: Macaulay duration of domestic government debt, selected countries
Country Sample Average Minimum Maximum
Austria 2000–2010 5.5 4.1 7
Denmark 2000–2010 4.7 3.7 7.3
Finland 2000–2010 2.8 2.4 3.5
France 2001–2004 4.5 4.3 4.8
Hungary 2000–2010 2.3 1.4 2.8
Italy 2000–2010 4.2 3.4 4.9
Norway 2000–2010 3.0 1.9 3.5
Spain 2000–2010 4.7 3.9 5.2
Sweden 2000–2005 2.8 2.7 3.1
United Kingdom 2000–2010 8.0 6.9 9.0
United States 2000–2010 3.5 3.4 4.0
Macaulay duration is measured in years. Source: OECD statistics library (https://stats.oecd.org/).
Downloaded 24 November 2018.
and the percentage change in price for a unit change in yield respectively – their numerical values
are usually similar. The DMO report average modified duration of conventional debt equal to
around 11%, suggesting a similar Macaulay duration in years. Data for 2018Q4 were downloaded
from https://www.dmo.gov.uk/data/.
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The ‘long duration’ calibration for χ is based on the UK case and is selected
to deliver a Macaulay duration of eight years. The ‘average duration’ calibration is
selected to deliver a Macaulay duration of four years, slightly above the cross-country
average (excluding the United Kingdom) of 3.8 years from Table 3.2. Appendix
1.D (equation (1.44)) shows that the steady-state Macaulay duration is given by
(1− βχ)−1. So if the desired Macaulay duration is M years, the required value of
χ is given by χ = β−1
(
1− (4M)−1), which incorporates the fact that each time
period in the model is one quarter.
3.4 Time-consistent policy without a zero bound
In this section, I examine the behavior of the model under time-consistent optimal
monetary policy. I focus on time-consistent optimal policy for two reasons. First,
optimal commitment policy in this class of models tends to generate an extreme form
of time inconsistency. Appendix 3.E demonstrates that the optimal commitment
policy implies that government debt follows a random walk allowing the policymaker
to increase welfare in the near term by inducing permanent movements in debt,
output and inflation (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013, demonstrate similar results in a
similar model). Second, there is evidence that monetary policymakers have doubts
over their ability to credibly pre-commit to future policy actions (see, for example,
Nakata, 2015).
As in Chapter 1, the policymaker at date t is treated as a Stackelberg leader
with respect to both private agents at date t and policymakers (and private agents)
in dates t+ i, i ≥ 1. The equilibrium Markov perfect policy is one in which optimal
decisions are a function only of the payoff relevant state variables in the model{
ηt, g¯t, Aˆt, φˆt, dˆt−1
}
. The policymaker recognizes that future allocations will satisfy
time-invariant policy functions with this property. Current policy decisions affect
future outcomes through their impact on the endogenous state variable, which in
the context of the present model is the stock of government debt.
To derive insights that can be studied analytically, I ignore the lower bound on
the short-term bond rate. Given the quadratic objective function and fully linear
constraints, the Markov perfect policy functions are linear functions of the state
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variables. Section 3.5 examines the behavior of the model when the presence of the
lower bound on the short-term bond rate is accounted for.
3.4.1 The optimal policy problem
The policymaker’s optimization problem is characterized by the following Lagran-
gean:
L˜t =1
2
[
pˆi2t + ωxˆ
2
t
]
− µxt
[
xˆt − Etxˆt+1 + σ (1− g)
(
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − r∗t
)]
− µpit [pˆit − κxˆt − βEtpˆit+1 − ut]
− µdt
[
dˆt − β−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
+ (1− χ) Vˆt − ζ−1g¯t
]
− µVt
[
Vˆt + Rˆt − χβVˆt+1
]
+ βEtL˜t+1
The first order conditions for minimization are:
0 = pˆit − µpit − β−1µdt (3.16)
0 = ωxˆt − µxt + κµpit (3.17)
0 = µxt
[
∂Etxˆt+1
∂dˆt
+ σ (1− g) ∂Etpˆit+1
∂dˆt
]
+ βµpit
∂Etpˆit+1
∂dˆt
− µdt + χβµVt
∂EtVˆt+1
∂dˆt
+ β
∂EtL˜t+1
∂dˆt
(3.18)
0 = − (1− χ)µdt − µVt (3.19)
0 = − σ (1− g)µxt − µVt (3.20)
Derivatives of EtL˜t+1 can be eliminated by noting that:
∂L˜t
∂dˆt−1
= β−1µdt ⇒
∂EtL˜t+1
∂dˆt
= β−1Etµdt+1
The linear-quadratic nature of the problem and the focus on Markov-perfect equi-
libria implies that equilibrium allocations are linear functions of the state variables.
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This means that:
∂EtZt+1
∂dˆt
≡ FZ
for some (fixed) coefficient FZ for any variable Z.
These observations can be used to write (3.18) as:
µdt = [Fxˆ + σ (1− g)Fpˆi]µxt + βFpˆiµpit + χβFVˆ µVt + Etµdt+1 (3.21)
A straightforward, but tedious, application of the method of undetermined coef-
ficients can be used to characterize the solutions of the coefficients {Fpˆi, Fxˆ, FVˆ , Fdˆ}.
Appendix 3.C contains the details and demonstrates that (conditional on solutions
for Fpˆi and Fdˆ):
Fxˆ = κ
−1Fpˆi − κ−1βFpˆiFdˆ
FVˆ = (1− χ)−1 β−1 − (1− χ)−1 β−1Fpˆi − (1− χ)−1 Fdˆ
Solving for Fpˆi and Fdˆ involves solving a coupled system of quadratic equations.
The quadratic equation for Fpˆi has a solution (conditional on Fdˆ) given by the fol-
lowing function:
Fpˆi = m (Fdˆ) ≡
1 + χ− (1 + βχ)Fdˆ
β
(
ω
κΞ
(1− βFdˆ) + κΞ
)−1
+ (1− χ) (κσ˜)−1 (1− βFdˆ)
(3.22)
where Ξ ≡ (1− χ) σ˜−1 + κβ−1.
The quadratic equation for Fdˆ can be factorized. One solution is shown to be
Fdˆ = β
−1. Equation (3.22) then implies that Fpˆi = κΞβ (1− β−1) < 0. The other
solution, conditional on Fpˆi, satisfies:
Fdˆ ≡ h (Fpˆi) =
(
1 + κσ˜ [β (1− χ)]−1)Fpˆi − κσ˜ [β (1− χ)]−1
Fpˆi − χκσ˜ (1− χ)−1
(3.23)
The model has a unique, stable (‘determinate’) solution if the debt stock re-
turns to steady state from any initial condition, which requires that Fdˆ < 1. Blake
and Kirsanova (2012) demonstrate the the presence of endogenous state variables
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Figure 3.1: Solutions for Fpˆi and Fdˆ
(a) Baseline model (χ = 0.945)
Fpˆi
Fdˆ
Fdˆ = h (Fpˆi)
Fpˆi = m
(
Fdˆ
)
Fdˆ = β
−1
B
A
C
(b) ‘Long duration’ variant (χ = 0.976)
Fpˆi
Fdˆ
Fdˆ = h (Fpˆi)
Fpˆi = m
(
Fdˆ
)
Fdˆ = β
−1
B A
C
Notes: Each panel plots the functions m and h defined by equations (3.22) and (3.23) respectively.
Panel (a) shows the baseline model and panel (b) shows the variant with long-duration government
debt. In each case, point A denotes the solution for the coefficients Fpˆi and Fdˆ consistent with the
unique Markov perfect equilibrium.
can generate multiple stable Markov perfect equilibria for time-consistent linear-
quadratic optimal policy problems.14
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical analysis of the candidate equilibria for Fpˆi and Fdˆ
for the baseline model (panel (a)) and ‘long duration’ parameterization (panel (b)).
In both cases there are three candidate equilibria, labeled A, B and C. Of these, B
and C generate an explosive trajectory for debt (since Fdˆ ≥ β−1 > 1). Point A is
the unique stable solution and is the equilibrium used for the experiments in the
next subsections.15
Comparing panels (a) and (b) reveals that intersection point A in panel (b)
lies to the North-West of the corresponding intersection point in panel (a). So the
equilibrium trajectory for government debt is more persistent in the long duration
variant. The longer-term debt variant also has the property that inflation depends
less strongly on previously accumulated debt.
Appendix 3.C demonstrates that the first order conditions can be combined into
14Indeed, one of their motivating examples adds (one period) government debt to a textbook
New Keynesian model.
15Figure 3.1 provides a ‘local’ analysis, plotting the m and h functions in the vicinity of the
intersection points. Figure 3.21 in Appendix 3.D expands the range over which the functions are
plotted to present a global picture, demonstrating that no other candidates exist.
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a targeting rule:
ωxˆt + κpˆit = Ξµ
d
t (3.24)
Equation (3.24) reveals that the value of the multiplier on the government budget
constraint, µdt , affects the optimal achievable combination of the output gap and
inflation. If the government budget is not a constraint on monetary policy (as is the
case under passive fiscal policy) then µdt = 0,∀t and (3.24) collapses to the targeting
rule in the New Keynesian benchmark model, (3.15), as previously claimed.
3.4.2 Impulse responses
This section examines the impulse responses of the model to shocks, comparing the
baseline (‘average duration’) model to the textbook New Keynesian benchmark and
to the ‘long duration’ variant.
To examine the implications for debt, I plot the responses of the par value of
debt, dˆ and the long-term bond rate, denoted Rˆ. As in Chapter 1, the long-term
bond rate is computed as the the yield to maturity:
Rˆt = χβEtRˆt+1 + (1− χβ) Rˆt
Figure 3.2 plots responses of the model to a positive innovation in each of the
shocks (solid black lines) alongside the responses of the benchmark New Keynesian
model (red dashed lines). To aid the comparison, the scale of each shock is chosen
so that it has an identical impact effect on the output gap in the baseline model (1
percentage point in absolute terms).
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Figure 3.2: Responses to shocks: baseline model and New Keynesian benchmark
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Notes: Impulse responses to shocks to the baseline model (solid black lines) and the ‘New Keyne-
sian’ variant described in Section 3.3.6 (dashed red lines). The scale of all shocks is normalized to
deliver a 1% response of the output gap in the baseline variant. Policy rate and long rate plotted
in annualized units. All variables are shown in percentage point deviations from steady state.
Two key results emerge from Figure 3.2.
First, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Gal´ı, 2007) disappears
when fiscal policy is active. The divine coincidence result refers to the fact that
optimal time-consistent policy in the textbook New Keynesian model (dashed red
lines) achieves complete stability of the output gap and inflation in response to gov-
ernment spending, preference and productivity shocks (rows 1–3). For that variant,
the relevant targeting criterion (3.15) can be achieved with xt = pit = 0,∀t. This is
achievable because, in that variant, these shocks affect the economy solely through
their effects on the natural real interest rate, r∗. The time-consistent policy is to
track movements in r∗t with the short-term nominal interest rate Rˆt, delivering a
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zero output gap and (hence) zero inflation.16
However, this policy response is not feasible in the baseline model (with active
fiscal policy). Tracking exogenous movements in r∗ with the nominal interest rate
would not stabilize the government debt stock.17 A necessary condition for doing so
is that the interest rate responds to the debt stock. Because the nominal interest
rate must respond to the debt stock, it cannot fully insulate the economy from the
effects of exogenous changes in r∗ and costly fluctuations in the output gap and
inflation cannot be avoided.
The second key result is that the (absolute) inflation and output gap responses
to government spending, preference and productivity shocks are identical (rows 1–
3). In all cases, the responses of inflation and the output gap satisfy the targeting
criterion (3.24). Appendix 3.C.1 shows that, in the absence of cost push shocks, this
targeting criterion can be combined with the first order condition for government
debt (3.21) and the IS curve (3.10) to deliver a second order difference equation for
inflation. Appendix 3.C.1 further demonstrates that the solution to that difference
equation implies that inflation and the output gap follow AR(1) processes given by:
pˆit+1 = Fdˆpˆit
xˆt+1 = Fdˆxˆt
for t ≥ 1.
So both inflation and the output gap follow identical (to scale) AR(1) processes
in response to preference, productivity and government spending shocks. The initial
response of the output gap in period 1 is equal to unity in all cases, by virtue of the
normalization assumption, so the (absolute) responses of both the output gap and
inflation are identical for these shocks. The fact that the AR(1) parameter is equal
to Fdˆ is an important result, discussed below.
16See Gal´ı (2008) for a complete analysis of optimal monetary policy in the textbook New
Keynesian model.
17An informal proof by contradiction is as follows. Suppose that tracking exogenous movements
in r∗ with Rˆ does stabilize inflation pˆit = 0,∀t. Note now that equation (3.13) implies that the
value of long-term debt will be a function of the exogenous fluctuations in r∗ (since Rˆt = r∗t ).
Inspecting (3.12) reveals than an exogenous impulse to Vˆt with pˆit = 0,∀t generates an explosive
trajectory for dˆt given that β
−1 > 1. So full stabilization of inflation by tracking r∗ with the policy
rate does not also ensure that the debt stock returns to steady state.
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Figure 3.3 compares responses from the baseline model (solid black lines) with
the ‘long duration’ variant (red black lines).
Figure 3.3: Responses to shocks under ‘average’ and ‘long’ debt duration
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Notes: Impulse responses to shocks to the baseline model (solid black lines) and variant with long
debt duration (dashed red lines). The scale of all shocks is normalized to deliver a 1% response of
the output gap in the baseline variant. Policy rate and long rate plotted in annualized units. All
variables are shown in percentage point deviations from steady state.
A key result is that the output gap and inflation are better stabilized in response
to preference, productivity and government spending shocks for the long duration
variant (rows 1–3). The responses of the output gap and inflation are also more
persistent in this variant, compared with the baseline calibration. A corollary of the
smaller responses of inflation and the output gap is that the policy rate must adjust
by more in response to each of these shocks.
The greater persistence of the output gap and inflation responses in the long-
duration variant follows from the result that these variables both follow AR(1) pro-
cesses with parameter Fdˆ. As shown in Figure 3.1, Fdˆ is larger for the long-duration
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variant.
These results relate to previous findings that optimal time-consistent policy may
exhibit a “debt stabilization bias”. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) study jointly op-
timal monetary and fiscal policy in a similar model.18 In their model, optimal time
consistent policy rapidly returns the government debt stock back to steady state
following a shock. That in turn requires large movements in output and inflation
to achieve the required change in real debt values. Leeper, Leith, and Liu (2019)
study the responses of a non-linear model with optimal monetary and fiscal policy
for alternative assumptions about government debt duration. They also find that
longer duration debt dampens the responses of macroeconomic variables to shocks
under optimal policy.
The presence of long-term debt reduces the degree to which large and immediate
movements in inflation will reduce the real value of government debt. Instead, it is
possible to stabilize the debt stock through smaller but more persistent movements
in inflation (which may nonetheless have a sizable effect on the market value of
debt). The presence of government debt with a longer duration allows even smaller,
and even more persistent, changes in inflation to be used to bring the debt stock
back to steady state following a shock.
Figure 3.4 examines the welfare implications of the shocks across model variants.
In each panel an approximation to the square root of the loss Lt is plotted for each
model variant.19 The square root transformation facilitates comparison of the model
variants, but obviously understates the true welfare differences between them.
As expected, the divine coincidence result for the New Keynesian variant implies
that there are no welfare losses from preference, productivity or government spending
shocks in that variant (red dashed lines). For these shocks, losses are, initially, much
smaller for the long duration variant (green lines) compared with the baseline model
(solid black lines). As the shocks dissipate, however, losses are larger for the long
duration variant.
18The main differences are the inclusion of distortionary taxation and the assumption that the
government finances its activities using one-period debt.
19The approximation is to compute losses over a finite horizon, H: Lˆt ≡
Et
∑H
i=0 β
i
[
pˆi2t+i + ωxˆ
2
t+i
]
. Results are shown for H = 200, but are not sensitive to this assumption.
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Figure 3.4: Normalized losses for each model variant
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horizon approximation to the loss defined in (3.14). The horizon H is set to 200.
These results are consistent with the observation from Figure 3.3 that inflation
and the output gap exhibit muted and persistent responses to preference, productiv-
ity and government spending shocks in the long duration variant. The presence of
longer duration debt increases the extent to which the monetary policymaker is able
to smooth welfare losses across time. The existence of longer duration debt means
that bond prices (Vˆ ) can be materially affected by relatively small, but very persist-
ent movements in inflation. The optimal monetary policy exploits this mechanism
to mitigate welfare losses in the near term, at the expense of larger losses in the
longer term.
For cost-push shocks, the welfare ranking across model variants is, initially, re-
versed. On impact, losses are greatest for the New Keynesian variant and, initially,
the baseline model also generates smaller losses than the long-duration variant. Be-
cause the cost-push shock has no persistence, losses in the New Keynesian variant
are zero from period 2 onwards.20
The smaller initial losses in the variants with active fiscal policy can be under-
stood by observing that inflation is below target from period 2 onwards in these
variants (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Relative to the New Keynesian variant, therefore,
the Phillips curve trade-off in the first period is improved, because inflation expecta-
tions are lower. This allows the policymaker to achieve a less costly mix of inflation
and the output gap in period 1. From period 2 onwards, losses are higher than
20The textbook New Keynesian model has no endogenous state variables, so the absence of any
disturbance from period 2 onward allows complete stabilization of the output gap and inflation
(Gal´ı, 2008, Figure 5.1).
203
3.4. Time-consistent policy without a zero bound
the textbook New Keynesian model because the requirement that monetary policy
stabilizes the government debt stock requires a persistent deviation of inflation and
the output gap. The net effect on the present value loss, L1 depends on whether
the gains from the improved trade-off in period 1 outweigh the future losses.
Figure 3.5 shows outcomes in period 1 for the baseline model and the textbook
New Keynesian model. The solid black lines show the baseline model and grey
dashed lines show the New Keynesian variant. In both cases, the inflation-output
gap trade-off is determined by the intersection of an upward- sloping Phillips curve
(3.11) and a downward-sloping optimal policy criterion. The optimal policy criterion
for the New Keynesian variant is given by (3.15). Appendix 3.C.1 demonstrates that
the targeting criterion in the baseline model can be written as:
ωxˆt +
(
κ− βΞFpˆiΩ−1
)
pˆit = Ω
−1Et (ωxˆt+1 + κpˆit+1) (3.25)
where Ω = χ+ Fpˆi
(
1− (1− β) 1−χ
κσ˜
)
> 0.
Figure 3.5: Optimal responses to cost-push shock in period 1
xˆ1
pˆi1
ωxˆ1 + κpˆi1 = 0
ωxˆ1 +
(
κ− βΞFpˆiΩ−1
)
pˆi1 = Ω
−1 (ωxˆ2 + κpˆi2)
pˆi1 = κxˆ1 + u1
pˆi1 = κxˆ1 + βpˆi2 + u1
Notes: The diagram shows the optimal policy decisions when a cost-push shock arrives in period
1, for the baseline model (solid black lines) and the New Keynesian variant described in Section
3.3.6 (dashed grey lines). The upward-sloping lines are the Phillips curve, (3.11), conditional on
expected outcomes in period 2. The downward-sloping lines are the optimal trade-off criteria:
equation (3.25) for the baseline model and equation (3.15) for the New Keynesian variant. The
ellipses are iso-loss lines, tracing out combinations of the output gap (xˆ) and inflation (pˆi) that
deliver the same value of the period 1 loss, L1 ≡ pˆi21 + ωxˆ21.
As noted above, the optimal response in the baseline model implies that inflation
is negative from period 2 onward. The spike in inflation in period 1 reduces the real
value of debt and negative inflation thereafter helps to stabilize real debt. The
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negative inflation in period 2 implies that the Phillips curve in the baseline model
lies below the Phillips curve in the New Keynesian variant.21
Other things equal, a downward shift in the Phillips curve allows the monetary
policy maker to achieve a better outcome (a smaller increase in inflation and a smal-
ler reduction in the output gap). The optimal combination of the output gap and
inflation that is chosen, however, depends on the trade-off criterion (3.25). Relative
to the New Keynesian model, the trade-off criterion in the baseline model features a
downward shift and an clockwise tilt. The downward shift reflects the fact that the
right hand side of (3.25) is negative.22 The tilt occurs because (κ− βΞFpˆiΩ−1) < κ.
The resulting optimal combination of the output gap and inflation features a similar
inflation rate to the New Keynesian case, but a noticeably smaller negative output
gap.
The ellipses in Figure 3.5 are iso-loss curves, showing combinations of the output
gap and inflation in period 1 that satisfy pˆi21 + ωxˆ
2
1 = L. The ellipse for the baseline
model (solid black line) lies within the ellipse for the New Keynesian variant (dashed
grey), so that the losses incurred in period 1 are lower in the baseline model. While
per-period losses are larger from period 2 onwards, the gain in period 1 is sufficient
for the discounted loss L1 to be lower in the baseline model than the New Keynesian
variant.
3.5 Time-consistent monetary policy at the
lower bound
The analysis in this section accounts for the existence of a lower bound on the
short-term bond rate. To do so, the model is solved using projection methods. To
reduce the number of state variables (and hence the dimensionality of the problem),
I abstract from government spending shocks and productivity shocks.
The motivation for ignoring government spending shocks is that the precise
21The upward-sloping black line in Figure 3.5 lies below the upward-sloping grey dashed line.
Inflation expectations in the textbook New Keynesian model are zero (pˆi2 = 0).
22The output gap and inflation in period 2 are both negative.
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nature of the effect of government spending on debt is determined by the particular
(extreme) assumption that real lump sum taxes are held fixed. Productivity and
preference shocks both influence the model only through their effects on the natural
rate of interest, r∗. If these two shocks had identical persistence (ρA = ρφ), then
their effects are identical, up to scale.
These simplifications imply that the natural real interest rate, r∗ can be treated
as a ‘primitive’ disturbance and I assume that it follows a simple autoregressive
process:
r∗t = ρrr
∗
t−1 + σrε
r
t (3.26)
I assume that the cost push shock process follows:
ut = ρuut−1 + σuεut (3.27)
Both εr and εu are i.i.d., normally distributed and have unit variance.
The persistence and standard deviations of the shocks are important parameters
for the model solution. I use the parameterization in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Shock process parameters
Description Value
ρr Natural rate persistence 0.85
100× σr Natural rate shock standard deviation 0.225
ρu Cost-push shock persistence 0
100× σu Cost-push shock standard deviation 0.135
The shock processes are calibrated with reference to the assumptions in Chapter
1. Relative to that calibration, the variance of the disturbance to r∗ is reduced
slightly. This is because the calibration in Chapter 1 was designed to present a
substantial stabilization problem to the policymaker in the presence of the zero
bound. The addition of the requirement that monetary policy also stabilizes the
government debt stock makes the policy problem more difficult, other things equal.23
23Another difference between the model specification used here and that in Chapter 1 is that
the effective slope of the IS curve is equal to σ˜ = σ (1− g) < σ. This means that the effect of
policy rate changes on aggregate demand is smaller, again making the stabilization problem more
challenging.
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The assumed persistence of the r∗ process is close to the average persistence of the
shock processes (productivity, preference and government spending) used in Section
3.4.
3.5.1 Optimal policy problem and solution
The policymaker’s optimization problem is the same as considered in Section 3.4.1,
with the addition of a constraint on the short-term bond rate:
Rˆt ≥ 1− β−1 (3.28)
where the lower bound on the nominal interest rate is assumed to be zero.24
The first order conditions (3.16)–(3.19) are unchanged. The first order condition
for the short-term nominal rate becomes
0 = −σ (1− g)µxt − µVt − µZt
where µZt is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (3.28). The fact that the
bound on the policy rate binds occasionally gives rise to a contemporary slackness
condition reported in Appendix 3.F.1.
I solve the model using projection methods. To reduce the dimensionality of the
state space, I approximate the stochastic processes (3.26) and (3.27) using finite state
Markov processes with transition matrices derived using the Rouwenhorst (1995)
method.25 The approach is described in detail in Appendix 3.F.
24Variables in the model are measured relative to steady state, so 1 − β−1 measures the dif-
ference between the steady state gross nominal interest rate β−1 and a gross nominal rate of 1
(corresponding to a net nominal interest rate of zero).
25Kopecky and Suen (2010) demonstrate that this approach generates accurate approximations
to autoregressive process with high persistence. In the context of the present model, this reduces
the computational burden of analyzing the case in which shocks to the natural rate of interest r∗
are very persistent.
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3.5.2 Outcomes at the zero bound
To examine the behavior of the model at the zero bound, I construct a recessionary
scenario. In period 0, the model is assumed to be at its deterministic steady state.
In period 1, the natural real interest rate is initialized at a negative value (−4% on
an annualized basis) and is assumed to follow the process (3.26) (with εrt = 0, t =
1, . . . ). The values of the cost-push state are set to zero throughout the simulation
(ut = 0, t = 1, . . . ). Conditional on the initial value of the natural rate, r
∗
1, the
exogenous states {ut, r∗t } follow their most likely paths. However, in each periods
outcomes for the endogenous variables account for the risk that future shocks arrive,
including those that would prolong the time spent at the zero bound.
Figure 3.6: A recessionary scenario that causes the ZLB to bind
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Notes: The panels show outcomes from simulations of the baseline model (solid black lines), the
variant with long-duration debt (dashed red lines) and the textbook New Keynesian model (grey
lines). In each case, the simulation is constructed from the policy functions solved by projection
methods. The initial value of the natural rate state r∗1 (plus the deterministic steady-state interest
rate) is set to −4% on an annualized basis. Thereafter r∗ follows the process (3.26), with shocks
set to their most likely value of zero, εrt = 0, t = 2, . . . . The cost-push state is set equal to its most
likely value, ut = 0, t = 1, . . . . The initial debt stock is at the deterministic steady state: dˆ0 = 0.
Figure 3.6 shows the effects of the recessionary scenario. The solid black lines
show the baseline model, the red dashed lines show the variant with long duration
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debt and the grey lines show the textbook New Keynesian model.26 The dotted line
in the top left panel shows the trajectory of the natural real interest rate, r∗.
Relative to the textbook New Keynesian model (grey lines), active fiscal policy
reduces the scale of the recession and allows the short-term policy rate to lift off
from the zero bound earlier. The deflationary effect of the recession increases the real
value of government debt. Other things equal, this increases inflation expectations,
as higher future inflation will be required to stabilize the real debt stock. This
mechanism reduces expected real interest rates, stimulating spending and supporting
inflation. In turn, that mitigates the recessionary effects of the fall in the natural
real interest rate.
Comparing the results from the baseline and ‘long duration’ variants reveals that
longer duration debt is associated with a (slightly) smaller recession and a later liftoff
from the zero bound. The results in Section 3.4.2 reveal that, away from the zero
bound, optimal policy is able to better stabilize the output gap and inflation with
long duration debt. However, achieving this improved stabilization performance
requires larger movements in the policy rate.
This implies that, with long duration debt, the zero bound is a more binding
constraint on the setting of the policy rate required to deliver smaller output and
inflation responses to a recessionary shock. For the particular shock examined in
Figure 3.6, the net effect is a slight improvement in output and inflation stabilization.
However, this improvement requires the policy rate to remain at the zero bound for
an additional two quarters compared with the baseline model.
These effects are also apparent in the simulated distributions of key variables,
for which Table 3.4 provides a summary.27
The results for the textbook New Keynesian model demonstrate the familiar
result that the zero lower bound induces a downward skew in the distributions for
inflation and the output gap, both of which have a negative mean.28 The mean of
the policy rate is below the deterministic steady-state value of 3%, as the downward
26That is, the variant with passive fiscal policy: see Section 3.3.6.
27Each model variant was simulated for 260, 000 periods, with the first 10, 000 periods discarded.
28See also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics from alternative model variants
Baseline Long duration New Keynesian
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Quarterly inflation, % 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.15
Output gap, % 0.00 0.80 0.01 0.66 -0.01 0.68
Annualized policy rate, % 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.7 3.5
Debt stock, % deviation from SS 0.18 0.22 1.3 0.31 0 0
Loss per period (pˆi2t + ωxˆ
2
t ) 0.034 – 0.023 – 0.031 –
When at ZLB: 0.057 – 0.023 – 0.058 –
When not at ZLB: 0.026 – 0.023 – 0.010 –
ZLB incidence, % 24 32 45
skew in the distribution of expected inflation dominates the positive effect on the
mean from truncation of the distribution at zero.
In contrast, the average policy rate is at or above the deterministic steady-state
value of 3% for the variants of the model with active fiscal policy. In these cases,
the truncation effect of the zero bound is dominant, pushing up on the mean policy
rate. One driver of this result is that the policy rate is more variable when fiscal
policy is active, particularly for the long duration debt variant (see Section 3.4.2
and Table 3.4). Higher variability of the policy rate increases the truncation effect,
other things equal.
Another driver of this result is the distribution of debt under active fiscal policy.
Table 3.4 shows that average debt is above the deterministic steady-state for both
the baseline and long duration model variants. This is because recessionary shocks
that cause the zero bound to bind generate increases in the debt stock via the debt
deflation mechanism described above (Figure 3.6). As there is no upper bound
on the policy rate, the debt deflation mechanism does not operate in reverse for
large expansionary shocks and the debt distribution shifts to the right (relative to
a symmetric distribution around the deterministic steady state).
The implications of initial debt levels for the responses to an expansionary shock
are explored in Figure 3.7. The top panel shows the responses of the baseline
model to a scenario in which the initial level of (annualized) r∗ is 1pp above steady
state under two assumptions for the initial stock of debt (d). The solid black lines
show a case in which the initial stock of debt is equal to the mean of the stochastic
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Figure 3.7: An expansionary shock with for different assumptions about initial debt
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Notes: The top panels (A) show outcomes from simulations of the baseline model. The lower
panels (B) show outcomes from simulations of the variant with long-duration debt. In all cases,
the simulation is constructed from the policy functions solved by projection methods. The initial
value of the natural rate state r∗1 is set to 1% above the deterministic steady-state (on an annualized
basis). Thereafter r∗ follows the process (3.26), with shocks set to their most likely value of zero,
εrt = 0, t = 2, . . . . The cost-push state is set equal to its most likely value, ut = 0, t = 1, . . . . The
dashed red lines show the case in which the initial value of the debt stock is set to the deterministic
steady state, dˆ0 = 0. The solid black lines show the case in which the initial value of the debt
stock is equal to the mean of the stochastic distribution reported in Table 3.4.
distribution (from table 3.4). The dashed red lines show the case in which the initial
debt level is equal to the deterministic steady state. The bottom panel repeats this
experiment for the variant of the model with long duration debt.
Figure 3.7 shows that the expansionary scenario generates a larger positive out-
put gap and more inflation when the initial level of debt is at its average level,
compared to the case in which the initial debt level is at the deterministic steady
state. When debt is relatively high, additional inflation is required to stabilize the
debt stock. As a result, the rightward shift in the distribution of debt generates a
rightward shift in the distributions of the output gap and inflation. Indeed, average
inflation and output gaps are positive under active fiscal policy.29 Unsurprisingly,
29The mean output gap for the baseline model is slightly positive but rounds to zero to two
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the rightward shift in these distributions is particularly evident for the long duration
variant, for which debt is higher on average.
The results so far indicate that, relative to the New Keynesian variant (with
passive fiscal policy), active fiscal policy generates a rightward shift in the distri-
butions of the output gap and inflation. As noted in the discussion of Figure 3.6,
this increases inflation expectations and hence mitigates the effects of recessionary
shocks when the policy rate is constrained at the zero bound. On the other hand,
the analysis in Section 3.4.2 revealed that, absent the zero bound, welfare would be
higher in the textbook New Keynesian model (with passive fiscal policy).
Which of these effects dominates?
The policy rate is at the zero bound 24% of the time in the baseline model,
compared with 45% for the textbook New Keynesian model (Table 3.4). Conditional
on being at the zero lower bound, losses are slightly lower on average. However,
these performance improvements are outweighed by higher losses when policy is not
constrained by the zero bound. Relative to the textbook New Keynesian model,
average losses are therefore slightly higher in the baseline model.
For the variant of the model with long duration debt, the policy rate is at the
zero bound around a third of the time, midway between the baseline and textbook
New Keynesian models. Conditional on being at the zero bound, losses are consid-
erably lower than the other variants. This performance improvement is sufficient to
compensate for higher losses (compared with the textbook New Keynesian model)
away from the zero bound.
The material welfare improvements at the zero bound for the long duration debt
variant are not evident from Figure 3.6. Once again, the distribution of govern-
ment debt matters. Figure 3.8 repeats the experiment from Figure 3.6, but under
the assumption that initial debt stocks are equal to the mean of the stochastic
distribution. This reveals greater performance improvements in the model with
long-duration debt. Higher average debt generates higher inflation expectations,
reducing real interest rates and stimulating aggregate demand. In this case, liftoff
decimal places, as reported in Table 3.4.
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Figure 3.8: Recessionary scenario under average debt levels
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Notes: The panels show outcomes from simulations of the baseline model (solid black lines), the
variant with long-duration debt (dashed red lines) and the textbook New Keynesian model (grey
lines). In each case, the simulation is constructed from the policy functions solved by projection
methods. The initial value of the natural rate state r∗1 (plus the deterministic steady-state interest
rate) is set to −4% on an annualized basis. Thereafter r∗ follows the process (3.26), with shocks
set to their most likely value of zero, εrt = 0, t = 2, . . . . The cost-push state is set equal to its most
likely value, ut = 0, t = 1, . . . . The initial value of the debt stock is set equal to the mean of the
stochastic distribution reported in Table 3.4.
from the zero bound occurs at the same time as the baseline model, though the
policy path remains slightly lower after liftoff.
3.6 Time-consistent monetary policy with fiscal
uncertainty
In this section, I study scenarios in which the initial debt stock is considered ‘too
high’ and must therefore be reduced. This is motivated by recent debates over the
extent to which current high government debt levels are sustainable. A full examin-
ation of those issues would require an analysis of the effects of fiscal tightening at (or
close to) the zero bound, in a model with distortionary taxation and a more mean-
ingful role for government. My objective is less ambitious and focuses on the effects
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of expectations of future fiscal actions on time-consistent monetary policy. A stark
comparison case is the textbook New Keynesian model with passive fiscal policy, in
which substantial debt reductions using lump sum taxation have no implications for
output or inflation.
I first modify the model to include fiscal reaction functions (for the primary sur-
plus) based on empirical estimates. This allows for a richer analysis of the likely
fiscal behavior in the scenarios considered later. I then consider a simple debt reduc-
tion scenario for two alternative empirical estimates of the fiscal reaction function:
one ‘active’ and the other ‘passive’. Finally, I consider the implications for time-
consistent monetary policy of the risk that fiscal policy switches from passive to
active during a debt reduction scenario.
3.6.1 Fiscal reaction functions
Consistent with many empirical studies, I assume that the fiscal reaction function
is defined in terms of the primary surplus (rather than the tax rate). Specifically,
the reaction function takes the form:
s¯t − s¯t−1 = φs
(
s¯t−1 − ρsd¯t
)
(3.29)
where s¯ denotes the absolute deviation of the primary surplus from steady state and
d¯t ≡ ζdˆt is the absolute deviation of the par value of debt from steady state. The
parameter values satisfy φs ≤ 0 and ρs ≥ 0.
Schoder (2014) estimates a similar reaction function, though in his specification
the primary surplus and debt stock are measured as ratios to GDP. The estimates
can be mapped to the model, by noting that s¯ and d¯ can be interpreted as ratios
to steady-state output (which is normalized to unity).30 I use Schoder’s estimates
for a pooled group of non-EMU OECD countries to parameterize two fiscal reaction
functions, shown in Table 3.5.
30Since the reaction function (3.29) is expressed in terms of deviations from steady state, es-
timated constants are ignored. Schoder (2014) also includes additional dynamic terms (though
coefficient estimates are not reported). I abstract from such dynamics for simplicity.
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Table 3.5: Fiscal reaction function parameter values
‘Passive’ ‘Active’
1980Q1–1996Q4 1997Q1–2010Q4
ρs 0.032 0.005
φs -0.223 -0.084
Notes: Estimates are from Schoder (2014, Table 2).
Schoder’s estimates for the early sample (1980–1996) feature a strong feedback
coefficient on the debt stock (ρs) and hence delivers a ‘passive’ fiscal policy in the
model. So, under this parameterization, the debt stock is stabilized for any path
of the price level and the government budget constraint is not a binding constraint
on the monetary policymaker. In contrast, the estimate for the later sample (1997–
2010) implies that the response of the surplus to the debt stock is much weaker,
giving rise to an ‘active’ fiscal policy configuration.31
To incorporate these reaction functions into the model, I replace equation (3.12)
with
dˆt = β
−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
− (1− χ) Vˆt − ζ−1s¯t (3.30)
which (as shown in Appendix 3.A) is the general formulation of the government
budget constraint written in terms of the primary surplus. Equation (3.12) in-
corporates the specific assumption that lump sum taxes are held fixed so that all
variations in the primary surplus are generated by changes in government spend-
ing. In contrast, in this section I assume that variations in s¯t are implemented via
changes in lump sum taxation, so the path of government spending and hence the
natural real interest rate, r∗t does not change.
These modifications imply that the primary surplus becomes an endogenous
state variable in the model, so that the characterization of time-consistent policy in
Section 3.4.1 is no longer valid. For the analysis in this section, the model under
31The active fiscal policy specification may be most relevant to the United Kingdom at the
present time. Schoder (2014) estimates a full sample value of ρs for the United Kingdom that
is negative. Afonso and Toffano (2013) estimate a regime switching model of fiscal behavior that
suggests that the United Kingdom entered an active fiscal regime at around the time of the financial
crisis.
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time-consistent optimal policy is solved numerically, using the algorithm of Dennis
(2007).
3.6.2 A simple debt reduction scenario
In period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the start of period 1, a credible
announcement is made that government debt will be reduced by ten percentage
points of annual GDP. Note that a permanent reduction in the debt to GDP ratio
also necessitates an appropriate reduction in ζ.32
Figure 3.9: A debt reduction scenario
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Notes: The panels show the result of a credible announcement at the start of period 1 that the
debt stock will be permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state) annual GDP. In
period 0, the economy is at an initial steady state. Results are shown for the baseline model (solid
black lines), the long-duration variant (dashed red lines) and the variant with passive fiscal policy
(solid grey lines). All variables are plotted as percentage point deviations from the final steady
state.
The results of the scenario are shown in Figure 3.9, with responses shown relative
to the new steady state.
The grey lies show the responses of the baseline model under the passive fiscal
rule from Table 3.5. For this variant, the reduction in the debt stock is implemented
32The baseline value for ζ is 2, representing a 50% annual debt to (annual) GDP ratio. In the
debt reduction scenario, ζ is set equal to 1.6, commensurate with a 10pp reduction in the annual
debt to GDP ratio.
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by a strong increase in primary surpluses (implemented via higher lump sum taxes).
The reduction in debt (panel (f)) occurs through a steady retirement of the number
of outstanding bonds (financed by higher taxes) and requires no change in the policy
rate (and hence no change in the bond price). As a result, the purely passive fiscal
adjustment has no implications for activity or inflation. So, as expected, under a
passive specification of the fiscal reaction function, the model behaves exactly like a
textbook New Keynesian model: movements in the primary surplus and government
debt stock have no implications for monetary policy.
In contrast, when fiscal policy is active the debt reduction scenario has substan-
tial implications for activity and inflation. Focusing first on the baseline model (solid
black lines), the primary surplus (panel (e)) barely responds to the debt reduction
scenario. This places a greater burden on bond prices and inflation to ensure that
the debt stock is reduced as announced. The optimal response is to generate a burst
of inflation (panel (b)), which creates fiscal space to finance the retirement of bonds
(panel (f)). Since the policymaker’s influence on inflation is via the Phillips curve
(3.11), the inflation is created by generating a strongly positive output gap (panel
(a)). A small increase in the policy rate (panel (c)), so that expected real interest
rates fall, supports the boom.33
For the variant of the model with long-duration debt (red dashed lines), the
broad patterns of the responses in Figure 3.9 are similar. The primary surplus does
not increase materially in response to the planned reduction of government debt and
a prolonged period of high inflation helps to create fiscal space to reduce the debt
stock.
However, two important differences emerge for the variant with longer duration
debt, relative to the baseline model. First, the rise in the output gap and inflation
are more moderate, but also much more persistent. Second, the fact that the optimal
response is to generate a prolonged boom influences the relative magnitudes of the
output gap and inflation responses.34
33Although the real interest rate declines (supporting a positive output gap), the persistent infla-
tion response implies that the policy rate must rise, in line with the Fisher identity. The responses
therefore exhibit some ‘neo-Fisherian’ qualities, often associated with equilibrium outcomes under
the fiscal theory of the price level.
34The Phillips curve (3.11) can be iterated forwards to express current inflation as the expected
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3.6.3 The importance of expectations
The results from the previous subsection show that the macroeconomic effects of
permanent changes in government debt stocks depend critically on whether the
government pursues an active or passive fiscal policy. As noted by Cochrane (2018b,
p356), the extent to which primary surpluses will be adjusted sufficiently to ensure
that the government debt stock is stabilized depends in large part on expectations
about future fiscal policy behavior.35
It is not unreasonable to assume that, in some situations, there may be uncer-
tainty over the government’s willingness and/or ability to stabilize government debt
for any path of the price level. For example, at the time of writing, there is an
active debate about the extent to which the Italian government’s fiscal plans are
sustainable.36
The idea that policy behavior may change over time has been studied extensively.
In particular, the sharp distinctions between the implications of ‘passive’ and ‘active’
policy regimes studied by Leeper (1991) become more nuanced if those regimes
change over time. For example, in many monetary models the coefficient on inflation
in a simple Taylor (1993) rule must be greater than unity for monetary policy to
be ‘active’.37 This condition is sometimes called the ‘Taylor principle’.38 However,
Davig and Leeper (2007) demonstrate that a unique stable rational expectations
equilibrium may exist even if the coefficient on inflation violates the Taylor principle
in some periods. A unique rational expectations equilibrium can be delivered if there
is a large enough probability of the coefficient satisfying the Taylor principle for a
sufficiently long duration.
discounted value of current and future output gaps. The fact that the output gap response is more
persistent in the long-duration parameterization increases the relative response of inflation.
35This point has been long understood (see, for example, Barro, 1979).
36See, for example, Financial Times (2018).
37The Taylor (1993) rule is an equation for the policy rate as a linear function of a constant,
the inflation rate and the output gap.
38The general requirement, for a very wide range of models, is that the responsiveness of the
policy rate to inflation is ‘strong enough’ to deliver a unique rational expectations equilibrium. So
there is a typically a threshold value for the coefficient on inflation in a simple rule, above which
the monetary policy rule is ‘active’. Whether this threshold value is equal to unity depends on the
details of the model.
218
3.6. Time-consistent monetary policy with fiscal uncertainty
The Davig and Leeper (2007) result is obtained in a model in which the values
of the coefficients in the monetary policy rule depend evolve according to a Markov
process. This means that the probability of transitioning from one set of coefficient
values to another is determined only by the current policy ‘regime’. The Markov
property facilitates the development of solution algorithms that can be applied to
a wide range of linear rational expectations models (see, for example, Svensson and
Williams, 2008; Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha, 2009, 2011; Blake and Zampolli, 2011).
These Markov-switching rational expectations methods have been applied to a
wide range of applications studying uncertainty about fiscal policy behavior. For
example, Francesco Bianchi, Leonardo Melosi and coauthors have used this type
of framework to study the past and possible future behavior of inflation in the
United States (see, for example, Bianchi, 2012; Bianchi and Ilut, 2017; Bianchi and
Melosi, 2014, 2017, 2018a,b).39 Many of these studies explore the possibility that
US inflation dynamics may have been driven by changing expectations of the fiscal
policy regime, in particular whether future policy would be active or passive.
The Markov switching approach has also been used to explore the prospects for
inflation in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, which led to a large increase
in government debt in many countries and subsequent fiscal tightening in many cases.
For example, Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) study the effects of uncertainty about
the timing, pace and composition of a planned fiscal consolidation.
The majority of these studies assume that policy behavior is described using
simple policy rules. Notable exceptions are Svensson and Williams (2008) and Blake
and Zampolli (2011), who provide algorithms to solve for optimal policy behavior
when structural parameters of the model economy evolve according to a Markov
process. However, even in these cases, the probability of a structural change is
exogenous with respect to macroeconomic variables.
The following subsection outlines an approach to solve for time-consistent op-
timal monetary policy in the presence of a time-varying probability of a change in
fiscal policy behavior. The solution approach is extended to allow for the probability
39Some of these investigations use expanded versions of the Markov switching framework in
which the policy regime may be imperfectly observed by private agents, requiring specialized
solution approaches such as that developed by Bianchi and Melosi (2016).
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to depend on the values of macroeconomic variables. This allows the analysis of the
(plausible) situation in which the probability of a change in fiscal regime depends
on the state of the public finances.
3.6.4 Fiscal uncertainty: a simple framework
This subsection describes a solution algorithm to explore the effects of uncertainty
about future fiscal policy behavior. An important innovation relative to studies
using the Markov-switching approach is that the probabilities of a switch in fiscal
policy may change over time and may also respond to the state of the economy.
The specific environment is illustrated in Figure 3.10.
Figure 3.10: The fiscal risk environment
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The scenario starts in period 1, with fiscal policy assumed to be conducted
using the passive rule from Table 3.5. In each period 2, . . . , T , the fiscal rule may
permanently switch to one of two alternatives. If transition does not occur in a
particular period, then the fiscal policy rule remains passive until the next period,
when there is once more a set of exit probabilities associated with switching to a
new fiscal rule. Note that the probabilities of switching to each of the fiscal policy
rules are allowed to change over time.
For example, at the start of period 2, the economy will shift to an active fiscal
rule with probability p2 and to the passive rule with probability q2. In both of these
cases, uncertainty is fully resolved as the switches are permanent. Alternatively,
fiscal policy remains passive with probability 1 − p2 − q2 and the risk of a switch
in fiscal policy behavior remains in period 3. All uncertainty is resolved in period
T + 1 so that qT+1 = 1− pT+1.
220
3.6. Time-consistent monetary policy with fiscal uncertainty
This structure is intended to capture the effects of a persistent risk that fiscal
policy may switch to an active rule.40 However, the environment is also restrictive
in some respects. For example, all uncertainty is resolved beyond a finite horizon
(T + 1), though this could be calibrated to be arbitrarily large.
The fact that a switch in fiscal rule is assumed to be permanent, once it has
occurred, is also somewhat restrictive. The benefit is that the states to which the
model switches are absorbing states. As shown in Appendix 3.G this permits solu-
tion of the model under optimal time-consistent policy using a backward-induction
method. It also allows the probabilities of a switch to an active policy rule to
vary over time. Both of these innovations create a richer environment than some
that have been studied with Markov-switching models using simple monetary policy
rules, such as those discussed in Section 3.6.3. Moreover, the solution method could
be extended quite easily to incorporate more persistent uncertainty by assuming
that fiscal rule switches involve transitions to variants with Markov switching fiscal
policy.41
3.6.5 Exogenous fiscal uncertainty
The first experiment reconsiders the debt reduction experiment of Section 3.6.2 when
there is a risk that the fiscal rule switches to become active. As before, in period 1
it is announced that the debt stock will be reduced by 10pp of annual (steady-state)
GDP. The debt reduction is perfectly credible, but there is uncertainty over the
fiscal rule that will be place to deliver that reduction.
I consider the case in which the probability of switching to the active fiscal policy
rule is 1% per quarter for T = 65 quarters. Specifically pt = 0.01, t = 2, . . . , T and
qt = 0, t = 2, . . . , T with pT+1 = 0 and qT+1 = 1. This means that, until period
T , there is a 1% chance each quarter that fiscal policy permanently switches to the
40The fact that one of the possible switches involves a shift to the passive fiscal rule may seem
puzzling, given that the baseline, ‘no switch’, assumption (moving along the horizontal arrowed
lines) is also that the fiscal policy rule is passive. The rationale this setup is simply to allow for the
case in which the risk is temporary. Doing so requires the passive fiscal rule to be an ‘exit state’,
given the assumption that all uncertainty is resolved in period T + 1.
41The solution of such a model under time-consistent policy has a representation that allows
the key objects in the solution algorithm described in Appendix 3.G to be easily computed (Blake
and Zampolli, 2011).
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‘active’ rule. If period T is reached without a switch to the active policy rule, then
the fiscal policy rule remains passive with certainty thereafter (since pT+1 = 0 and
qT+1 = 1). This parameterization implies that the probability that the fiscal rule
does not switch to the active rule is (1− 0.01)64 ≈ 0.53. So it is more likely than
not that the fiscal rule will remain passive throughout the debt reduction process.
Figure 3.11: Debt reduction with fiscal risk: baseline model
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No rule switch Expectation Switch in periods 30 and 42
Notes: The panels show the result of a debt reduction scenario with exogenous fiscal risk in the
baseline model. An announcement is made at the start of period 1 that the debt stock will be
permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state) annual GDP. In period 0, the
economy is at steady state. In period 1, fiscal policy is passive. For t = 2, . . . , T , there is a 1%
probability that the fiscal policy rule permanently switches to active, conditional on a switch not
having already occurred. If a switch has not occurred by period T , then fiscal policy remains passive
from period T +1 onwards with certainty. The solid grey line shows the outcomes conditional on a
switch never occurring. The solid blue line shows the expected path. The dashed black lines show
outcomes in which a switch in the fiscal rule occurs in periods 30 and 42. All variables are plotted
as percentage point deviations from the final steady state.
Figure 3.11 shows the results. The grey lines depict the outcomes when no fiscal
rule switch occurs. Since the ex ante probability of observing these trajectories is
around 0.53, this is (by far) the most likely outcome. The blue lines depict the
expected outcomes, which are the probability weighted averages of the trajectories
corresponding to a switch to an active fiscal rule in periods 2, . . . , T . The dashed
black lines show two illustrative trajectories corresponding to the case in which the
fiscal rule becomes active in periods 30 and 42.
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Recall that, if fiscal policy is known to be passive with certainty, the debt re-
duction has no effect on the output gap or inflation (see the grey lines in Figure
3.9). Figure 3.11 shows that the presence of fiscal risk overturns this result. The
grey lines show the most likely trajectories for the key variables, the ‘modal path’.
Along the modal path, the output gap and inflation are both positive. The modal
path for the policy rate also lies above the steady state.
To understand the modal path outcomes, first note that the expected path (blue
line) for inflation lies above the modal path (grey line). This reflects the fact that,
each period, there is a risk that the fiscal rule becomes active, in which case inflation
rises markedly: the dashed lines show the cases in which such a switch occurs in
periods 30 and 42. Higher inflation expectations are consistent with a positive
expected path for the output gap. Although the policy rate rises above steady
state, the expected path of the real interest rate is below steady state, providing the
stimulus required for the output gap to rise above zero.
The results indicate that the policymaker is willing to accommodate some of the
effects of higher inflation expectations in the form of higher actual inflation in the
near term. It is optimal to do so because this inflation erodes the real value of debt
and this reduces the losses incurred in states of the world in which the fiscal policy
rule becomes active.
In the event that a switch to active fiscal policy occurs (dashed black lines) the
pattern of the responses are qualitatively similar to those studied under certainty in
Figure 3.9 (solid black lines). Unsurprisingly, the surge in inflation and the output
gap is smaller if the switch occurs later, since by this time the debt stock has already
fallen somewhat towards the new steady state.
Figure 3.12 repeats the experiment for long duration parameterization. The
broad contours for many variables are similar to the baseline model. The fiscal risk
increases inflation expectations and the policymaker accommodates this by allowing
positive inflation along the modal path. Unsurprisingly, given the results of Figure
3.9, the increases in inflation associated with a fiscal rule switch (dashed black lines)
are somewhat smaller than the baseline model. This has a smaller effect on inflation
expectations and so the increases in inflation and the policy rate along the modal
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Figure 3.12: Debt reduction with fiscal risk: long duration debt variant
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Notes: The panels show the result of a debt reduction scenario with exogenous fiscal risk in the
variant of the model with long-duration government debt. An announcement is made at the start of
period 1 that the debt stock will be permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state)
annual GDP. In period 0, the economy is at steady state. In period 1, fiscal policy is passive. For
t = 2, . . . , T , there is a 1% probability that the fiscal policy rule permanently switches to active,
conditional on a switch not having already occurred. If a switch has not occurred by period T , then
fiscal policy remains passive from period T + 1 onwards with certainty. The solid grey line shows
the outcomes conditional on a switch never occurring. The solid blue line shows the expected path.
The dashed black lines show outcomes in which a switch in the fiscal rule occurs in periods 30 and
42. All variables are plotted as percentage point deviations from the final steady state.
path are also smaller than in the baseline model.
One important difference in the results for the long duration variant is that the
modal path for the output gap is negative. The expected path of the output gap
is slightly positive beyond the first few periods, consistent with positive inflation
and expected inflation. In this case, the upward pressure on inflation expectations
acts like a cost push shock, increasing the rate of inflation consistent with a closed
output gap. The optimal response is to tighten monetary policy and trade off a
smaller rise in inflation against a slightly negative output gap.
The relative magnitudes of the output gap and inflation responses in the event
that fiscal policy switches to become active are important determinants of this res-
ult. In the long duration variant, the rise in annual inflation in the event of a
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switch is relatively large, compared with the rise in the output gap. As discussed
previously, the long-duration variant generates more persistent movements in the
output gap and inflation. A small but very persistent positive expected output gap
is sufficient to raise inflation by a (relatively) large amount. As a result, the rise in
inflation expectations is driven by expectations of a higher output gap in the more
distant future, rather than the current output gap. As described above, the rise in
inflation expectations therefore resembles a cost-push disturbance which induces the
policymaker to generate a negative output gap along the modal path.
3.6.6 Endogenous fiscal uncertainty
The fiscal risk environment allows the probability of switching to an active fiscal
policy rule to change over time. A particular case of interest is one in which the
probability is related to macroeconomic outcomes. For example, the probability of
a switch to active policy may be related to the size of the debt stock or primary
surplus.
Appendix 3.G.9 demonstrates how the solution algorithm can be extended so that
the monetary policymaker optimally accounts for the effects of their policy actions
on the probability of a switch in the fiscal rule. To provide some intuition for that
extension, consider a simplified two-period example. Suppose the policymaker’s
objective is to choose the instrument x to minimize:
L ≡ LP (x1, x0) +
[
p2L
A (x2, x1) + (1− p2)LP (x2, x1)
]
where LP and LA denote losses under ‘passive’ and ‘active’ fiscal policy rules. These
losses are different because the structure of the economy, and hence the achievable
macroeconomic outcomes, depend on the fiscal policy regime.
Losses in period 2 depend on the current (x2) and lagged (x1) instrument in the
presence of endogenous state variables. The term in square brackets represents the
expected loss in period 2 when the probability of switching to the active fiscal policy
in period 2 is p2. For now, it is assumed that the probability is treated as exogenous
by the policymaker.
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As in the general algorithm presented in Appendix 3.G, this problem can be
solved by backward induction. In period 2, the fiscal policy rule will either be active
or passive. In each case, there will be an optimal policy response function for the
instrument setting at date 2.42 Specifically, let x2 = fA (x1) and x2 = fP (x1) be the
best response functions under active and passive fiscal policies respectively.
Then the policy problem is to minimize:
L ≡ LP (x1, x0) +
[
p2L
A (fA (x1) , x1) + (1− p2)LP (fP (x1) , x1)
]
with respect to x1.
The first order condition is:
0 = LP1 (x1, x0) + p2
[
LA1 (fA (x1) , x1) f
′
A (x1) + L
A
2 (fA (x1) , x1)
]
+ (1− p2)
[
LP1 (fP (x1) , x1) f
′
P (x1) + L
P
2 (fP (x1) , x1)
]
(3.31)
where LAi and L
P
i represent the partial derivatives of L
A and LP with respect to
arguments i = 1, 2 and f ′A and f
′
P represent the first derivatives of fA and fP
respectively. The algorithm presented in Appendix 3.G demonstrates how to find
the best response functions x2 = fA (x1) and x2 = fP (x1) and the optimal decision
x1 by backward induction (for T > 2 this involves solving a sequence of first order
conditions).
Now suppose that the probability of switching to active fiscal policy in period 2
is endogenous and specifically that it depends on x1, so that p2 = p2 (x1).
In this case, the first order condition is:
0 = LP1 (x1, x0) + p2 (x1)
[
LA1 (fA (x1) , x1) f
′
A (x1) + L
A
2 (fA (x1) , x1)
]
+ p′2 (x1)L
A
(
fA (x1) , x1
)
+ (1− p2 (x1))
[
LP1 (fP (x1) , x1) f
′
P (x1) + L
P
2 (fP (x1) , x1)
]
− p′2 (x1)LP
(
fP (x1) , x1
)
(3.32)
42As discussed in Appendix 3.G.2, it is assumed that it is revealed at the start of each period
whether or not a switch in fiscal policy rule has taken place. This information is revealed before
the policymaker and private agents make their decisions for that period.
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where the policymaker now accounts for the effects of their policy decision in period
1 on the probability of a fiscal rule switch in period 2. This effect is captured by
the terms p′2 (x1) ≡ ∂p2(x1)∂x1 .
Comparing equations (3.31) and (3.32) reveals that treating the probabilities as
if they are exogenous (that is, using (3.31)) when they are in fact endogenous omits
the following term from the first order condition:
T = p′2 (x1)
[
LA
(
fA (x1) , x1
)− LP (fP (x1) , x1)]
Appendix 3.G.9 demonstrates how to compute the equivalent of T for the general
problem and specifies an iterative process for incorporating it into the first order
conditions for optimal policy.
To incorporate endogenous uncertainty into the debt reduction scenario, I sup-
pose that the probability of a switch is determined by an exponential distribution
function:
pt = f (s¯t−1) =
{
0 if s¯t−1 ≤ 0
1− exp (−ξ−1s¯t−1) if s¯t−1 > 0
(3.33)
with ξ > 0. Since the timing protocol is such that agents learn whether or not a
switch in period t occurs before they take their period t decisions, pt is a function
of the primary surplus in period t− 1.
This specification means that the likelihood of a switch to the active fiscal rule
is increasing in the primary surplus. The motivation for this assumption is that a
higher primary surplus increases the fiscal burden on households, since taxes are
high and/or government spending is low. A higher fiscal burden on households may
increase the likelihood that the government adopts an active fiscal policy.43 Under
active fiscal policy, primary surpluses can be reduced, since they are not required to
adjust to stabilize the debt stock, easing the tax burden on households.
While analysis of sovereign default often considers default probabilities that de-
pend on the level of debt (for example Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Mu¨ller, 2013),
43That could come about through political pressure, a change in administration or the govern-
ment acting preemptively to avoid such an outcome.
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I assume that the probability of a fiscal rule switch depends on the primary surplus.
One motivation for this assumption is the literature on ‘fiscal limits’, which posit
that there is a maximal level of the primary surplus that can be achieved by the
government (Davig et al., 2011; Bi, 2012). If the value of outstanding debt is larger
than the present discounted value of the maximal surplus, then the debt stock can-
not be financed by future surpluses. Allowing the probability of a fiscal rule switch
to depend on the level of the primary surplus could therefore be interpreted in terms
of uncertainty over the maximal level of the primary surplus and hence the fiscal
limit.44
The parameter ξ controls the strength of the mapping from the primary surplus
to the probability of switching to the active fiscal rule. For example, a small value
of ξ implies that small primary surpluses are sufficient to imply a high probability of
switching to the active fiscal policy rule. The simulation below uses ξ = 46, which
is chosen so that the ex ante probability of not switching to the active fiscal rule
by period T is approximately 0.53. That is the same probability as the exogenous
fiscal uncertainty simulation in Section 3.6.5.
Figure 3.13: Ex ante probabilities of fiscal rule switch
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Notes: The figure plots ex ante probabilities of a switch to the active fiscal rule. These probabilities
are computed as pt
∏t−1
s=1 (1− ps), where pt is the probability of a switch to active policy in period t
conditional on a switch not having occurred previously. The solid black line shows the probabilities
under endogenous fiscal risk and the dashed grey line shows the probabilities under exogenous risk
(with a fixed conditional probability pt = 0.01, t = 2, . . . , T ).
Figure 3.13 shows the rule switching probabilities associated with this simulation,
compared to the exogenous risk simulation from Section 3.6.5. The figure shows the
44The fiscal limit would also depend on the level of outstanding debt and economic fundamentals
such as productivity (see Bi, 2012).
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ex ante probability (i.e., from the perspective of period 1 of the simulation) of a
switch in each period. Given that qt = 0, t = 2, . . . , T , the ex ante probability of a
switch to the active fiscal rule in period t ≥ 2 is given by pt
∏t−1
s=1 (1− ps).
The exogenous probability case (grey line) from Section 3.6.5 assumed a 1%
probability of a switch occurring, conditional on a switch not having already occurred
(i.e., ps = 0.01). The ex ante probability therefore declines from a peak value of 0.01
in period 2. In contrast, the ex ante probabilities for the endogenous risk profile
have a hump-shaped profile, reflecting the endogenous dependence on the primary
surplus, s¯t−1. The choice of ξ ensures that the integrals beneath the black and grey
lines are equal, so that the ex ante probability of a fiscal rule switch not occurring
is the same. The difference, therefore, is the time profile of that risk.
Figure 3.14 shows the results of the simulation under endogenous fiscal uncer-
tainty. As previously, the grey lines show the most likely outcome (with ex ante
probability 0.53) that a switch to active fiscal policy does not occur. The blue
line shows the expected trajectory (based on information in period 1). The dashed
line shows the case in which a switch to active fiscal policy occurs in period 27.
This period is chosen because the unconditional probability of a fiscal switch in the
endogenous and exogenous experiments are roughly equal at about 0.8% (Figure
3.13).
Comparing the results with those under exogenous fiscal uncertainty (Figure
3.11) reveals that the responses of output and inflation along the modal and expected
paths are more ‘front loaded’. This reflects the fact that a switch to active fiscal
policy is more likely when the primary surplus is higher, which occurs in the earlier
part of the simulation. However, relative to the exogenous probability experiment,
the probability of a switch between periods 3 and 25 is relatively high (Figure 3.13).
The inflationary impact of a switch to the active fiscal rule is larger when the debt
stock is high. So higher probabilities of a switch when the debt stock is high increases
inflation expectations, relative to the exogenous probability example. This makes
the stabilization problem faced by the monetary policymaker more difficult and a
larger deviation of the output gap and inflation are optimally accommodated.
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Figure 3.14: Debt reduction with endogenous fiscal risk: baseline model, ξ = 46
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No rule switch Expectation Switch in period 27
Notes: The panels show the result of a debt reduction scenario with endogenous fiscal risk in
the baseline model. An announcement is made at the start of period 1 that the debt stock will
be permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state) annual GDP. In period 0, the
economy is at steady state. In period 1, fiscal policy is passive. For t = 2, . . . , T , the probability
of a switch to active fiscal policy in period t, conditional on a switch not having already occurred,
is determined by (3.33), with ξ = 46. If a switch has not occurred by period T , then fiscal policy
remains passive from period T + 1 onwards with certainty. The solid grey line shows the outcomes
conditional on a switch never occurring. The solid blue line shows the expected path. The dashed
black lines show outcomes in which a switch in the fiscal rule occurs in period 27.
3.6.7 Risk reduction and time-consistent policy
As noted previously, the endogenous probabilities of a switch to active fiscal policy
are in part determined by the choices of the monetary policymaker. The policymaker
sets policy to minimize expected losses, taking into account the effects of their
decisions on future outcomes. As discussed above, the effects of policy choices on
the primary surplus have two effects. First, the modal path of the primary surplus
affects the probability of a switch to active fiscal policy. Second, the modal path of
the primary surplus affects the modal path of the debt stock and hence the impact
of a switch to active fiscal policy.
To examine these effects further, I consider an alternative calibration for (3.33):
setting ξ = 10. This implies a higher probability of a switch to active fiscal policy
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for a given primary surplus (s¯). Figure 3.15 plots (3.33) for ξ = 10 against the
ξ = 46 value used previously.
Figure 3.15: Endogenous probability function, (3.33), for ξ = 10 and ξ = 46
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Notes: The solid black line plots (3.33) with ξ = 46 and the dashed grey dashed line for ξ = 10.
The x-axis measures s¯.
Figure 3.16 shows the outcome of the endogenous risk simulation using ξ = 10.
Compared with the case with ξ = 46 (Figure 3.14), the probability of a switch to
active fiscal policy is markedly higher in the first few periods of the simulation. The
probability that a switch to active fiscal policy takes place at some point during the
simulation is 81%, substantially higher than the 53% in Figure 3.14. However, it is
still the case that the modal path is the one in which a switch to active fiscal policy
never occurs.
The results of Figure 3.16 demonstrate that a higher risk of a switch to active
fiscal policy increases the amount of inflation that the policymaker accommodates
in the near term. The modal paths for the output gap and inflation in Figure 3.16
are materially higher than those in Figure 3.14. However, the effects of a switch to
active fiscal policy (dashed black lines) are smaller, should they occur. As noted
above, this result is delivered by the fact that higher inflation along the modal path
reduces the debt stock more rapidly so that a switch to active fiscal policy is less
costly. A higher risk of switching to active fiscal policy therefore leads to higher
welfare losses along the modal path and lower losses in the event that a switch
actually occurs.
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Figure 3.16: Debt reduction with endogenous fiscal risk: baseline model, ξ = 10
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No rule switch Expectation Switch in period 27
Notes: The panels show the result of a debt reduction scenario with endogenous fiscal risk in
the baseline model. An announcement is made at the start of period 1 that the debt stock will
be permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state) annual GDP. In period 0, the
economy is at steady state. In period 1, fiscal policy is passive. For t = 2, . . . , T , the probability
of a switch to active fiscal policy in period t, conditional on a switch not having already occurred,
is determined by (3.33), with ξ = 10. If a switch has not occurred by period T , then fiscal policy
remains passive from period T + 1 onwards with certainty. The solid grey line shows the outcomes
conditional on a switch never occurring. The solid blue line shows the expected path. The dashed
black lines show outcomes in which a switch in the fiscal rule occurs in period 27.
To examine the contributions of losses in the central case versus losses when a
switch to active fiscal policy occurs, I consider a hypothetical experiment. In this
experiment, all agents (including the policymaker) believe that the risk of a switch
to active fiscal policy is always zero (the case considered in Section 3.6.2). But, in
fact, the probability of a switch to active fiscal policy is given by equation (3.33). If
it occurs, a switch to active fiscal policy is a complete surprise.
Figure 3.17 shows the outcomes in this hypothetical case.45 The results show
that, as expected, the modal paths coincide with the passive fiscal policy results
in Figure 3.9. Because agents (wrongly) believe that the probability of a switch to
active fiscal policy is zero, the expected paths (solid blue lines) lie on top of the
45The solution algorithm allows this case to be analyzed by setting the probability of a switch
to active fiscal policy to zero in each period (pt = 0, t = 1, . . . , T ).
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Figure 3.17: Debt reduction with zero perceived fiscal risk: baseline model
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No rule switch Expectation Switch in periods 27 and 42
Notes: The panels show the result of a debt reduction scenario with exogenous fiscal risk in
the baseline model. An announcement is made at the start of period 1 that the debt stock will
be permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state) annual GDP. In period 0,
the economy is at steady state. In period 1, fiscal policy is passive. All agents (including the
policymaker) believe that fiscal policy will remain passive with certainty. However, for t = 2, . . . , T ,
the probability that the fiscal policy rule permanently switches to active, conditional on a switch
not having already occurred, is given by (3.33). The solid grey line shows the outcomes conditional
on a switch never occurring. The solid blue line shows the expected path. The dashed black lines
show outcomes in which a switch in the fiscal rule occurs in periods 27 and 42. All variables are
plotted as percentage point deviations from the final steady state.
modal paths. Along the modal path, inflation is stable and the debt stock falls
slowly. As a result, the effects of a (completely unanticipated) switch to active fiscal
policy (dashed black lines) are larger than in Figures 3.11 and 3.14. Moreover, the
probability of a switch to active fiscal policy is generally higher than the case studied
in Figure 3.14, because the modal path for the primary surplus is higher. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.18.
The net effect of (a) better outcomes along the modal path and (b) worse out-
comes in the event of a switch to active fiscal policy can be assessed by computing
the expected losses associated with each simulation.46 This is done in Figure 3.19,
which plots conditional expected losses for the experiment in which the effects of
46Appendix 3.G.13 describes the necessary computations.
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Figure 3.18: Ex ante probabilities of switch to active fiscal policy rule
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Notes: The solid black line shows the ex ante probability of a switch to active fiscal policy for
the experiment in which agents and the policymaker internalize the endogeneity of risk (Figure
3.16). The dashed grey line shows the ex ante probability of a switch to active fiscal policy for the
experiment in which agents and the policymaker completely ignore the risk (Figure 3.17). In both
cases the ex ante probability is computed as pt
∏t−1
j=1 (1− pj) where pt is the conditional probability
of a switch to active fiscal policy conditional on such a switch having not already occurred.
endogenous probabilities are internalized (solid black line) and completely ignored
(dashed grey line). The expected losses are computed conditional on a switch to
active fiscal policy having not already occurred. Given the underlying informational
assumptions, the expected loss in period 1 is the unconditional expected loss for the
debt reduction scenario. Importantly, for the case in which the risk is ignored, ex-
pected losses are computed using the true probabilities of a switch (shown in Figure
3.18).47
Figure 3.19 demonstrates that the expected loss in period 1 is higher for the
case in which the policymaker internalizes the endogeneity of the probability of a
switch to active fiscal policy. Expected losses (conditional on a switch not having
already occurred) are lower from period 3 onwards when the risk is internalized. This
reflects the two factors discussed previously. First, the probability of of a switch to
active fiscal policy is lower when the risk is internalized (Figure 3.18). Second, when
the risk is internalized, the high inflation in the near term (Figure 3.16, panel(b))
reduces the real value of debt and hence the impact of a switch to active fiscal policy,
conditional on a switch having not already occurred.
47In contrast, Figure 3.17 plots expectations under the hypothetical case in which agents incor-
rectly believe the risk to be zero in all periods.
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Figure 3.19: Expected losses when effects of endogenous probabilities are internal-
ized and ignored
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Notes: The solid black line shows expected losses for the experiment in which agents and the
policymaker internalize the endogeneity of risk (Figure 3.16). The dashed grey line shows expected
losses for the experiment in which agents and the policymaker completely ignore the risk (Figure
3.17). In both cases expected loss is computed conditional on a switch to active fiscal policy having
not previously occurred.
However, lower expected conditional losses from period 3 onwards can only be
achieved by higher inflation in the near term. The higher inflation is sufficient to
deliver the result that the unconditional expected loss for the debt reduction scenario
is higher when the risk is internalized rather than ignored.
At first sight, this result may seem puzzling. It implies that ‘ignorance is bliss’:
lower welfare losses can be achieved if the policymaker and private agents ignore
the risk. The explanation is simply that policy behavior is restricted to be time
consistent. Recall that this means that the policymaker acts as a Stackelberg leader
with respect to the private sector and future policymakers. The policymaker intern-
alizes the fact that future policymakers will also act in a time consistent manner.
The private sector internalizes that current and future policymakers will behave in
this way. While ignoring the risk may deliver a lower unconditional expected loss,
it is not possible to coordinate beliefs on such an equilibrium as it violates time
consistency. There is an incentive to deviate from this set of beliefs.
To demonstrate this, Figure 3.20 presents a variant of the scenario in which it is
assumed that, in period 1, the policymaker deviates from the time-consistent policy
plan. Specifically, in period 1, the instrument is set to the level that is optimal if
the risk is ignored by all agents and policymakers in all periods.48 However, private
48From Figure 3.17, panel (c), the policy rate is set to its steady-state value.
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Figure 3.20: Debt reduction experiment with deviation from time consistency
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Time consistent Deviation in period 1
Notes: The panels show the result of a debt reduction scenario with exogenous fiscal risk in
the baseline model. An announcement is made at the start of period 1 that the debt stock will
be permanently reduced by ten percentage points of (steady-state) annual GDP. In period 0,
the economy is at steady state. In period 1, fiscal policy is passive. All agents (including the
policymaker) believe that fiscal policy will remain passive with certainty. However, for t = 2, . . . , T ,
the probability that the fiscal policy rule permanently switches to active, conditional on a switch not
having already occurred, is given by (3.33). The solid black line shows the outcomes conditional
on a switch not occurring under time-consistent monetary policy. The dashed grey lines show
outcomes in which the monetary policymaker deviates from time consistent policy in period 1. All
variables are plotted as percentage point deviations from the final steady state.
agents believe that future policymakers will behave in a time consistent manner.
Appendix 3.G.14 provides details of how this simulation is constructed.
The solid black lines in Figure 3.20 show the modal path outcomes under time
consistent monetary policy (as shown in Figure 3.16). The dashed grey lines show the
modal path when the policymaker deviates from time consistent policy in period 1, as
described above. In this case, agents know that future monetary policy will be time
consistent. They therefore recognize that future policymakers have an incentive to
create inflation in the near term, for the same reasoning discussed in the description
of Figure 3.16. High expected inflation combined with a policy rate set at the steady
state level generates even higher inflation (and a large positive output gap) in period
1. The unconditional expected loss when the policymaker deviates in period 1 is
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therefore higher than the case in which policy is set in a time-consistent manner
throughout.49
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has studied the behavior of a simple model with long-term government
debt, time consistent monetary policy and active fiscal policy (‘fiscal dominance’).
The analytical results using the linear quadratic variant of the model show that
the duration of government debt plays a key role in determining the extent of the
‘debt stabilization bias’ (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013; Leeper et al., 2019).
The analysis incorporating the possibility that the zero bound may bind indicate
that active fiscal policy may support inflation expectations in a liquidity trap, as
agents expect higher future inflation to be used to reduce the real value of debt
accumulated during the recession. This effect may be sufficient to improve welfare
relative to the textbook case in which fiscal policy is passive.
The analysis of fiscal risk shows that, when government debt is materially above
its desired level, even small probabilities of a switch to active fiscal policy can gener-
ate a rise in inflation expectations that the monetary policymaker accommodates in
the form of higher actual inflation. This result is partly driven by the requirement
that monetary policy be time consistent.
49The unconditional expected loss is 31.65 when the policymaker deviates, compared with 31.24
under fully time consistent monetary policy.
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Appendix 3.A The log-linear model
This appendix derives a log-linear representation of the model. For variable Xt,
Xˆt ≡ lnXt − lnX defines the log-deviation of Xt from its steady-state value, X. A
useful feature of the derivation is that the steady-state level of output is normalized
to unity, as described in Appendix 3.A.4.
3.A.1 Households
The first-order conditions for the optimization problem are:
φtc
− 1
σ
t = µtPt (3.34)
φtn
ψ
t = Wtµt (3.35)
0 = − µt + βRtEtµt+1 (3.36)
0 = − Vtµt + βEt (%+ χVt+1)µt+1 (3.37)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the nominal budget constraint (3.4).
Let the real Lagrange multiplier be defined as:
Λt ≡ Ptµt
and real short bond holdings and long-term debt as
bt ≡ Bt
Pt
dt ≡ Dt
Pt
The first order conditions for short-term and long-term bond holdings, (3.36)
and (3.37) can be written in terms of real-valued variables as:
0 = − Λt + βRtEtΛt+1pi−1t+1 (3.38)
0 = − ΛtVt + βEt (%+ χVt+1) Λt+1pi−1t+1 (3.39)
Combining these equations gives:
RtVtEtΛt+1pi−1t+1 = Et (%+ χVt+1) Λt+1pi−1t+1 (3.40)
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In steady state this implies that:
V = % (R− χ)−1 = % (β−1 − χ)−1
Setting % = β−1 − χ therefore implies that V = 1, that is, the steady-state price
of debt is unity. Adopting this assumption means that the real debt stock d can be
treated as the real par value of debt.
Log-linearizing (3.40) gives:
RV
(
Rˆt + Vˆt
)
= χV Vˆt+1
which implies that:
Vˆt = −Rˆt + χβVˆt+1 (3.41)
which uses the fact that R = β−1 in a zero inflation steady state.
Combining (3.34) and (3.38) creates an Euler equation for consumption:
φtc
− 1
σ
t = βRtEtφt+1c
− 1
σ
t+1pi
−1
t+1
which can be log-linearized to give:
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1
]
− σEt
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)
(3.42)
The first order conditions for labor supply (3.35) and consumption (3.34) can be
combined and log-linearized to give
ψnˆt = wˆt − σ−1cˆt (3.43)
3.A.2 Firms
The pricing structure is the same as considered in Chapter 1 and described in detail
in Appendix 1.B.2.
The real profit of producer j is:
(1 + Γ)Pj,t
Pt
yj,t − wtnj,t =
(
(1 + Γ)
Pj,t
Pt
− wt
At
)(
Pj,t
Pt
)−ηt
yt
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where Γ > 0 is the subsidy that ensures that the steady-state level of output is
efficient.
The objective function for a producer that is able to reset prices is:
maxEt
∞∑
k=t
Λk (βα)
k−t
(
(1 + Γ)
Pj,t
Pk
− wk
Ak
)(
Pj,t
Pk
)−ηt
yk
where Λ represents the household’s stochastic discount factor and 0 ≤ α < 1 is the
probability that the producer is not allowed to reset its price each period.
The derivation of the log-linearized pricing equation is identical to that presented
in Appendix 1.B.2, with the exception that the productivity-adjusted real wage
wt/At appears in place of wt. So the log-linearized pricing equation is given by:
pˆit =
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
wˆt − Aˆt − η
η − 1 ηˆt
)
+ βEtpˆit+1 (3.44)
3.A.3 Government
Log-linearizing (3.8) gives:
Vˆt + dˆt =
%+ χV
V
(
dˆt−1 − pit
)
+ χVˆt − st − s
V d
Since the steady-state level of output is normalized to unity, V d = ζ where ζ is
the steady state ratio of government debt to output. Moreover, in the steady state,
%+χV
V
= R = β−1.
These observations imply that:
dˆt = β
−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
− (1− χ) Vˆt − ζ−1s¯t (3.45)
where s¯t ≡ st − s is the linear deviation of the surplus from steady state.
The real surplus is given by:
st = τ − gt
since taxes are held fixed (τt = τ, ∀t).
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In deviations from steady state, this implies that:
s¯t = −g¯t (3.46)
Using this result in (3.45) gives
dˆt = β
−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
− (1− χ) Vˆt + ζ−1g¯t (3.47)
3.A.4 Market clearing and the efficient allocation
Without loss of generality, I specify the steady-state level of productivity, A to
ensure that the steady-state level of output y is equal to unity. This implies that
the steady-state level of government spending g represents that fraction of output
consumed by the government (so 0 ≤ g < 1).
As in Chapter 1, aggregate output satisfies
Atnt = Dtyt (3.48)
where
Dt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)−η
dj (3.49)
is a measure of price dispersion.
Goods market clearing requires:
ct + gt = yt
where Dt is a second order price dispersion term, as analyzed in Appendix 1.C.
To a log-linear approximation, this is:
(1− g) cˆt + g¯t = yˆt (3.50)
The subsidy required to make the steady state efficient is:
Γ =
η
η − 1
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In a flexible price equilibrium with no distortion from monopolistic competition,
the real wage will equal the marginal product of labor, which is equal to At. So the
efficient allocations, denoted with an asterisk, can be found from the labor supply
relation (3.43):
ψnˆ∗t = Aˆt − σ−1cˆ∗t
Imposing market clearing, (1− g) c∗t + g¯t = Aˆt + n∗t = y∗t implies that potential
output is given by:
yˆ∗t =
σ (1− g) (1 + ψ)
1 + ψσ (1− g) Aˆt +
1
1 + ψσ (1− g) g¯t
3.A.5 The ‘gap’ representation
The Phillips curve and Euler equation can be written in terms of the output gap,
defined as the deviation between output and the efficient level of output.
Substituting the labor supply equation (3.43) into the log-linearized pricing equa-
tion (3.44) gives:
pˆit =
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψnˆt + σ
−1cˆt − Aˆt
)
+ βEtpˆit+1
− (1− βα) (1− α)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
=
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
((
ψ + σ−1 (1− g)−1) yˆt − (1 + ψ) Aˆt − σ−1 (1− g)−1 g¯t)
+ βEtpˆit+1 − (1− βα) (1− α)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
=
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψ + σ−1 (1− g)−1) xˆt + βEtpˆit+1 + ut
+
(1− βα) (1− α)
α
[(
ψ + σ−1 (1− g)−1) yˆ∗t − (1 + ψ) Aˆt − σ−1 (1− g)−1 g¯t]
where the second line uses market clearing and the third line uses the definition of
the output gap yˆt − yˆ∗t ≡ xˆt and defines the cost push shock, u, as:
ut ≡ −(1− βα) (1− α)
α
η
η − 1 ηˆt
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Notice that the final term in brackets on the final line is given by:(
ψ + σ−1 (1− g)−1) yˆ∗t − (1 + ψ) Aˆt − σ−1 (1− g)−1 g¯t
= σ−1 (1− g)−1
[
(1 + ψσ (1− g)) yˆ∗t − (1 + ψ)σ (1− g) Aˆt − g¯t
]
= 0
The Phillips curve can therefore be written as:
pˆit = κxˆt + βEtpˆit+1 + ut (3.51)
where
κ ≡ (1− βα) (1− α)
α
(
ψ + σ−1 (1− g)−1)
The Euler equation for consumption (3.42) can be written as:
(1− g)−1 yˆt − (1− g)−1 g¯t = (1− g)−1 Et [yˆt+1 − g¯t+1]− σ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1
]
− σEt
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)
which incorporates the market clearing condition for output.
Rearranging gives:
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − σ (1− g)
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1
]
+ Et
[
g¯t − g¯t+1 − σ (1− g)
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)]
This implies that:
yˆt − yˆ∗t + yˆ∗t = Et
(
yˆt+1 − y∗t+1 + y∗t+1
)− σ (1− g) [Rˆt − Etpˆit+1]
+ Et
[
g¯t − g¯t+1 − σ (1− g)
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)]
or
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 − σ (1− g)
[
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − r∗t
]
(3.52)
243
3.B. The utility-based loss function
where the efficient rate of interest r∗ satisfies
r∗t = Et
[
σ−1 (1− g)−1 (y∗t+1 − y∗t + g˜t − g˜t+1)− (φˆt+1 − φˆt)]
= Etσ−1 (1− g)−1
(
σ(1−g)(1+ψ)
1+ψσ(1−g) Aˆt+1 +
1
1+ψσ(1−g) g¯t+1
−y∗t + g¯t − g¯t+1
)
− Et
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)
= Et
[
−
(
φˆt+1 − φˆt
)
+
1 + ψ
1 + ψσ (1− g)
(
Aˆt+1 − Aˆt
)]
− ψ
1 + ψσ (1− g)Et (g¯t+1 − g¯t)
Appendix 3.B The utility-based loss function
The model structure is very similar to that analyzed in Chapter 1. As a result,
the derivation of the utility-based loss function follows many of the same steps.
The derivation here uses key results from Chapter 1 (Appendix 1.C) and focuses
on differences arising from the presence of government spending and the absence of
portfolio adjustment costs.
Ignoring constants, the period utility function is:
Ut = φt
[
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
− n
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
]
As in Appendix 1.C markup shocks are ignored (by setting ηt = η,∀t) to simplify
notation. Since cost push shocks are independent of policy this does not affect the
derivation.
Approximating the utility from consumption to second order gives:
φt
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
≈ c1− 1σ
(
ct − c
c
)
− 1
2σ
c1−
1
σ
(
ct − c
c
)2
+ c1−
1
σ
ct − c
c
φt − φ
φ
+ t.i.p. (3.53)
where t.i.p. denotes ‘terms independent of policy’ (that is, functions of exogenous
disturbances) and the fact that φ = 1 in steady state is used to simplify the first
two terms.
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Using the second order approximation for the percentage changes in consumption
implies that:
c
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1
σ
≈ c1− 1σ
(
cˆt +
1
2
(
1− σ−1) cˆ2t + cˆtφˆt)+ h.o.t.
where h.o.t. are ‘higher order terms’.
The sub-utility function for labor supply is:
φtn
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
≈ n
1+ψ
1 + ψ
+ n1+ψ
nt − n
n
+
ψn1+ψ
2
(
nt − n
n
)2
+
n1+ψ
1 + ψ
φt − φ
φ
+ n1+ψ
nt − n
n
φt − φ
φ
≈n1+ψnt − n
n
+
ψn1+ψ
2
(
nt − n
n
)2
+ n1+ψ
nt − n
n
φt − φ
φ
+ t.i.p.
Using the mapping from percentage changes to log-deviations, to second order,
implies that:
φtn
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
≈ n1+ψ
[
nˆt +
(1 + ψ)
2
nˆ2t + nˆtφˆt
]
+ h.o.t.
A second order approximation to the aggregate production function (3.48) is:
yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t = nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t + Aˆtnˆt − Dˆt + t.i.p.
which uses the fact that Dˆt is a second order term (see Appendix 1.C).
This implies that:
φtn
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
≈ n1+ψ
[
yˆt +
(1 + ψ)
2
yˆ2t − (1 + ψ) yˆtAˆt + yˆtφˆt − Dˆt
]
+ h.o.t.+ t.i.p.
The second-order approximation to the utility function is therefore
Ut ≈ c1− 1σ
(
cˆt +
1
2
(
1− σ−1) cˆ2t + cˆtφˆt)
− n1+ψ
[
yˆt +
(1 + ψ)
2
yˆ2t − (1 + ψ) yˆtAˆt + yˆtφˆt − Dˆt
]
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The steady-state labor supply relationship is
nψ = wc−1/σ = Ac−1/σ
Steady-state market clearing is
c+ g = y = An
since steady-state price dispersion is D = 1.
This implies that
n1+ψ = (1− g)−1 c1− 1σ
so that the utility function can be written as
Ut ≈ c1− 1σ
[
cˆt +
1
2
(1− σ−1) cˆ2t + cˆtφˆt − (1− g)−1 yˆt − (1+ψ)2(1−g) yˆ2t
+ (1+ψ)
(1−g) yˆtAˆt − (1− g)−1 yˆtφˆt − (1− g)−1 Dˆt
]
The goods market clearing condition is:
ct = yt − gt
A second order approximation to the goods market clearing condition is:
(1− g) cˆt + 1− g
2
cˆ2t = yˆt +
1
2
yˆ2t + t.i.p.
These results can be used to write the approximation to utility in terms of output
deviations and price dispersion only.
First substitute for
cˆt = −1
2
cˆ2t +
yˆt
1− g +
1
2 (1− g) yˆ
2
t
to give:
Ut ≈ c1− 1σ

−1
2
cˆ2t +
yˆt
1−g +
1
2(1−g) yˆ
2
t +
1
2
(1− σ−1) cˆ2t + cˆtφˆt
− (1− g)−1 yˆt − (1+ψ)2(1−g) yˆ2t + (1+ψ)(1−g) yˆtAˆt
− (1− g)−1 yˆtφˆt − (1− g)−1 Dˆt

≈ c
1− 1
σ
1− g
[
−Dˆt − 1− g
2σ
cˆ2t −
ψ
2
yˆ2t + (1− g) cˆtφˆt + (1 + ψ) yˆtAˆt − yˆtφˆt
]
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where the second line collects common terms.
Substituting for cˆ2t gives:
Ut ≈ c
1− 1
σ
1− g
[
−Dˆt − ψ + σ˜
−1
2
yˆ2t +
1
σ˜
yˆtg¯t + (1− g) cˆtφˆt + (1 + ψ) yˆtAˆt − yˆtφˆt
]
where σ˜ ≡ (1− g)σ as in the main text.
Noting that
(1− g) cˆtφˆt− yˆtφˆt = φˆt [(1− g) cˆt − yˆt] = φˆt [(1− g) cˆt − (1− g) cˆt − g¯t] = −φˆtg¯t
which is independent of policy gives:
Ut ≈ c
1− 1
σ
1− g
[
−Dˆt − ψ + σ˜
−1
2
yˆ2t +
1
σ˜
yˆtg¯t + (1 + ψ) yˆtAˆt
]
The terms in yˆt can be written as:
−ψ + σ˜
−1
2
yˆ2t +
1
σ˜
yˆtg¯t + (1 + ψ) yˆtAˆt =− ψ + σ˜
−1
2
[
yˆ2t − 2yˆt
(
1
1+ψσ˜
g¯t
+ σ˜(1+ψ)
1+ψσ˜
Aˆt
)]
= − ψ + σ˜
−1
2
[
yˆ2t − 2yˆtyˆ∗t
]
= − ψ + σ˜
−1
2
[
yˆ2t − 2yˆtyˆ∗t + (yˆ∗t )2 − (yˆ∗t )2
]
= − ψ + σ˜
−1
2
(yˆt − yˆ∗t )2 +
ψ + σ˜−1
2
(yˆ∗t )
2
= − ψ + σ˜
−1
2
x2t + t.i.p.
Define the discounted loss function to be minimized as:
L = −2 (1− g) c 1σ−1
∞∑
t=0
βtUt =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
2Dˆt +
(
ψ + σ˜−1
)
xˆ2t
]
The analysis of the price dispersion term Dˆt is identical to that in Appendix 1.C
so that the loss function can be written as:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
αη
(1− αβ) (1− α) pˆi
2
t +
(
ψ + σ˜−1
)
xˆ2t
]
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Normalizing the coefficient on inflation to unity implies that the loss function is:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
pˆi2t +
(1− αβ) (1− α)
αη
(
ψ + σ˜−1
)
xˆ2t
]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
pˆi2t +
κ
η
xˆ2t
]
Appendix 3.C Time-consistent linear-quadratic
policy
This appendix focuses on solving for the coefficients that describe the dependence of
endogenous variables on the debt stock (that is, Fpˆi,Fxˆ,FVˆ ,Fdˆ). The starting point
is the first order conditions derived in Section 3.4.1 of the main text.
Note first that (3.19) and (3.20) imply that:
µxt = (1− χ) σ˜−1µdt (3.54)
and
µVt = − (1− χ)µdt (3.55)
Using the preceding results in the equation for µdt gives:
µdt = [Fxˆ + σ˜Fpˆi] (1− χ) σ˜−1µdt + βFpˆiµpit − χβFVˆ (1− χ)µdt + Etµdt+1
= [Fxˆ + σ˜Fpˆi] (1− χ) σ˜−1µdt + βFpˆi
(
pˆit − β−1µdt
)− χβFVˆ (1− χ)µdt
+ Etµdt+1
Collecting terms and rearranging gives:[
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ
]
µdt = βFpˆipˆit + Etµdt+1 (3.56)
Combining (3.16) and (3.17) gives:
0 = ωxˆt − µxt + κpˆit − κβ−1µdt
which implies that:
ωxˆt + κpˆit =
(
(1− χ) σ˜−1 + κβ−1)µdt (3.57)
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or
µdt =
ω
Ξ
xˆt +
κ
Ξ
pˆit (3.58)
where
Ξ ≡ (1− χ) σ˜−1 + κβ−1 > 0 (3.59)
Then:[
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpˆi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ
] (ω
Ξ
xˆt +
κ
Ξ
pˆit
)
= βFpˆipˆit + Et
(ω
Ξ
xˆt+1 +
κ
Ξ
pˆit+1
)
(3.60)
To solve for the ‘F ’ coefficients, ignore exogenous terms and substitute out for
expectations (so, for example, Etxt+1 = Fxˆdt = FxˆFdˆdt−1):
βFpˆiFpˆi +
(ω
Ξ
FxˆFdˆ +
κ
Ξ
FpˆiFdˆ
)
=
[
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpˆi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ
]
×
(ω
Ξ
Fxˆ +
κ
Ξ
Fpˆi
)
which implies that[
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpˆi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ − Fdˆ
] (ω
Ξ
Fxˆ +
κ
Ξ
Fpˆi
)
= βF 2pˆi (3.61)
Now apply the same approach for the structural model equations, which gives
the following.
Rˆt = − Vˆt + χβFVˆ dˆt
xˆt = Fxˆdˆt − σ˜Rˆt + σ˜Fpˆidˆt (3.62)
which implies that:
xˆt = Fxˆdˆt + σ˜Vˆt − σ˜χβFVˆ dˆt + σ˜Fpˆidˆt
and hence:
Fxˆ = FxˆFdˆ + σ˜FVˆ − σ˜χβFVˆ Fdˆ + σ˜FpˆiFdˆ (3.63)
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The Phillips curve implies that:
pˆit = κxˆt + βFpˆidˆt
so that:
Fpˆi = κFxˆ + βFpˆiFdˆ (3.64)
The government debt accumulation equation gives:
dˆt = β
−1dˆt−1 − β−1pˆit − (1− χ) Vˆt
which implies that:
Fdˆ = β
−1 − β−1Fpˆi − (1− χ)FVˆ (3.65)
The preceding steps have delivered four equations in four unknowns, repeated
here for convenience:
βF 2pˆi =
[
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpˆi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ − Fdˆ
]
×
(ω
Ξ
Fxˆ +
κ
Ξ
Fpˆi
)
(3.66)
Fxˆ = FxˆFdˆ + σ˜FVˆ − σ˜χβFVˆ Fdˆ + σ˜FpˆiFdˆ (3.67)
Fpˆi = κFxˆ + βFpˆiFdˆ (3.68)
Fdˆ = β
−1 − β−1Fpˆi − (1− χ)FVˆ (3.69)
The final two equations can be used to express Fxˆ and FVˆ as functions of Fpˆi and
Fdˆ:
Fxˆ = κ
−1Fpˆi − κ−1βFpˆiFdˆ (3.70)
FVˆ = (1− χ)−1 β−1 − (1− χ)−1 β−1Fpˆi − (1− χ)−1 Fdˆ (3.71)
Using these expressions in the first two equations gives:
βF 2pˆi =
[
1 + χβ (1− χ) (1− χ)−1 (β−1 − β−1Fpˆi − Fdˆ) + χFpˆi
− (1− χ) σ˜−1 (κ−1Fpˆi − κ−1βFpˆiFdˆ)− Fdˆ
]
×
(ω
Ξ
(
κ−1Fpˆi − κ−1βFpˆiFdˆ
)
+
κ
Ξ
Fpˆi
)
=
[
1 + χ− χβFdˆ − (1− χ) (κσ˜)−1 (1− βFdˆ)Fpˆi − Fdˆ
]
×
( ω
Ξκ
(1− βFdˆ) +
κ
Ξ
)
Fpˆi
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and
κ−1Fpˆi (1− βFdˆ) = κ−1Fpˆi (1− βFdˆ)Fdˆ + σ˜FpˆiFdˆ
+ σ˜
(
(1− χ)−1 β−1 − (1− χ)−1 β−1Fpˆi − (1− χ)−1 Fdˆ
)
× (1− βχFdˆ)
The second equation implies a quadratic equation for Fdˆ conditional on a solution
(or conjecture) for Fpˆi. The first equation can be used to solve for Fpˆi conditional on
a solution (or conjecture) for Fdˆ.
Specifically, conditional on a solution for Fdˆ, Fpˆi satisfies:
Fpˆi = m (Fdˆ) ≡
1 + χ− (1 + βχ)Fdˆ
β
(
ω
κΞ
(1− βFdˆ) + κΞ
)−1
+ (1− χ) (κσ˜)−1 (1− βFdˆ)
(3.72)
The quadratic equation for Fdˆ is given by:
0 =
[
βχκσ˜
1− χ − βFpˆi
]
F 2
dˆ
+
[
Fpˆi (1 + β + κσ˜)− κσ˜
1− χ −
χκσ˜
(1− χ) (1− Fpˆi)
]
Fdˆ
+
[
κσ˜
β (1− χ) (1− Fpˆi)− Fpˆi
]
which can be rearranged to give:
0 =
[
χκσ˜
1− χ − Fpˆi
]
βF 2
dˆ
+
[
Fpˆi − χκσ˜
(1− χ)
]
Fdˆ
+
[
Fpˆi (β + κσ˜)− κσ˜
1− χ +
χκσ˜
(1− χ)Fpˆi
]
Fdˆ
+
[
κσ˜
β (1− χ) (1− Fpˆi)− Fpˆi
]
The third term can be written as:[
Fpˆi (β + κσ˜)− κσ˜
1− χ +
χκσ˜
(1− χ)Fpˆi
]
Fdˆ
=
[
βFpˆi +
(1− χ)κσ˜
1− χ Fpˆi −
κσ˜
1− χ +
χκσ˜
(1− χ)Fpˆi
]
Fdˆ
=
[
βFpˆi +
κσ˜
1− χ (Fpˆi − 1)
]
Fdˆ
= −
[
κσ˜
1− χ (1− Fpˆi)− Fpˆi
]
βFdˆ (3.73)
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This implies that the quadratic equation can be factorized as:
0 =
[
Fpˆi − χκσ˜
1− χ
]
Fdˆ (1− βFdˆ) +
[
κσ˜
β (1− χ) (1− Fpˆi)− Fpˆi
]
(1− βFdˆ)
= (1− βFdˆ)
[(
Fpˆi − χκσ˜
1− χ
)
Fdˆ +
κσ˜
β (1− χ) (1− Fpˆi)− Fpˆi
]
So one solution is Fdˆ = β
−1. That implies that Fpˆi = m (β−1) = κΞβ (1− β−1) < 0.
The other solution for Fdˆ satisfies:
Fdˆ ≡ h (Fpˆi) =
(
1 + κσ˜ [β (1− χ)]−1)Fpˆi − κσ˜ [β (1− χ)]−1
Fpˆi − χκσ˜ (1− χ)−1
(3.74)
Note that h can be written as:
h (·) = 1 + κσ˜ [β (1− χ)]
−1 (Fpˆi − 1 + βχ)
Fpˆi − χκσ˜ (1− χ)−1
The previous results can be used to re-write the targeting rule in terms of the
output gap and inflation.
3.C.1 Model properties under time-consistent policy
The coefficient in brackets on the left side of (3.60) is:
Ω ≡ 1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpˆi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ
= 1 + χ (1− Fpˆi − βFdˆ) + χFpˆi − (1− χ) σ˜−1
(
κ−1Fpˆi − κ−1βFpˆiFdˆ
)
=1 + χ− χβFdˆ −
1− χ
κσ˜
Fpˆi +
1− χ
κσ˜
βFpˆiFdˆ
Rearranging (3.74) reveals that:
FdˆFpˆi =
χκσ˜
1− χFdˆ +
(
1 +
κσ˜
β (1− χ)
)
Fpˆi − κσ˜
β (1− χ)
so that
1− χ
κσ˜
βFpˆiFdˆ = χβFdˆ +
(
1 + β
1− χ
κσ˜
)
Fpˆi − 1
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and plugging this into the equation for Ω gives:
Ω = χ+ Fpˆi
(
1− (1− β) 1− χ
κσ˜
)
This allows (3.56) to be written as
µdt = βFpˆiΩ
−1pˆit + Ω−1Etµdt+1
and (3.60) to be written as:
Ω (ωxˆt + κpˆit) = βΞFpˆipˆit + Et (ωxˆt+1 + κpˆit+1)
or
ωxˆt +
(
κ− βΞFpˆiΩ−1
)
pˆit = Ω
−1Et (ωxˆt+1 + κpˆit+1)
When cost-push shocks are zero, the Phillips curve implies that the output gap
satisfies:
xˆt = κ
−1 (pˆit − βEtpˆit+1)
Which implies that the targeting rule can be written as:
Ω
(
ωκ−1 (pˆit − βEtpˆit+1) + κpˆit
)
= βΞFpˆipˆit + Et
(
ωκ−1 (pˆit+1 − βEtpˆit+2) + κpˆit+1
)
which uses the law of iterated conditional expectations.
Collecting terms and rearranging gives a second order difference equation for
inflation:[
Ω
(ω
κ
+ κ
)
− βΞFpi
]
pˆit −
[ω
κ
(1 + βΩ) + κ
]
Etpˆit+1 +
βω
κ
Etpˆit+2 = 0
For an impulse response, in which an unexpected shock is revealed in period 1
and no additional information arrives thereafter, the path for inflation must satisfy
the difference equation. That is[
Ω
(ω
κ
+ κ
)
− βΞFpi
]
pˆit −
[ω
κ
(1 + βΩ) + κ
]
pˆit+1 +
βω
κ
pˆit+2 = 0
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where the expectation operator has been removed.
We seek a solution of the form pit+1 = Gpit which implies([
Ω
(ω
κ
+ κ
)
− βΞFpi
]
−
[ω
κ
(1 + βΩ) + κ
]
G+
βω
κ
G2
)
pˆit = 0
The roots of the characteristic polynominal satisfy:
G =
ω
κ
(1 + βΩ) + κ ±
([
ω
κ
(1 + βΩ) + κ
]2 − 4 [Ω (ω
κ
+ κ
)− βΞFpˆi] βωκ ) 12
2βω
κ
(3.75)
For the parameter values used in both the baseline and long-duration variants,
the two solutions for G are real. In both cases, the larger root exceeds 1 and the
smaller root is less than 1.
The preceding analysis has shown that, in the absence of cost push shocks, the
path for inflation satisfies:
pˆit+1 = Gpˆit, t ≥ 1
The Phillips curve implies that:
xˆt+1 = κ
−1 (pˆit+1 − βpˆit+2) = κ−1 (1− βG) pˆit+1
and substituting this into (3.58) evaluated at t+ 1 gives:
µdt+1 =
[ ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]
pˆit+1
Also note that, for t > 1:
xˆt+2 =κ
−1 (1− βG) pˆit+2 = κ−1 (1− βG)Gpˆit+1 = Gxˆt+1
µdt+2 =
[ ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]
pˆit+2 =
[ ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]
Gpˆit+1 = Gµ
d
t+1
The preceding results can be used in (3.56) evaluated at t+ 1 to give:[
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ
+χFpi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ
]
µdt+1 = βFpˆipˆit+1 + µ
d
t+2
=βFpˆi
[ ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]−1
µdt+1 +Gµ
d
t+1
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which implies that the coefficients satisfy:
1 + χβ (1− χ)FVˆ + χFpi − (1− χ) σ˜−1Fxˆ = βFpˆi
[ ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]−1
+G
Using the solutions for Fxˆ and FVˆ ((3.70) and (3.71)) in the left hand side and
collecting terms gives:
1 + χ (1− βFdˆ)−
1− χ
σ˜κ
Fpˆi (1− βFdˆ) = βFpˆi
[ ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]−1
+G
which implies that:
Fpˆi =
1 + χ (1− βFdˆ)−G
β
[
ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]−1
+ 1−χ
σ˜κ
(1− βFdˆ)
Equating this to the solution for Fpi in (3.72) gives:
1 + χ (1− βFdˆ)−G
β
[
ω
κΞ
(1− βG) + κ
Ξ
]−1
+ 1−χ
σ˜κ
(1− βFdˆ)
=
1 + χ− (1 + βχ)Fdˆ
β
(
ω
κΞ
(1− βFdˆ) + κΞ
)−1
+ (1− χ) (κσ˜)−1 (1− βFdˆ)
which reveals that
G = Fdˆ
Appendix 3.D Global analysis of stable roots
under time-consistent policy
Figure 3.21 presents an analysis of the h and m functions (solid red and dashed
blue lines respectively) over a broader range for Fpˆi and Fdˆ than considered in the
main text. This demonstrates that, conditional on the values of the other model
parameters, the stable Markov perfect equilibria are unique for the baseline and long
duration values of χ as well as for a case in which the duration of bonds is very short
(χ = 0.5). In the very short duration case, Fdˆ ≈ 0 which suggests that the ‘debt
stabilization bias’ is significant in this case, consistent with the results of Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2013) who analyze a model with one period debt (χ = 0).
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Figure 3.21: Global analysis of Fpˆi and Fdˆ
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Notes: Each panel plots the functions m and h defined by equations (3.22) (dashed blue line) and
(3.23) (solid red line) respectively. Each panel examines a variant of the model for alternative
values f χ: the baseline model (χ = 0.945), the long-duration debt variant (χ = 0.976) and a
variant with very short debt duration (χ = 0.5).
Appendix 3.E Optimal policy under
commitment
The optimal policy problem is:
minE0
∞∑
t=0
βt

1
2
[pˆi2t + ωxˆ
2
t ]− λpit [pˆit − κxˆt − βEtpˆit+1 − ut]
−λxt
[
xˆt − Etxˆt+1 + σ˜
(
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − r∗t
)]
−λdt
[
dˆt − β−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
+ (1− χ) Vˆt − ζ−1g¯t
]
−λVt
[
Vˆt + Rˆt − χβVˆt+1
]

(3.76)
The first order conditions with respect to pˆit, xˆt, dˆt, Vˆt and Rˆt, for t ≥ 1 are:
0 = pˆit − λpit − β−1λdt + β−1βλpit−1 + β−1σ˜λxt−1 (3.77)
0 = ωxˆt + κλ
pi
t − λxt + β−1λxt−1 (3.78)
0 = − λdt + ββ−1Etλdt+1 (3.79)
0 = − λVt + β−1χβλVt−1 (3.80)
0 = − σ˜λxt (3.81)
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and the corresponding first order conditions for t = 0 are:
0 = pˆi0 − λpi0 − β−1λd0 (3.82)
0 = ωxˆ0 + κλ
pi
0 − λx0 (3.83)
0 = − λd0 + ββ−1E0λd1 (3.84)
0 = − λV0 (3.85)
0 = − σ˜λx0 (3.86)
From (3.81) and (3.86), we see that the IS curve is not a binding constraint
(λxt = 0,∀t), so that we can write the system of first order conditions as:
0 = pˆit − λpit − β−1λdt + λpit−1 (3.87)
0 = ωxˆt + κλ
pi
t (3.88)
0 = − λdt + Etλdt+1 (3.89)
0 = − λVt + χλVt−1 (3.90)
Note also that λVt is decoupled from the rest of the system of equations, so the
solution is λVt = χ
tλ0 = 0 where the final equality follows from (3.85). This implies
that the first order conditions can be written as:
pˆit = − ω
κ
(xˆt − xˆt−1) + β−1λdt (3.91)
λdt = Etλdt+1 (3.92)
for t ≥ 1 and the first order condition at t = 0 is
pˆi0 = −ω
κ
xˆ0 + β
−1λd0 (3.93)
For the standard New Keynesian model, the evolution of government debt is not
a constraint on policy, so that λdt = 0,∀t and (3.91) reduces to the familiar textbook
condition: pˆit = −ωκ (xˆt − xˆt−1).
Figure 3.22 shows the responses of the model under optimal commitment (dashed
red lines) alongside the baseline assumption of time-consistent policy (solid black
lines). Under optimal commitment, the policymaker finds it optimal to allow the
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stock of long-term bonds (fourth column) to move permanently, so that the debt
stock is a random walk. This result stems from the fact that the first order condition
for the debt stock implies that λdt = Etλdt+1 (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013).
Figure 3.22: Responses to shocks in baseline model: time-consistent policy and
commitment
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Notes: Impulse responses to shocks to the baseline model with time-consistent monetary policy
(solid black lines) and optimal commitment policy (dashed red lines). The scale of all shocks is
normalized to deliver a 1% response of the output gap in the baseline variant. Policy rate and
long rate plotted in annualized units. All variables are shown in percentage point deviations from
steady state.
These permanent movements in the stock of debt require permanent movements
in the short-term nominal interest rate, the output gap and inflation. This cre-
ates a mechanism through which the policymaker operating under commitment can
dampen near term fluctuations in the output gap and inflation relative to the out-
comes achievable under time-consistent policy (first two columns). However, the
permanent components of the output gap and inflation responses create persistent
welfare losses in the longer term. For example, it is clear that inflation deviations
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are larger under commitment than time-consistent policy, creating an incentive to
deviate from the commitment policy. This illustrates that the commitment policy
in the model is particularly time inconsistent.50
Appendix 3.F Solution of the model accounting
for the lower bound
This appendix details the solution of the model when the presence of the zero lower
bound is accounted for. The algorithm is presented in subsection 3.F.6, with pre-
ceding subsections defining notation and deriving key ingredients required for the
solution.
3.F.1 First order conditions
The constrained loss minimization problem is:
min
1
2
[
pˆi2t + ωxˆ
2
t
]
− µxt
[
xˆt − Etxˆt+1 + σ (1− g)
(
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − r∗t
)]
− µpit [pˆit − κxˆt − βEtpˆit+1 − ut]
− µdt
[
dˆt − β−1
(
dˆt−1 − pˆit
)
+ (1− χ) Vˆt − ζ−1g¯t
]
− µVt
[
Vˆt + Rˆt − χβVˆt+1
]
− µZt
[
Rˆt − β−1 + 1
]
+ βEtL˜t+1
where µZ is the Lagrange multiplier on the zero bound constraint.
50The extent of the time inconsistency depends on the relative losses from pursuing the com-
mitment policy relative to the time-consistent policy. Those losses also depend on the output
gap (with a relatively small weight). Though it is difficult to discern by eye given the scale of
the charts in Figure 3.22, there is a permanent movement in the output gap, which exceeds the
response under time-consistent policy from around period 25 onwards.
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The first order conditions are:
0 = pˆit − µpit − β−1µdt (3.94)
0 = ωxˆt − µxt + κµpit (3.95)
0 = µxt
[
∂Etxˆt+1
∂dˆt
+ σ (1− g) ∂Etpˆit+1
∂dˆt
]
+ βµpit
∂Etpˆit+1
∂dˆt
− µdt + χβµVt
∂EtVˆt+1
∂dˆt
+ β
∂EtL˜t+1
∂dˆt
(3.96)
0 = − (1− χ)µdt − µVt (3.97)
0 = − σ (1− g)µxt − µVt − µZt (3.98)
0 = µZt
(
Rˆt − β−1 + 1
)
(3.99)
where (3.99) is the contemporary slackness condition.
Applying the envelope condition implies that (3.96) can be written as:
0 = µxt
[
∂Etxˆt+1
∂dˆt
+ σ (1− g) ∂Etpˆit+1
∂dˆt
]
+ βµpit
∂Etpˆit+1
∂dˆt
− µdt + χβµVt
∂EtVˆt+1
∂dˆt
+ Etµdt+1
The policy function iteration technique has the following basic structure (the full
algorithm is described below). First, outcomes for each element of the state space are
solved, conditional on guesses for expectations and the derivatives of expectations
with respect to debt. Then these outcomes are used to form a guess for the policy
functions. Those guesses are then used to update the estimates of expectations and
the derivatives of those expectations with respect to government debt. This process
continues until the policy functions converge.
3.F.2 Conditional solutions
To simplify notation, the following conventions are adopted. Time subscripts are
removed, with a prime used to denote outcomes in the following period. Then For
variable z, let partial derivatives be represented as:
Dz ≡ ∂Ez
′
∂dˆ
(3.100)
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Consider first the solution under the assumption that the lower bound does not
bind. We can stack the equations characterizing the equilibrium to give:

0 1 σ˜ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −κ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β−1 0 0 1− χ 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −β−1 −1 0 0 0
0 ω 0 0 0 0 κ −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 βDpˆi Dxˆ + σ˜Dpˆi χβDVˆ 0
0 0 0 0 0 − (1− χ) 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −σ˜ −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M

pˆi
xˆ
Rˆ
Vˆ
dˆ′
µd
µpi
µx
µV
µZ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
=

Exˆ′ + σ˜Epˆi′ + σ˜r∗
βEpˆi′ + u
β−1dˆ
χβEVˆ ′
0
0
−Eµd′
0
0
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
(3.101)
which can be solved for the vector of endogenous variables and Lagrange multipliers
as:
z = M−1C
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In the case in which the zero bound does bind we have:
0 1 σ˜ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −κ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β−1 0 0 1− χ 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −β−1 −1 0 0 0
0 ω 0 0 0 0 κ −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 βDpˆi Dxˆ + σ˜Dpˆi χβDVˆ 0
0 0 0 0 0 − (1− χ) 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −σ˜ −1 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M˜

pˆi
xˆ
Rˆ
Vˆ
dˆ′
µd
µpi
µx
µV
µZ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
=

Exˆ′ + σ˜Epˆi′ + σ˜r∗
βEpˆi′ + u
β−1dˆ
χβEVˆ ′
0
0
−Eµd′
0
0
1− β−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜
(3.102)
which can be solved for the vector of endogenous variables and Lagrange multipliers
as:
z = M˜−1C˜
Note that the differences between M and M˜ and between C and C˜ are isolated
to the bottom row of each matrix.
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3.F.3 State space and policy functions: notation
The description of the algorithm can be simplified by introducing some notation for
the key objects that will be solved for.
The vector of endogenous variables are denoted by z, defined implicitly above,
but explicitly here:
z ≡

pˆi
xˆ
Rˆ
Vˆ
dˆ′
µd
µpi
µx
µV
µZ

The exogenous states are denoted s:
s ≡
[
r∗
u
]
and full state vector for relevant policy functions is, s˜:
s˜ ≡
[
s
dˆ
]
The exogenous state is defined as a set of fixed values for the cost push shock
and natural rate. Specifically, Sr ≡
{
r∗1 . . . r
∗
nr
}
and Su ≡ {u1 . . . unu}. The
transition matrices for the Markov processes are Ωr and Ωu.
The combined (exogenous) state-space is given by S = Su × Sr with transition
matrix Ω = Ωr ⊗ Ωu.51 The endogenous state is dˆ, which is discretized on a grid
51The first nu elements of the state space are {u1, r∗1} , . . . , {unu , r∗1}, followed by
{u1, r∗2} , . . . , {unu , r∗2} and so on.
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Sd ≡
{
dˆ1 . . . dˆnd
}
, with dˆi > dˆi−1, i = 2, . . . , nd. The endogenous state is assumed
to be ordered last. So the full state space is given by S˜ = S × Sd.52 Thus, S˜ is a
ns˜ × 3 matrix, where ns˜ ≡ ns × nd. The index of the element
{
ui, r
∗
j , dˆk
}
∈ S˜ is
(k − 1)× ns + (j − 1)× nu + i.
This implies that the combined state can be written as:
S˜ =

S dˆ11ns
...
...
S dˆnd1ns

where 1ns is a ns × 1 unit vector.
This representation of the state space is useful for subsequent computations since
approximation of expectations requires interpolation between grid points for the
endogenous state, while integrating across the exogenous state S. Similar methods
are used for the estimation of derivatives of expectations.
The objects of interest are policy functions. These are ns˜ × nz matrices. Let a
generic policy function be denoted f .
3.F.4 Expectations
It is useful to define an ‘expectation’ operator that integrates out exogenous state
uncertainty but holds the endogenous state vector constant:
ESf ≡ f¯S ≡

Ω 0 . . . 0 0
0 Ω . . . 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 . . . Ω 0
0 0 . . . 0 Ω

f
so that the ‘bar’ is used as a summary notation for expectations and the S superscript
indicates that the expectation is computed with respect to the exogenous state
variables only.
52Thus the first ns ≡ nu×nr elements are given by the triples
{
u1, r
∗
1 , dˆ1
}
, . . . ,
{
unu , r
∗
nr , dˆ1
}
,
the next ns elements are
{
u1, r
∗
1 , dˆ2
}
, . . . ,
{
unu , r
∗
nr , dˆ2
}
and so on.
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To compute the actual expectation requires conditioning on the solution for dˆ′
at the particular point in the state space. This can be done as follows.
• Extract the relevant column of f that corresponds to debt. Let this column
vector be denoted d. The elements of this vector denote the solutions dˆ′ ∈ z
for each state 1, . . . , ns˜.
• Let the elements of d be denoted dk, k = 1, . . . , ns˜. Let the exogenous state
corresponding to this solution be S<k>. For each k, perform the following:
– Compute the indices in Sd that bracket this element.
53 This gives two
indices i1, i2 ∈ Sd with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 (= i1 + 1) ≤ nd .
– Compute the weights that should apply to each of these gridpoints (using
linear interpolation). This gives φ1 =
dk−Sd(i1)
Sd(i2)−Sd(i1) and φ2 = 1− φ1.
– Compute the indices of the elements of S˜ corresponding to the elements
in S˜ for which (a) S = S<k> and (b) Sd = Sd (i1) and Sd = Sd (i2).
Denote these indices as i˜1 and i˜2.
– Estimate the expectation using linear interpolation as:
f¯k,· = φ1¯fSi˜1,· + φ2¯f
S
i˜2,·
where the subscript ‘j, ·’ denotes the j-th row of a matrix.
The penultimate step (finding i˜1 and i˜2) can be aided by a pre-computation
operation. To see this, recall that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , ns˜}, there is an exogenous
state, S<k>. The indices corresponding to different values of dˆ for the same value of
S<k> are multiples of ns away from from k. This allows us to form a ns˜×nd matrix
of indices – a ‘lookup matrix’, denoted Λ – as follows.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , ns˜}
• Compute j, defined as the index of the grid point dˆ′k within Sp. Recall that dˆ′
is the final (third) state.
• For m = 1, . . . , ns, form the k-th row of Λ as:
Λk,m = k − (j −m)ns
53Extrapolation is conceptually identical, but for the purposes of exposition, I assume that
interpolation is required.
265
3.F. Solution of the model accounting for the lower bound
Then, in the computation of expectations, for each k the indices are found by
setting i˜1 = Λk,i1 and i˜2 = Λk,i2 .
3.F.5 Derivatives
The first order conditions depend on derivatives of expectations of the policy func-
tions. To approximate these derivatives, a two-sided finite difference approach is
used. The derivatives are computed in two steps. In the first step, two-sided fi-
nite difference derivatives of the static expectations are computed, using adjacent
gridpoints for dˆ. In the second step, linear interpolation is used to approximate the
derivatives at the relevant values of d.
The first step is to approximate the derivative of the static expectation function
f¯S. We seek the finite difference approximation to the derivative of f¯S for each row
m = 1, . . . , ns˜. First note that Sd is assumed to be formed of an evenly-spaced grid
of values: Sd =
{
dˆ1 . . . dˆnd
}
, with dˆi+1 = dˆi + hd. So the difference between each
grid point is hd.
Consider an m for which the corresponding element of Sd is dˆi with 1 < i < nd,
that is, an interior point. Then the ‘static derivative’ at point m is given by:
DSm,· =
1
2hd
(¯
fSm+ns,· − f¯Sm−ns,·
)
Now consider the endpoints. For 1 ≤ m ≤ ns, i = 1 and a one-sided difference
is used:
DSm,· =
1
hd
(¯
fSm+ns,· − f¯Sm,·
)
Similarly, for ns˜ − ns + 1 ≤ m ≤ ns˜, i = nd and the one-sided approximation is
given by:
DSm,· =
1
hd
(¯
fSm,· − f¯Sm−ns,·
)
The second step is to form an estimate of the derivative at d using linear inter-
polation. This step is set out in the description of the algorithm below.
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3.F.6 Algorithm
The objective of the algorithm is to solve for the policy function f by iterating
directly on it.
1. Initialize a guess, f<0>, for the policy function f .
2. Build the ‘lookup matrix’, Λ, as described above.
3. For each iteration j = 1, . . .
Update expectations
a) Update the guess for ‘static’ expectations. As described above, this in-
tegrates out exogenous state uncertainty but holds the endogenous state
vector constant:
f¯S<j> =

Ω 0 . . . 0 0
0 Ω . . . 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 . . . Ω 0
0 0 . . . 0 Ω

f<j−1>
b) Extract the vector of d˜′ values, d<j−1> as the relevant column of f<j−1>.
c) Compute the indices and weights of the elements of Sp that bracket the
values in d<j−1>. Use the lookup matrix Λ to convert these into ns˜ × 2
matrices of indicators and interpolation/extrapolation weights, denoted
Υ and Φ respectively.
d) For each m = 1, . . . , ns˜: Compute expectations by extracting interpol-
ation indices [ι1 ι2] = Υm and weights [φ1 φ2] = Φm. Translate the
interpolation weights into S˜ space by setting ι˜1 = Λm,ι1 and ι˜2 = Λm,ι2 .
Now set
f¯m,· = φ1¯f
S<j>
ι˜1,· + φ2¯f
S<j>
ι˜2,·
Update the estimate of the derivative of expectations
e) Update the estimate of the ‘static’ derivatives, DS, as described in 3.F.5.
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f) Compute the derivatives prevailing at d by linear interpolation. For each
m = 1, . . . , ns˜, set:
Dm,· = φ1DSι˜1,· + φ2D
S
ι˜2,·
where the indices ι˜1, ι˜2 and weights φ1, φ2 are the same as in step 3d.
Update the guess for the policy function
g) For each m = 1, . . . , ns˜:
i. Extract latest guesses for expectations and their derivatives:
Ez′ = f¯m,· D = Dm,·
ii. Assume that the zero bound does not bind. Form M and C using
Ez′ and D and solve the system (3.101) as z = M−1C.
iii. Check whether this solution is indeed consistent with a positive in-
terest rate by checking whether the relevant element of z exceeds the
zero bound. If it does, proceed to step 3(g)v, otherwise proceed to
step 3(g)iv.
iv. Compute the solution imposing the lower bound. Form M˜ and C˜
using Ez′ and D and solving (3.102) as z = M˜−1C˜.
v. Load the solutions into the latest guess for the policy function:
f<j>m,· = z
4. Check for convergence. If
∣∣f<j> − f<j−1>∣∣ < ε, set f = f<j> and stop, otherwise
set j = j + 1 and return to step 3.
3.F.7 Practical implementation
Solutions for the policy functions were found using a heuristic iterative procedure.
Before finding the solution, the equilibrium distribution of the endogenous state
variable is unknown. So some iterative experimentation with the end points of the
grid (ie dˆ1 and dˆnd) was required to ensure that the policy functions did not require
extrapolation beyond these points.
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Similarly, some experimentation was required to choose the increment hd between
grid points for dˆ in way that provided a balance between computational efficiency and
accurate computation of the derivatives of expected policy functions. In practice,
the model was solved on a coarse grid for dˆ and the resulting solution used to produce
a guess (using linear interpolation) for the policy function on a finer grid.
Appendix 3.G Optimal monetary policy in the
presence of fiscal uncertainty
This Appendix provides details of the solution algorithm used to analyze scenarios
under fiscal uncertainty.
3.G.1 Structure of uncertainty
There is a state st that may take one ofK+1 distinct values at each date t = 1, . . . , T :
st ∈ S ≡ {s<0>, s<1>, . . . , s<K>}. The subscript < j > is used to denote state j to
clarify that the subscript indicates the state rather than a time period.
State zero (s<0>) is the initial state, or status quo. The process starts in this
state in period 1, so that s1 = s<0>. The remaining K states, {s<j>}Kj=1 are called
‘exit states’.
The transition law between states varies over time. At date t, the transition
matrix is:
Mt =

1−∑Kj=1 pj,t p1,t p2,t . . . pK,t
0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1

for pj,t ≥ 0, ∀j, t and
∑K
j=1 pj,t ≤ 1,∀t > 1.
This implies that, each of the exit states s<j>, j = 1, . . . , K is an absorbing state.
Once the economy has transitioned to that state, it never leaves it.
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The fact that the transition matrix is time-varying makes it possible to incor-
porate differences in the likelihood of switches at different moments in time. For
example, it may be be (credibly) announced that a switch will definitely occur
between periods t1(> 0) and t2(> t1) in which cases the probabilities of switching
outside this date range could be set to zero.
All uncertainty is assumed to be resolved at date T + 1. That requires that∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 = 1, so that in period T + 1 the economy will be in one of the exit
states s<j>, j = 1, . . . , K and will remain in that state forever more. Delivering a
unique date at which uncertainty is resolved requires
∑K
j=1 pj,t < 1, t = 1, . . . , T .
3.G.2 Timing
The timing of events within each period is as follows. At the start of period t, the
state st is revealed to all agents. Then any other shocks that hit the economy are
revealed to all agents. Finally, all agents (the private sector and the policymaker)
make their decisions.
3.G.3 Model structure
The model equations describe the evolution of the endogenous variables (x) and the
policy instruments (r):54
F (st) [Etxt+1 − x¯ (st)] +G (st) [xt − x¯ (st)]
+H (st) [xt−1 − x¯ (st)] +M (st) [rt − r¯ (st)] = Ψ (st) zt
where the coefficient matrices (F,G,H,M,Ψ) are functions of the state st as are
the steady state values of the endogenous variables (x¯) and the policy instrument(s)
(r¯).55 The model is perturbed by exogenous shocks zt which are iid with mean zero
and unit variance.
54It is assumed that r is a vector, so that multiple instruments can be considered.
55It is possible that the structural changes implied by some or all of the final states ({sj}Kj=2)
imply changes in the levels of policy instruments consistent with the policy objectives. For example,
a structural changes that permanently change the efficient rate of interest would likely change the
level of the short-term policy rate consistent with hitting a particular inflation target on average.
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3.G.4 Policymaker behavior
The monetary policymaker sets its policy instrument(s) in a time-consistent manner.
Specifically, the policymaker minimizes a loss function that is assumed to be a
quadratic function of the model variables:
Lt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
(xt+i − x¯ (st+i))′W (xt+i − x¯ (st+i))
+ (rt+i − r¯ (st+i))′Q (rt+i − r¯ (st+i))
]
whereW is a positive semi-definite weighting matrix and a discount factor 0 < β < 1.
The loss function is assumed to depend on the deviations of the endogenous variables
from their long-run levels, which may change over time in response to the underlying
state st. Policy preferences (as encoded in the W matrix and the discount factor β)
are assumed to be invariant to the state st.
3.G.5 Shocks and uncertainty
The object of interest is the set of possible paths that the economy may follow
over the periods t = 1, . . . , T . It is assumed that this object is computed under
the assumption that date-1 uncertainty has been resolved. That is, the solution is
conditional on the following outcomes. First, it has been revealed at the start of
period 1 that a structural change has not occurred. Second, the shocks hitting the
economy in period 1 (z1) have been revealed. So the solutions are conditional on
information (and associated expectations) at date 1.
These assumptions mean that shocks in period 1 are fully observed E1z1 = z1 and
expectations of future shocks are all zero: E1zt = 0,∀t > 1. This precludes analysis
of certain experiments (for example, the revelation in period 1 that a certain shock
will take a particular value in period 10), though some of these experiments could be
undertaken by an appropriate augmentation of the vector of endogenous variables
xt.
The benefit of this approach, of course, is simplicity. For notational convenience,
the expectations operator is omitted unless doing so is likely to cause confusion.
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3.G.6 Solution algorithm
Three of the maintained assumptions mean that equilibrium outcomes can be found
by backward induction.
First, the fact that the policymaker acts under discretion implies that they take
the behavior of future policymakers as given. The second assumption is that each
of the final states is an absorbing state. Once the economy has reached one of these
states, there are no further structural changes. This means that the future evolution
of the endogenous variables in each of these states can be computed using standard
linear quadratic procedures and policy will be characterized by a time-invariant
feedback rule. Finally, we assume that all uncertainty is resolved at a known date,
T+1. This means that from period T+1 onward, there are only K possible states of
nature. Again, each of these states is characterized by a time-invariant model and,
in period T , expected outcomes can be computed by weighting the outcomes from
each state by the respective probabilities of entering that state in period T + 1.56
These observations imply that the object of interest is the equilibrium path
of the economy (and policy) for the case in which the economy stays in state 0
(status quo) until period T . All other outcomes (that is, structural change at any
date u = 1, . . . , T + 1) can be computed by combining the ‘non-exit’ trajectory for
periods t = 1, . . . , u and the relevant exit path from period u+1 onwards. Expected
paths can be computed by probability weighting these paths.
Solutions in each exit state
Suppose that in period 1 < u ≤ T , state s<j>, j ∈ {1, . . . , K} is revealed.57 This
implies that the policymaker at date u solves:
min
ru
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
(xu+i − x¯<j>)′W (xu+i − x¯<j>) + (ru+i − r¯<j>)′Q (ru+i − r¯<j>)
]
(3.103)
56That is, {pj,T+1}Kj=1.
57Note that u is strictly greater than 1 because outcomes are computed conditional on no
structural change in period 1.
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subject to:
F<j> [E1xt+1 − x¯<j>] +G<j> [xt − x¯<j>]
+H<j> [xt−1 − x¯<j>] +M<j> [rt − r¯<j>] = 0
where for notational simplicity we use the < j > subscript to index state-dependent
objects to state < j >, for example:
x¯<j> ≡ x¯ (s<j>)
F<j> ≡ F (s<j>)
and so on. Note that the expectations operator is conditional on date-1 information
and the fact that E1zt = 0 has been used.
This is a standard linear quadratic policy problem and can be solved using a
variety of methods. I use the algorithm developed by Dennis (2007). The solution
has the form:
xt − x¯<j> = B<j> [xt−1 − x¯<j>] (3.104)
rt − r¯<j> = D<j> [xt−1 − x¯<j>] (3.105)
Computing expectations
Recall that the objective is to compute the equilibrium outcomes for the case in
which exit does not occur until period T + 1. For this case, in each period t =
1, . . . , T , all agents understand that the economy may move to the K exit states
with some probability.58
The expected outcome for the endogenous variables conditional on transition to
state s<j> is:
E1 [xt+1|st+1 = s<j>] = x¯<j> +B<j> [xt − x¯<j>]
because E1zt+1 = 0.
58The probability of exit may be zero in some periods t (pj,t = 0, j = 1, . . . ,K) without affecting
the approach to computing the equilibrium.
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This means that the expected outcome is given by:
E1xt+1 =
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1 (x¯<j> +B<j> [x˜t − x¯<j>]) + (1− pt+1) x˜t+1
where the ‘tilde’ is used to denote outcomes in the case where exit does not occur
in a particular period. So x˜t denotes the outcome in period t conditional on exit
not having occurred by date t. The notation pt+1 is used to denote the probability
that exit occurs (to any of the K exit states) in period t+ 1:
pt+1 ≡
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1
Expectations can therefore be written as:
E1xt+1 = Bt+1x˜t + Ct+1 + (1− pt+1) x˜t+1 (3.106)
where
Bt+1 ≡
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1B<j>
Ct+1 ≡
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1 (I−B<j>) x¯<j>
The policy problem
As noted above, the policy problem can be solved recursively by backward induction.
Period T
Consider first the policymaker in date T . The policymaker realizes that a structural
change will occur with certainty in period T+1 (though will, in general, be uncertain
about which of the states will be reached). That is, pT+1 = 1.
The policy problem is then:
min
rT
ET
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
(xT+i − x¯ (sT+i))′W (xT+i − x¯ (sT+i))
+ (rT+i − r¯ (sT+i))′Q (rT+i − r¯ (sT+i))
]
(3.107)
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subject to:
F<0> [BT+1x˜T + CT+1 − x¯<0>] +G<0> [x˜T − x¯<0>]
+H<0> [x˜T−1 − x¯<0>] +M<0> [r˜T − r¯<0>] = 0
where expectations have been eliminated using (3.106) (incorporating the fact that
pT+1 = 1) and denoted the current choice of the policy instruments as r˜T (because
they correspond to choices along the ‘non-exit’ path).
Rearranging gives:
[F<0>BT+1 +G<0>] x˜T + F<0> [CT+1 − x¯<0>]
−G<0>x¯<0> +H<0> [x˜T−1 − x¯<0>] +M<0> [r˜T − r¯<0>] = 0
If G<0> has full rank, then F<0>BT+1 + G<0> should also have full rank. This
implies that:
x˜T =− [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]−1 F<0> [CT+1 − x¯<0>]
+ [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]
−1G<0>x¯<0>
− [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]−1H<0> [x˜T−1 − x¯<0>]
− [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]−1M<0> [r˜T − r¯<0>]
Collecting terms gives:
x˜T = AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T
where:
AT ≡ [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]−1
× [M<0>r¯<0> + (F<0> +G<0> +H<0>) x¯<0> − F<0>CT+1]
BT ≡− [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]−1H<0>
CT ≡− [F<0>BT+1 +G<0>]−1M<0>
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The loss function can be expanded as:
LT ≡
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
(xT+i − x¯ (sT+i))′W (xT+i − x¯ (sT+i))
+ (rT+i − r¯ (sT+i))′Q (rT+i − r¯ (sT+i))
]
= (x˜T − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T − x¯<0>) + (r˜T − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)′
W
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)
+
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)′
Q
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)
(3.108)
Appendix 3.G.8 demonstrates that the loss function (3.108) can be written as:
LT = (x˜T − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T − x¯<0>) + (r˜T − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1 (x˜T − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜T − x¯<j>)
where
V<j> = B
′
<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j> + βB
′
<j>V<j>B<j>
Putting the preceding results together implies that the policy problem can be
written as:
min
r˜T
(AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T − x¯<0>)′W (AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T − x¯<0>)
+ (r˜T − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1
 (AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T − x¯<j>)
′
×V<j>
× (AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T − x¯<j>)

The first order condition with respect to r˜T is:
0 =C ′TW (AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T − x¯<0>) +Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1C ′TV<j> (AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT r˜T − x¯<j>)
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The first order condition can be rearranged to give:
r˜T =FT [C ′TW [AT + BT x˜T−1 − x¯<0>]−Qr¯<0>]
+ βFT
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1C ′TV<j> (AT + BT x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)
where
FT ≡ −
(
Q+ C ′TWCT + β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1C ′TV<j>CT
)−1
This can be expressed more compactly as:
r˜T = R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1
where
R∗T ≡FT
[
C ′TW (AT − x¯<0>)−Qr¯<0> + β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1C ′TV<j> (AT − x¯<j>)
]
D∗T =FT
[
C ′TWBT + β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1C ′TV<j>BT
]
and the asterisk superscript indicates that the coefficients embody the optimal policy
responses in period T .
Plugging the solution for the instrument back into the expression for x˜T gives:
x˜T =AT + BT x˜T−1 + CT [R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1]
=AT + CTR∗T + BT x˜T−1 + CTD∗T x˜T−1
=A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1
where
A∗T ≡AT + CTR∗T
B∗T ≡BT + CTD∗T
and, again, the asterisk indicates that the coefficients embody the optimal policy
responses in period T .
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Period T − 1
Now consider the policy problem at date T −1. The model equations that constrain
the policymaker at date T − 1 can be written as:
F<0> [BT x˜T−1 + CT + (1− pT ) x˜T − x¯<0>] +G<0> [x˜T−1 − x¯<0>]
+H<0> [x˜T−2 − x¯<0>] +M<0> [r˜T−1 − r¯<0>] = 0
which includes outcomes at date T . The results from the analysis of period T can
be applied, so that:
F<0> [BT x˜T−1 + CT + (1− pT ) (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1)− x¯<0>] +G<0> [x˜T−1 − x¯<0>]
+H<0> [x˜T−2 − x¯<0>] +M<0> [r˜T−1 − r¯<0>] = 0
Collecting terms gives:
[F<0> (BT + (1− pT )B∗T ) +G<0>] x˜T−1 + F<0> [CT + (1− pT )A∗T ]
− [F<0> +G<0> +H<0>] x¯<0> −M<0>r¯<0>
+H<0>x˜T−2 +M<0>r˜T−1 = 0
which can be written as:
x˜T−1 = AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1
where:
AT−1 ≡− [F<0> (BT + (1− pT )B∗T ) +G<0>]−1
×
[
F<0> [CT + (1− pT )A∗T ]−M<0>r¯<0>
− [F<0> +G<0> +H<0>] x¯<0>
]
BT−1 ≡− [F<0> (BT + (1− pT )B∗T ) +G<0>]−1H<0>
CT−1 ≡− [F<0> (BT + (1− pT )B∗T ) +G<0>]−1M<0>
The loss function is:
LT−1 ≡
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
(xT−1+i − x¯ (sT−1+i))′W (xT−1+i − x¯ (sT−1+i))
+ (rT−1+i − r¯ (sT−1+i))′Q (rT−1+i − r¯ (sT−1+i))
]
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which can be expanded to give:
LT−1 = (x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T−1 − x¯<0>) + (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+
K∑
j=1
pj,T
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
x<j>T−1+i − x¯<j>
)′
W
(
x<j>T−1+i − x¯<j>
)
+
K∑
j=1
pj,T
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
r<j>T−1+i − r¯<j>
)′
Q
(
r<j>T−1+i − r¯<j>
)
+ β (1− pT )LT
The first three terms of the loss function are isomorphic to those in the loss
function at date T , which means that:
LT−1 = (x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T−1 − x¯<0>) + (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T (x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)
+ β (1− pT )LT
In comparison to period T , the only difference in the loss function is therefore
the fact that the policymaker must account for outcomes in the event that exit does
not occur in period T . The probability of non-exit in period T is (1− pT ) and is
strictly positive (given the assumed structure of uncertainty).
Incorporating optimal responses into the loss function gives:
LT = (x˜T − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T − x¯<0>) + (r˜T − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1 (x˜T − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜T − x¯<j>)
= (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)′W (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)
+ (R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1 − r¯<0>)′Q (R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1 (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)
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With this expression in hand LT−1 can be differentiated with respect to r˜T−1,
taking into account the mapping from r˜T−1 to x˜T−1 implied by the structural equa-
tions (that is x˜T−1 = AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1). Taking the derivative and
setting it equal to zero gives:
0 =C ′T−1W (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1 − x¯<0>) +Q (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,TC ′T−1V<j> (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1 − x¯<j>)
+ β (1− pT )
 (B
∗
TCT−1)′W (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)
+ (D∗TB∗TCT−1)′Q (R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 (B∗TCT−1)′ V<j> (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)

The term x˜T−1 can be eliminated using x˜T−1 = AT−1 +BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1 to
give:
0 =C ′T−1W (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1 − x¯<0>) +Q (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,TC ′T−1V<j> (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1 − x¯<j>)
+ β (1− pT )
×

(B∗TCT−1)′W (A∗T + B∗T (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1)− x¯<0>)
+ (D∗TB∗TCT−1)′Q
(
D∗T (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1)
+R∗T − r¯<0>
)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 (B∗TCT−1)′ V<j>
× (A∗T + B∗T (AT−1 + BT−1x˜T−2 + CT−1r˜T−1)− x¯<j>)

Collecting terms delivers an optimal response function for the instrument:
r˜T−1 = R∗T−1 +D∗T−1x˜T−2
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where
R∗T−1 = FT−1

C ′T−1W (AT−1 − x¯<0>)−Qr¯<0>
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,TC ′T−1V<j> (AT−1 − x¯<j>)
+β (1− pT )× (B
∗
TCT−1)′W (A∗T + B∗TAT−1 − x¯<0>)
− (D∗TB∗TCT−1)′Qr¯<0>
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 (B∗TCT−1)′ V<j> (A∗T + B∗TAT−1 − x¯<j>)


D∗T−1 = FT−1×
C ′T−1WBT−1 + β
∑K
j=1 pj,TC ′T−1V<j>BT−1
+β (1− pT )
×
(
(B∗TCT−1)′WB∗TBT−1 + β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 (B∗TCT−1)′ V<j>B∗TBT−1
)

FT−1 = −

Q+ C ′T−1WCT−1 + β
∑K
j=1 pj,TC ′T−1V<j>CT−1
+β (1− pT )×[
(B∗TCT−1)′WB∗TCT−1 + (D∗TB∗TCT−1)′QD∗TCT−1
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 (B∗TCT−1)′ V<j>B∗TCT−1
]

−1
With the optimal response function for the instrument in hand, the optimal
evolution of x is given by:
x˜T−1 =A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2
where
A∗T−1 ≡AT−1 + CT−1R∗T−1
B∗T−1 ≡BT−1 + CT−1D∗T−1
using the same manipulations as in period T .
Period T − 2
Eliminating expectations from the model equations in period T − 2 gives:
x˜T−2 = AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2
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where:
AT−2 ≡−
[
F<0>
(
BT−1 + (1− pT−1)B∗T−1
)
+G<0>
]−1
×
[
F<0>
[
CT−1 + (1− pT−1)A∗T−1
]−M<0>r¯<0>
− [F<0> +G<0> +H<0>] x¯<0>
]
BT−2 ≡−
[
F<0>
(
BT−1 + (1− pT−1)B∗T−1
)
+G<0>
]−1
H<0>
CT−2 ≡−
[
F<0>
(
BT−1 + (1− pT−1)B∗T−1
)
+G<0>
]−1
M<0>
The loss function is:
LT−2 = (x˜T−2 − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T−2 − x¯<0>) + (r˜T−2 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T−2 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T−1 (x˜T−2 − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜T−2 − x¯<j>)
+ β (1− pT−1)LT−1
Substituting for LT−1 and LT and the optimal policy responses in future periods
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gives:
LT−2 = (AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2 − x¯<0>)′W×
(AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2 − x¯<0>)
+ (r˜T−2 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T−2 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T−1
 (AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2 − x¯<j>)
′
×V<j>×
(AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2 − x¯<j>)

+ β (1− pT−1)

(A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2 − x¯<0>)′
×W×(A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2 − x¯<0>)
+ (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T

(A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2 − x¯<j>)′
×V<j>×(A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2 − x¯<j>)


+ β2 (1− pT−1) (1− pT )×
(A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)′W (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)
+ (R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1 − r¯<0>)′Q (R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1
 (A
∗
T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)′
×V<j>×
(A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)


To differentiate this expression with respect to the instrument r˜T−2, note that
the chain rule and the form of the optimal response functions implies that:
∂x˜T−2
∂r˜T−2
= C ′T−2
∂x˜T−1
∂r˜T−2
=
(B∗T−1CT−2)′
∂r˜T−1
∂r˜T−2
=
(D∗T−1CT−2)′
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The first order condition with respect to r˜T−2 is:
0 = C ′T−2W (AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2 − x¯<0>) +Q (r˜T−2 − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,T−1C ′T−2V<j> (AT−2 + BT−2x˜T−3 + CT−2r˜T−2 − x¯<j>)
+ β (1− pT−1)
×

(B∗T−1CT−2)′W (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2 − x¯<0>)
+
(D∗T−1CT−2)′Q (r˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T
(B∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j> (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1x˜T−2 − x¯<j>)

+ β2 (1− pT−1) (1− pT )
×

(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′W (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<0>)
+
(D∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′Q (R∗T +D∗T x˜T−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1
(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j> (A∗T + B∗T x˜T−1 − x¯<j>)

Collecting terms gives
rT−2 = R∗T−2 +D∗T−2xT−3 (3.109)
where
R∗T−2 = FT−2
[
C ′T−2W (AT−2 − x¯<0>)−Qr¯<0>
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T−1C ′T−2V<j> (AT−2 − x¯<j>)
]
+ β (1− pT−1)FT−2
×

(B∗T−1CT−2)′W (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1AT−2 − x¯<0>)
+
(D∗T−1CT−2)′Q (R∗T−1 +D∗T−1AT−2 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T
(B∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j> (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1AT−2 − x¯<j>)

+ β2 (1− pT−1) (1− pT )FT−2
×

(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′W (A∗T + B∗T (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1AT−2)− x¯<0>)
+
(D∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′Q (R∗T +D∗T (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1AT−2)− r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1

(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′
×V<j>×(A∗T + B∗T (A∗T−1 + B∗T−1AT−2)− x¯<j>)


284
3.G. Optimal monetary policy in the presence of fiscal uncertainty
D∗T−2 = FT−2

C ′T−2WBT−2 + β
∑K
j=1 pj,T−1C ′T−2V<j>BT−2
+β (1− pT−1)
×

(B∗T−1CT−2)′WB∗T−1BT−2
+
(D∗T−1CT−2)′QD∗T−1BT−2
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T
(B∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j>B∗T−1BT−2

+β2 (1− pT−1) (1− pT )
×

(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′WB∗TB∗T−1BT−2
+
(D∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′QD∗TB∗T−1BT−2
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1
(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j>B∗TB∗T−1BT−2


FT−2 = −

C ′T−2WCT−2 +Q+ β
∑K
j=1 pj,T−1C ′T−2V<j>CT−2
+β (1− pT−1)

(B∗T−1CT−2)′WB∗T−1CT−2
+
(D∗T−1CT−2)′QD∗T−1CT−2
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T
(B∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j>B∗T−1CT−2

+β2 (1− pT−1) (1− pT )
×

(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′WB∗TB∗T−1CT−2
+
(D∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′QD∗TB∗T−1CT−2
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1
(B∗TB∗T−1CT−2)′ V<j>B∗TB∗T−1CT−2


−1
Period 1 < t < T
The preceding steps reveal that it is possible to specify an iterative scheme for
computing the optimal response functions at an arbitrary period t. Note that
the matrices characterizing optimal decisions in all future periods s = t + 1, . . . , T
(A∗s,B∗s ,D∗s ,R∗s) will have already been computed in previous steps.
First, construct a variant of the model with expectations substituted out:
x˜t = At + Btx˜t−1 + Ctr˜t
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where:
At =−
[
F<0>
(
Bt+1 + (1− pt+1)B∗t+1
)
+G<0>
]−1
×
[
F<0>
[
Ct+1 + (1− pt+1)A∗t+1
]−M<0>r¯<0>
− [F<0> +G<0> +H<0>] x¯<0>
]
Bt =−
[
F<0>
(
Bt+1 + (1− pt+1)B∗t+1
)
+G<0>
]−1
H<0>
Ct =−
[
F<0>
(
Bt+1 + (1− pt+1)B∗t+1
)
+G<0>
]−1
M<0>
Bt+1 =
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1B<j>
Ct+1 =
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1 (I−B<j>) x¯<j>
pt+1 =
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1
With the aid of the following recursive variables:
Θu =
{
A∗u + B∗uΘu−1 u > t
Au u = t
Γu =
{
B∗uΓu−1 u > t
I u = t
Pu =
{
β (1− pu)Pu−1 u > t
1 u = t
the optimal response function for the instrument(s) can be written as:
r˜t = R∗t +D∗t x˜t−1
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where
R∗t =Ft

C ′tW (At − x¯<0>)−Qr¯<0> + β
∑K
j=1 pj,t+1C ′tV<j> (At − x¯<j>)
+
∑T
u=t+1Pu
 (ΓuCt)
′W (Θu − x¯<0>)
+ (D∗uΓu−1Ct)′Q (R∗u +D∗uΘu−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,u+1 (ΓuCt)′ V<j> (Θu − x¯<j>)


D∗t =Ft
 C
′
tWBt + β
∑K
j=1 pj,t+1C ′tV<j>Bt
+
∑T
u=t+1Pu
[
(ΓuCt)′WΓuBt + (D∗uΓu−1Ct)′QD∗uΓu−1Bt
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,u+1 (ΓuCt)′ V<j>ΓuBt
] 
and
Ft = −
 C
′
tWCt +Q+ β
∑K
j=1 pj,t+1C ′tV<j>Ct
+
∑T
u=t+1Pu
[
(ΓuCt)′WΓuCt + (D∗uΓu−1Ct)′QD∗uΓu−1Ct
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,u+1 (ΓuCt)′ V<j>ΓuCt
] 
−1
With the optimal response function for the instrument in hand, the law of motion
for x˜ is:
x˜t =A∗t + B∗t x˜t−1
where
A∗t ≡At + CtR∗t
B∗t ≡Bt + CtD∗t
Once these optimal response matrices have been computed, the algorithm moves
back to period t− 1 and applies the same steps again.
Period 1
The general approach for computing the optimal responses in period 1 is the same
as for subsequent periods. However, in this case the values of the contemporaneous
shocks may be non-zero. Recall that all solutions are conditional on period 1 in-
formation. That information set contains the fact that a structural change does not
occur in period 1 and the values of the shocks in period 1.
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These considerations imply that the model equations can be written as:
x˜1 = A1 + B1x˜0 + C1r˜1 + Ψ˜z1
where
Ψ˜ =
[
F<0>
(
Bt+1 + (1− pt+1)B∗t+1
)
+G<0>
]−1
Ψ<0>
and that the optimal policy response function satisfies:
r˜1 = R∗1 +D∗1x˜0 + Ωz1
The shocks appear in the structural model equations in the same way as x0 which
implies that:
Ω =F1
 C
′
1W Ψ˜1 + β
∑K
j=1 pj,2C ′1V<j>Ψ˜1
+
∑T
u=2Pu
[
(ΓuC1)′WΓuΨ˜1 + (D∗uΓu−1C1)′QD∗uΓu−1Ψ˜1
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,u+1 (ΓuC1)′ V<j>ΓuΨ˜1
] 
This means that the optimal outcomes in period 1 are given by:
x˜1 = A∗1 + B∗1x˜0 + Φz1
where
Φ = Ψ˜ + C1Ω
3.G.7 Computing expected paths
The procedure outlined above demonstrates how to compute the sequence of optimal
feedback matrices {A∗t ,B∗t ,R∗t ,D∗t }t=1,...,T as well as the optimal responses to shocks
in period 1: Ω and Φ.
With these matrices in hand the path of the economy along the ‘no exit’ case
({x˜t, r˜t}t=1,...,T ) can be computed using the following recursions:
x˜t =
{
A∗1 + B∗1x˜0 + Φz1, t = 1
A∗t + B∗t x˜t−1, t = 2, . . . , T
r˜t =
{
R∗1 +D∗1x˜0 + Ωz1, t = 1
R∗t +D∗t x˜t−1, t = 2, . . . , T
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The trajectory associated with exit to state j at date 1 < t ≤ T is given by:
x˜u =
{
x˜u, u = 1, . . . , t− 1
x¯<j> +B
u−t+1
<j> (x˜u−1 − x¯<j>) , u = t, . . .
r˜u =
{
r˜u, u = 1, . . . , t− 1
r¯<j> +D<j>B
u−t
<j> (x˜u−1 − x¯<j>) , u = t, . . .
The probability of observing exit to state j in period t is given by:
qj,t = pj,t
t−1∏
u=2
(1− pu)
The trajectories for exit at to each state at each date t can therefore be weighted
by their respective probabilities to construct the outcomes expected conditional on
the date 1 information set.
3.G.8 Loss function manipulations
This appendix details some loss function manipulations that work with discoun-
ted sums of future losses. The focus is cases in which exit to a particular state
j ∈ {1, . . . , K} has occurred. Note that exit can only occur in a period t strictly
greater than 1, since the solution is conditional on it being revealed that exit has not
occurred in period 1. Moreover, the solution is conditioned on date-1 expectations,
so the expected values of future shocks are zero.
As noted above, in this case optimal discretionary policy delivers the following
laws of motion for the endogenous variables and instruments:
xt − x¯<j> = B<j> [xt−1 − x¯<j>]
rt − r¯<j> = D<j> [xt−1 − x¯<j>]
for t > 1. Note again that these expressions embody the fact that E1zt = 0.
This implies that, for i ≥ 1:
xt+i − x¯<j> = Bi<j> [xt − x¯<j>]
Similarly,
rt+i − r¯<j> = D<j>Bi−1<j> [xt − x¯<j>]
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Period T loss
The starting point is (3.108):
LT ≡ (x˜T − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T − x¯<0>) + (r˜T − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)′
W
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)
+
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)′
Q
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)
Consider the component of the loss associated with exit to state j ∈ {1, . . . , K}
in period T + 1.
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This is given by.
L<j>T+1 ≡
∞∑
i=1
βi
[ (
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)′
W
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)
+
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)′
Q
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
) ]
=
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)′
W
(
x<j>T+i − x¯<j>
)
+
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)′
Q
(
r<j>T+i − r¯<j>
)
=
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
Bi<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)′
W
(
Bi<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)
+
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
D<j>B
i−1
<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)′
Q
(
D<j>B
i−1
<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)
= β
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)′ [
B′<j>WB<j>
] (
Bi<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)
+ β
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)′ [
D′<j>QD<j>
] (
Bi<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
)
= β [x˜T − x¯<j>]′
( ∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
B′<j>WB<j>
]
Bi<j>
)
[x˜T − x¯<j>]
+ β [x˜T − x¯<j>]′
( ∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
D′<j>QD<j>
]
Bi<j>
)
[x˜T − x¯<j>]
= β [x˜T − x¯<j>]′ V<j> [x˜T − x¯<j>]
where
V<j> ≡
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
B′<j>WB<j>
]
Bi<j>+
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
D′<j>QD<j>
]
Bi<j>
The manipulations to derive the final expression are straightforward. The first
equality splits the expression into two infinite sums. The second uses the laws of
motion for x<j>T+i and r
<j>
T+i to express them in terms of x˜T . The third equality rewrites
the expressions in terms of infinite geometric sums starting from i = 0. The fourth
equality collects terms and the final equality implicitly defines V<j>.
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Note that V<j> can be written as follows:
V<j> =
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
B′<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j>
]
Bi<j>
=
[
B′<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j>
]
+
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
B′<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j>
]
Bi<j>
=
[
B′<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j>
]
+ βB′<j>
{ ∞∑
i=0
βi
(
Bi<j>
)′ [
B′<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j>
]
Bi<j>
}
B<j>
=B′<j>WB<j> +D
′
<j>QD<j> + βB
′
<j>V<j>B<j>
and a fixed point for V<j> can be found numerically, using a doubling algorithm.
59
3.G.9 Internalizing the effects of endogenous probabilities
If the policymaker internalizes the effects of endogenous probabilities then the first
order condition at date t is the sum of two terms:
T∑
s=t
∂Lt
∂x˜t+s
∂x˜t+s
∂rt
∣∣∣∣
pj,s,j=1,...,K,s=t,...,T+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous probabilities
+
T+1∑
s=t
K∑
j=1
∂Lt
∂pj,s
∂pj,s
∂rt
∣∣∣∣
x˜s,s=t,...,T+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability effect
= 0
When probabilities are treated as exogenous by the policymaker the second term
is ignored. So the solution developed in the algorithm presented in Appendix 3.G.6
solves
T∑
s=t
∂Lt
∂x˜t+s
∂x˜t+s
∂rt
∣∣∣∣
pj,s,j=1,...,K,s=t,...,T+1
= 0
In this Appendix, I show how the solution algorithm from Appendix 3.G.6 can
be extended to include the effects of the second ‘probability effect’ term. To do so I
59Validity of the derivation requires that all eigenvalues of B<j> lie within the unit disk, so that
the equilibrium under optimal discretion in each exit state is unique and non-explosive.
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conjecture that the extended solution algorithm will generate a solution of the same
form as that of Appendix 3.G.6, namely:
r˜t = R∗t +D∗t x˜t−1
x˜t =A∗t + B∗t x˜t−1
but with different expressions for the coefficient matrices R∗t ,D∗t ,A∗t ,B∗t . This con-
jecture is verified below and the updated solutions for the coefficient matrices are
derived.
The first objective is to compute the derivative of the loss function with respect
to the effect of the instrument on the switching probabilities, holding the path of
the endogenous variables {x˜}Ts=t fixed. The starting point is to characterize the loss
function.
The loss function
From Appendix 3.G.6, the loss function at date t can be written as:
Lt = (x˜t − x¯<0>)′W (x˜t − x¯<0>) + (r˜t − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜t − r¯<0>)
+ β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1 (x˜t − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜t − x¯<j>)
+ β (1− pt+1)
 (x˜t+1 − x¯<0>)
′W (x˜t+1 − x¯<0>)
+ (r˜t+1 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜t+1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,t+2 (x˜t+1 − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜t+1 − x¯<j>)

+ β2 (1− pt+1) (1− pt+2)×[
(x˜t+2 − x¯<0>)′W (x˜t+2 − x¯<0>) + (r˜t+2 − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜t+2 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+3 (x˜t+2 − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜t+2 − x¯<j>)
]
+ . . .
+ βT−t
T∏
s=t+1
(1− ps)×[
(x˜T − x¯<0>)′W (x˜T − x¯<0>) + (r˜T − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜T − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,T+1 (x˜T − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜T − x¯<j>)
]
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Since the derivative holds {x˜s, r˜s}Ts=t fixed, the loss function can be simplified by
defining:
Wt ≡ (x˜t − x¯<0>)′W (x˜t − x¯<0>) + (r˜t − r¯<0>)′Q (r˜t − r¯<0>)
Vj,t ≡ (x˜t − x¯<j>)′ V<j> (x˜t − x¯<j>)
Using these definitions gives:
Lt = Wt + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1Vj,t + β (1− pt+1)
[
Wt+1 + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+2Vj,t+1
]
+ β2 (1− pt+1) (1− pt+2)
[
Wt+2 + β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+3Vj,t+2
]
+ . . .
+ βT−t
T∏
s=t+1
(1− ps)
[
WT + β
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1Vj,T
]
= Wt + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1Vj,t +
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
qt+s
[
Wt+i + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+i+1Vj,t+i
]
where the definition qt+s ≡ (1− pt+s) is used to simplify notation.
3.G.10 Derivatives
The derivative capturing the ‘probability effect’ is:
Tt ≡ ∂Lt
∂rt
∣∣∣∣
{x˜s}Ts=t
= β
K∑
j=1
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
Vj,t
+
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
∂qt+s
∂rt
[
Wt+i + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+i+1Vj,t+i
]
+
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
qt+sβ
K∑
j=1
∂pj,t+i+1
∂rt
Vj,t+i
which can be written as:
Tt = β
K∑
j=1
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
Vj,t + Tˆ t + β
K∑
j=1
T˜j,t
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where
Tˆ t ≡
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
∂qt+s
∂rt
[
Wt+i + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+i+1Vj,t+i
]
T˜j,t ≡
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
qt+s
∂pj,t+i+1
∂rt
Vj,t+i
These components can each be written recursively, since
Tˆ t =
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
∂qt+s
∂rt
[
Wt+i + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+i+1Vj,t+i
]
= β
∂qt+1
∂rt
[
Wt+1 + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+2Vj,t+1
]
+ β
∂qt+1
∂rt
T−(t+1)∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
∂qt+1+s
∂rt
[
Wt+1+i + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1+i+1Vj,t+1+i
]
= β
∂qt+1
∂rt
[
Wt+1 + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+2Vj,t+1
]
+ β
∂qt+1
∂rt
∂rt+1
∂rt
T−(t+1)∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
∂qt+1+s
∂rt+1
[
Wt+1+i + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1+i+1Vj,t+1+i
]
= β
∂qt+1
∂rt
[
Wt+1 + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+2Vj,t+1
]
+ β
∂qt+1
∂rt
∂rt+1
∂rt
Tˆ t+1
and
T˜j,t =
T−t∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
qt+s
∂pj,t+i+1
∂rt
Vj,t+i
=βqt+1
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
Vj,t+1 + βqt+1
T−(t+1)∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
qt+1+s
∂pj,t+1+i+1
∂rt
Vj,t+1+i
=βqt+1
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
Vj,t+1 + βqt+1∂rt+1
∂rt
T−(t+1)∑
i=1
βi
i∏
s=1
qt+1+s
∂pj,t+1+i+1
∂rt+1
Vj,t+1+i
=βqt+1
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
Vj,t+1 + βqt+1∂rt+1
∂rt
T˜j,t+1
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To compute the derivatives, first note that the functions mapping endogenous
outcomes to probabilities can be written as:
pj,t+1 = fj (Sx˜t)
where S is a 1×nx˜ vector that extracts a linear combination of endogenous variables.
In the experiment considered in Section 3.6.6, for example, it simply selects the
element of x˜ corresponding to the primary surplus.
This means that
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
= f ′j (Sx˜t)S
∂x˜t
∂rt
= f ′j (Sx˜t) (SCt)′
which embodies the equilibrium mapping between x˜t and rt in the same way as the
derivation in Appendix 3.G.6.
As in the derivation in Appendix 3.G.6, the best response functions can be used
to show that:
∂rt+1
∂rt
=
(D∗t+1Ct)′
These results mean that the recursive solutions can be written as:
Tˆ t = β∂qt+1
∂rt
[
Wt+1 + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+2Vj,t+1
]
+ β
∂qt+1
∂rt
(D∗t+1Ct)′ Tˆ t+1
T˜j,t =βqt+1f ′j (Sx˜t) (SCt)′ Vj,t+1 + βqt+1
(D∗t+1Ct)′ T˜j,t+1
where all of the terms on the right hand sides of these expressions can be pre-
computed, including
∂qt+1
∂rt
= −
K∑
j=1
∂pj,t+1
∂rt
= −
K∑
j=1
f ′j (Sx˜t) (SCt)′
Similarly, Tt is given by:
Tt = Tˆ t + β
K∑
j=1
[
f ′j (Sx˜t) (SCt)′ Vj,t + T˜j,t
]
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The steps above show that it is possible to compute Tt by a backward recursion
starting from TT . Since all uncertainty is resolved in period T + 1, qT+1 = 0, which
implies that Tj,T = 0, j = 1, . . . , K. The same observation implies that ∂qT+1∂rT = 0,
so that Tˆ T = 0.60
3.G.11 Adjusting the solution algorithm to incorporate Tt
The previous steps have shown how to compute Tt recursively using expressions
that can be easily evaluated, conditional on sequences for {x˜t, r˜t}Tt=1, probabilities
{pj,t}Tt=1 , j = 1, . . . , K and solution matrices {D∗t , Ct}Tt=1.
The solution algorithm in Appendix 3.G.6 solves for optimal response functions
by setting the ‘exogenous probabilities’ derivative to zero, ignoring the probability
effect (Tt). The effect of the probability effect can be incorporated by adjusting the
first order condition as follows:
T∑
s=t
∂Lt
∂x˜t+s
∂x˜t+s
∂rt
∣∣∣∣
pj,s,j=1,...,K,s=t,...,T+1
+ Tt = 0
Appendix 3.G.6 derives the first term on the left hand side, so the probability
effect can be incorporated by setting that expression plus Tt equal to zero. Inspection
of the first order conditions in Appendix 3.G.6 reveals that doing this leads to Tt
being incorporated into the ‘levels’ adjustment coefficient R∗t . The intuition for
this is that the probability effect is computed conditional on the future solution
trajectory and is therefore not a function of x˜t−1 (which is also the case for the
other components of R∗t ).
Specifically, to incorporate the probability effect, the solution for R∗t must be
60The fact that qT+1 = 0 means that the sum of the marginal effects of rT on the probabilities
pj,T+1 must be zero to ensure that qT+1 = 0 is satisfied for all possible realizations of rT .
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adjusted to:
R∗t = Ft

Tt + C ′tW (At − x¯<0>)−Qr¯<0>
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,t+1C ′tV<j> (At − x¯<j>)
+
∑T
u=t+1Pu× (ΓuCt)
′W (Θu − x¯<0>)
+ (D∗uΓu−1Ct)′Q (R∗u +D∗uΘu−1 − r¯<0>)
+β
∑K
j=1 pj,u+1 (ΓuCt)′ V<j> (Θu − x¯<j>)


(3.110)
3.G.12 The modified solution algorithm
The preceding steps have shown how to characterize the solution in which the poli-
cymaker internalizes the effects of their actions on future switching probabilities.
However, the non-linearity of the relationships required to compute Tt complicate
simultaneous solution of equation (3.110) and Tt. That is, equation (3.110) involves
non-linear functions of the solution trajectories {x˜t, r˜t}Tt=1 which are themselves func-
tions of R∗t .
For this reason an iterative approach is adopted. The algorithm as follows:
1. Initialize a guess for {Tt}Tt=1 and probabilities {pj,t}Tt=1, j = 1, . . . , K.
2. Solve for best response matrices {R∗t ,D∗t ,A∗t ,B∗t }Tt=1 using the algorithm in
Appendix 3.G.6, but with R∗t computed using (3.110).
3. Compute the solution trajectories {x˜t, r˜t}Tt=1 using the method in Appendix
3.G.7.
4. Update the guess for {Tt}Tt=1 using the steps in Appendix 3.G.10.
5. Update the sequence of probabilities, {pj,t = fj (Sx˜t−1)}Tt=1, j = 1, . . . , K.
6. If the guesses for {Tt}Tt=1 and probabilities {pj,t}Tt=1, j = 1, . . . , K are suffi-
ciently close to the previous guesses, stop. Otherwise return to step 2.
In practice, the feedback between the updating the probabilities {pj,t}Tt=1 and
{Tt}Tt=1 can be powerful, so applying damping to the updating steps may be required.
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3.G.13 Expected loss computations
The loss function manipulations in Appendix 3.G.9 can be used to construct a
recursive representation for the expected loss in period t conditional on not having
switched to the active fiscal rule by that date.
Let this loss be denoted L˜t. The results from Appendix 3.G.9 reveal that:
L˜t =Wt + β
K∑
j=1
pj,t+1Vj,t + β (1− pt+1) L˜t+1
which can be computed as a backward recursion from T noting that
L˜T+1 =
K∑
j=1
pj,T+1Vj,T
Note that, since there is no uncertainty over the fiscal regime in period 1, L˜1
represents the unconditional expected loss in period 1.
3.G.14 Simulation to study time consistency
This Appendix provides details of the simulation used to explore the effects of time
inconsistency in Section 3.6.7.
I use the same notation as above. However, to simplify the exposition, I ignore
the ‘< 0 >’ subscript on the model solution matrices for the baseline model (with
passive fiscal policy). Since the steady states x¯ and r¯ are the same for all model
variants, these are normalized to zero.
The model structure is given by:
FEtxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt−1 +Mrt = Ψzt
In period 1, we have:
FE1x2 +Gx1 +Hx0 +Mr1 = 0
since there are no shocks in period 1.
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If in period 1 the policymaker sets the policy rate at the level that would be
appropriate if all agents ignored the risk, then r1 = 0. If we further suppose that the
private sector recognizes that future policymakers will be have in a time consistent
manner, then expectations are given by:
E1x2 =
K∑
j=1
pj,2B<j>x1 + (1− pt+1) x˜2
Putting these observations together implies that:
F
K∑
j=1
pj,2B<j>x1 + (1− pt+1)Fx˜2 +Gx1 +Hx0 = 0
so that:
x1 = −
[
G+ F
K∑
j=1
pj,2B<j>
]−1
[(1− p2)Fx˜2 +Hx0] (3.111)
The solution for x˜2 is obtained by using the solution algorithm for time-consistent
monetary policy, with initial conditions given by x1. Thus, since x˜2 depends on x1,
an iterative procedure is required.
The solution algorithm therefore follows these steps:
1. Construct a guess for x1.
2. Solve for x˜t, t = 2, . . . , T using the algorithm in Appendix 3.G.11, with initial
conditions given by x1.
3. Update the guess for x1 by:
a) Computing {pj,2}Kj=1 using the endogenous mapping from x1 to a prob-
ability of a switch to active fiscal policy in period 2.
b) Solve for x1 using (3.111).
4. If the latest guess for x1 is sufficiently close to the previous guess, stop. Oth-
erwise return to Step 2.
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Conclusion
This thesis has explored a number of questions regarding the effects of monetary
and fiscal policies, and their optimal conduct, in the presence of a lower bound
on the short-term interest rate. Here I bring together the key contributions of my
work, consider the implications for policy and discuss possible extensions that may
be considered in future work.
Key contributions
My research has uncovered several new results.
Chapter 1 contains the first analysis of optimal quantitative easing (QE) in a
stochastic model containing the portfolio balance mechanism, through which most
monetary policymakers believe QE works. The predictions of the model broadly
match the actual behavior of monetary policymakers in the United States and the
United Kingdom in response to the financial crisis.
However, the model predicts that QE should start to be unwound before the
short-term policy rate rises from the lower bound. In practice, policymakers have
preferred to delay QE unwind until after the short-term interest rate has risen above
the lower bound. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed in Chapter 1
and prompt some ideas for further research, discussed below.
Chapter 2 demonstrates that recent findings that money-financed government
spending has large macroeconomic effects (Gal´ı, 2014a) are driven by the implica-
tions of monetary financing for the implicit rule for the short-term nominal interest
rate, rather than the nature of financing per se. While other research (English
et al., 2017, undertaken concurrently with Chapter 2) finds the same result, I further
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demonstrate that a rule that finances government spending using money creation
may perform very poorly in response to other (non-fiscal) shocks.
These insights prompt an analysis of money-financed transfers in a setting that
breaks the conventional duality between interest rate rules and money supply rules.
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze monetary financing in a frame-
work in which monetary transfers can be regarded as an independent policy instru-
ment. That is achieved by assuming that money may earn interest and that a simple
financial friction causes households to regard government liabilities as net wealth.
In this setting, simulations suggest that money-financed transfers could have sizable
expansionary effects at the zero bound. However, the scale of the transfer required to
deliver a substantial increase in spending may need to be extremely large. Moreover,
robustness analysis shows that the responses to money-financed transfers are highly
sensitive to the nature of the frictions giving rise to a demand for money.
Chapter 3 contains several insights into the interplay between fiscal policy and
optimal time-consistent monetary policy. The analytical results deepen our under-
standing of the ‘debt stabilization bias’ (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013; Leeper and
Leith, 2016). While similar results have been found in concurrent research using
richer models (for example Leeper et al., 2019), the simplicity of the model used in
Chapter 3 highlights the crucial role of the duration of government debt.
Another insight is that the constraints placed on monetary policy behavior by
active fiscal policy may deliver welfare benefits in some situations. In particular,
active fiscal policy generates the expectation of higher future inflation following a
recessionary shock that raises the real value of debt. This effect can help to stabilize
the economy when it encounters the zero bound. If the duration of government debt
is long enough, the improved stabilization at the zero bound may offset the welfare
costs of imperfect stabilization in normal times, a new and striking result.
Chapter 3 also develops a new solution algorithm to analyze the implications of
a risk of a permanent switch in fiscal policy behavior. The results of that analysis
suggest that a time-consistent monetary policymaker may optimally accommodate
the inflationary effects of the risk of a switch to active fiscal policy. More broadly,
the solution algorithm can be easily applied to a range of other applications in which
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policymakers face the risk of a permanent (or highly persistent) structural change
(for example, changes in trade policies, the arrival of a financial crisis).
Policy implications
Even though the models used in this thesis are stylized, the results provide some
potential lessons for policymakers. At the very least, they raise possible questions
for further research (some of which are discussed below).
The results of Chapter 1 suggest that policymakers should pay close attention
to the evolution of the government debt stock (and its maturity structure) if QE
operates through a portfolio balance mechanism. Changes in government debt issu-
ance and maturity structure could have at least as much influence on the monetary
policy stance as asset purchases or sales, as Figure 1.1 suggests may have been the
case in the United Kingdom.
Moreover if the ‘flow effects’ of QE are as powerful as estimated in Chapter 1, it
is important to unwind QE in good time for the next encounter with the zero bound,
in order to restore firepower. In particular, the model suggests that permanently
holding a sizable portion of long term debt on the central bank balance sheet will
hamper the ability to respond to future zero bound episodes and may therefore
reduce welfare.
The results of Chapter 2 suggest that macroeconomic policymakers were prob-
ably right not to use monetary financing as a stimulus measure in the aftermath of
the financial crisis. According to the model I use, generating a moderate amount
of stimulus would have required unprecedentedly large transfers to households.
Moreover, the results are sensitive to alternative specifications of the frictions that
give rise to a demand for money. Overall, the results do not suggest that there is any
particular benefit to monetary financing relative to debt financing (which is better
understood).
The results of Chapter 3 show that monetary policymakers should pay attention
to government debt dynamics and debt sustainability. Even a relatively small risk
of a move to active fiscal policy could have an economically meaningful effect on
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longer-term inflation expectations. Such movements in inflation expectations will,
in general, make it more difficult for a monetary policymaker to achieve a flexible
inflation targeting mandate.
More broadly, the finding that active fiscal policy may help monetary policy-
makers to stabilize the economy at the zero bound has implications for the design
of macroeconomic policy frameworks. In particular, policymakers may wish to con-
sider the extent to which policy frameworks can be designed to incorporate explicit
shifts in the roles of fiscal and monetary policy behaviors in the vicinity of the zero
lower bound.
Avenues for future work
The investigations in Chapters 1–3 adopt a common approach. In each case I start
from a simple, textbook, model and introduce the minimal additional features re-
quired to study the question of interest. This approach is motivated by the fact
that many key results in monetary economics are based on the textbook model,
presented by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) as the foundation of the ‘science’ of
monetary policy. It helps to isolate the effects of additional features and compare
the results with a well-known benchmark. In some cases, it permits the derivation
of analytical results.
It would, however, be interesting to explore the robustness of my findings in
richer settings. Some of the most promising extensions are discussed below.
Even a decade after the introduction of quantitative easing, Bernanke’s remark
that QE works in practice but not in theory has some force. The results of Chapter 1
depend on the particular transmission mechanism through which QE is assumed to
operate. It would be useful to compare the optimal policy prescriptions with models
containing alternative transmission mechanisms through which QE may operate.
Some results based on alternative theories of QE are indeed starting to emerge (for
example Bhattarai et al., 2015; Carlstrom et al., 2017; Cui and Sterk, 2018).
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More ambitiously, it would be instructive to analyze optimal policy in the pres-
ence of uncertainty over the transmission channel of QE. This uncertainty was per-
vasive at the inception of the policy (Benford et al., 2009). A particular aspect of
the uncertainty relates to the observation that the effects of QE may be state con-
tingent, in particular that the effects on asset prices (and hence the macroeconomy)
may depend on the extent to which financial markets are disrupted (Joyce et al.,
2011, Figure 8). Incorporating such effects would be a valuable addition to the
literature.
As noted in Section 2.6.1, the analysis of Chapter 2 abstracts from banks and the
banking system more generally. Interpreting the results in terms of the implications
for a financial system underpinned by interest-bearing reserves would be a useful
extension, requiring a more fully articulated treatment of the financial system.
The results of Chapter 2 also imply that there is no particular reason to favor
monetary financing over debt financing. A richer assessment of this issue might
usefully incorporate portfolio frictions along the lines of Chapter 1. Such a model
would provide a richer framework for a cost-benefit assessment of alternative mon-
etary policy tools.
As observed in Section 3.3.7, the duration of UK government debt is much longer
than other advanced economies. One may be tempted to infer that the implications
of active fiscal policy in the United Kingdom could be approximated by the ‘long
duration’ variant of the model studied in Chapter 3. However, that model abstracts
from two other important features of the UK economy: a flexible exchange rate
and the substantial fraction of government debt that is index linked. The first
feature provides a mechanism through which price level movements can be achieved
relatively rapidly through large movements in the exchange rate. The second implies
that a portion of the government debt stock cannot be revalued by changes in the
path of the price level. Assessing the net effects of these competing channels in a
richer model would be an interesting exercise.
Combining elements of the analysis of fiscal risks and the presence of the zero
lower bound may produce some important insights. This would permit an analysis
of whether it would be beneficial for fiscal policy to become temporarily active when
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the economy encounters the lower bound. If the expected duration of the active
fiscal policy regime was long enough, it may raise inflation expectations enough to
mitigate the deflationary effects of the lower bound. Moreover, if fiscal policy was
ultimately expected to switch back to a passive regime, output and inflation may
also be better stabilized when away from the zero bound.
In general, it would be interesting to explore how the conclusions of my research
change when a richer menu of fiscal policy options is available. Studying jointly
optimal monetary and fiscal policies could be productive in several ways. The port-
folio balance mechanism embedded in the model of Chapter 1 implies a key role
for the government debt stock (and maturity structure) in determining the policy
stance. But in that model, government debt and the maturity structure of issuance
are held fixed for simplicity. A simplification in Chapter 3 is the assumption that
taxes are lump sum and fiscal policy operates according to a simple rule. Relaxing
these assumptions and assuming that fiscal policy also acts optimally could be an
fruitful avenue for future research.
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